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l)CONTEXT EFFECTS IN VALUATION, JUDGMENT AND CHOICE 
A NEUROSCIENTIFIC APPROACH
It is well known that our choices and judgments depend on the context. For instance,
prior experiences can influence subsequent decisions. People tend to make riskier decisions
if they have a chance to win back a previous loss or if they can gamble with previously
won money. Another example of context is social environment. People often change their
judgments to conform to observed group behavior. Since the reasons driving such context
effects are less clear, this dissertation explores the mechanisms behind behavioral patterns
with the help of a modern neuroscience technique, functional magnetic resonance imaging.
The dissertation concentrates particularly on choice and judgment in risky and in social
settings. It consists of three parts. The first part provides a primer on the methodology of
neuroeconomics and a synthesis of the body of knowledge on the brain mechanisms of
valuation and choice. The second part investigates risk behavior in sequential choice situa -
tions. The findings suggest that decision makers tend to take excessive risk after both
wins and losses, due to increasing affective arousal and decreasing control. The third part
of this dissertation focuses on the influence of social context on judgment. Results
indicate that people automatically learn to behave as others do—being different from
others is processed in the brain in a similar way to behavioral errors. This indicates the
great power of relevant social groups in influencing our behavior. Overall, this dissertation
highlights the reasons behind context dependency and demonstrates the power of modern
neuroscientific methods for understanding economic behavior.
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
Neuroeconomics emerged during the last decade as a new interdisciplinary field 
that aims to facilitate a profound understanding of decision-making processes 
through the integration of knowledge and insight from the disciplines of 
economics, psychology and neuroscience. To date, various aspects of decision 
making have been studied as part of the neuroeconomics discipline, ranging from 
risk and valuation to intertemporal choice and social decision making. In addition 
to the emergence of neuroeconomics, the prospect of using neuroscientific tools to 
understand human decision behavior has also garnered attention in the field of 
marketing. This research area, known as consumer neuroscience or 
neuromarketing (Smidts, 2002), is closely related to the broad range of research 
interests in neuroeconomics. The resulting work is often published and presented 
in similar forums to neuroeconomic experiments. Both neuroeconomic and 
neuromarketing research are also generally referred to as decision neuroscience 
(Sanfey, 2007; Shiv et al., 2005). 
Both neuroeconomics and neuromarketing have investigated the neuronal 
networks related to valuation and choice behavior1. Research themes in 
neuromarketing have for instance included the evaluation of TV commercials 
(Ambler, Ioannides, & Rose, 2000; Astolfi et al., 2008; Rossiter, Silberstein, Harris, 
& Nield, 2001), processes related to brand perception (Schaefer, 2009; Yoon, 
Gutchess, Feinberg, & Polk, 2006), trade-off difficulty (Hedgcock & Rao, 2009), 
salesperson’s interpersonal mentalizing skills (Dietvorst et al., 2009), and the 
effectiveness of celebrities in advertising and persuasion (Klucharev, Smidts, & 
Fernandez, 2008; Stallen et al., 2010). Broadly speaking, two different research 
perspectives can be taken in addressing neuromarketing topics (Ariely & Berns, 
2010; Smidts, 2002): 
                                                          
1 For a detailed review, please see Chapter 2. 
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1. Theory generating and theory testing using tools from 
neuroimaging. The goal is to increase process-level 
understanding of consumer behavior. 
2. Gathering information on the quality of the marketing stimulus 
and predicting consumer choices by means of neuroimaging. 
This ‘stimulus-centered approach’ aims at providing reliable 
information above and beyond regular methods of marketing 
research, improving for instance the design of packages, 
effectiveness of commercials and quality of products.   
Until recently the largest part of the literature has concentrated on understanding 
the processes underlying consumer behavior. For instance, neuromarketing has 
studied why context variables influence the hedonic experience of goods. One 
experiment indicates that brand information can influence the consumption 
experience by higher level processes related to retrieval of brand information from 
memory (McClure et al., 2004). In contrast, another study found that the price of 
wines directly modulates the activity in a brain area related to hedonic experience, 
integrating the low-level sensory taste perception with flavor expectancy based on 
price information (Plassmann, O'Doherty, Shiv, & Rangel, 2008). Interestingly, 
these valuation areas have also been found to correlate with later purchase 
behavior and willingness to pay for goods (Knutson, Rick, Wimmer, Prelec, & 
Loewenstein, 2007; Plassmann, O'Doherty, & Rangel, 2007), which indicates the 
potential for the second, marketing stimulus-based approach.  
Recently, the marketing stimulus-centered approach has gained more 
attention in the literature. As already mentioned above, neuronal activations to 
product displays correlate with the future purchase behavior (Knutson, et al., 
2007). A recent study indicates further that neuronal responses to products predict 
future willingness-to-purchase to a similar degree, irrespective of whether 
consumers pay attention on the product displays or not (Tusche, Bode, & Haynes, 
2010). In another example, the brain signals evoked by anti-smoking ads have 
been reported to improve the prediction of future reductions in smoking above 
and beyond traditional self-report measures (Falk, Berkman, Whalen, & 
Lieberman, 2011). Another study indicates that the self-related processing 
Introduction 3 
 
occurring in the brain during personally tailored anti-smoking messages predicts 
smoking cessation four months later (Chua et al., 2011).   
Neuroeconomics and neuromarketing have attracted attention both 
among academics and the general public. The academic interest is indicated by the 
emergence and expansion of the Society of Neuroeconomics and the Association 
of NeuroPsychoEconomics and the active participation of researchers in annual 
conferences arranged by these two societies. Furthermore, the academic 
community is actively publishing articles in neuroeconomics and neuromarketing. 
By the end of 2010 there were 44 hits in the Web of Science® search engine2 for 
review articles in neuroeconomics3. The number of publications in 
neuromarketing4 at that time was lower, with one review article and 26 other 
types of reports. However, the field of neuromarketing does not have such a well-
established standing and terminology as neuroeconomics does and thus the terms 
used in the search are less likely to be included in the reports that could be 
considered a part of neuromarketing. Both neuroeconomic and neuromarketing 
research have also been widely discussed in the popular press and on internet 
forums. Most notably, neuroeconomics and neuromarketing have inspired the 
authors of such books as “Decisions, Uncertainty, and the Brain: The Science of 
Neuroeconomics” and “Foundations of Neuroeconomic Analysis” by Paul W. 
Glimcher (Glimcher, 2003, 2011), a pioneering researcher in neuroeconomics, and 
the best-seller “Buyology” (Lindstrom, 2008), which introduced neuromarketing 
to the general audience.  
The emergence of neuromarketing has also attracted commercial interest 
which led to the introduction of neuromarketing consulting firms already at the 
early stage of academic research (Harrison, 2008). Intriguingly, using 
neuroimaging methods as a marketing tool was patented in the United States as 
early as in 2000 (Zaltman & Kosslyn, 2000), which was four years before the 
publication of the first widely acknowledged neuromarketing study which 
compared preference formations in relation to two common beverages, Coca-Cola 
and Pepsi (McClure, et al., 2004). The Nielsen Company recently acquired 
                                                          
2The search engine is available at www.isiknowledge.com. The following data bases were 
used: Science Citation Index Expanded from 1945 onwards and Social Sciences Citation 
Index from 1956 onwards. 
3 Searching for ‘neuroeconomics’ or ‘neuroeconomic’ in the title, abstract or keywords. 
4 Searching for ‘neuromarketing’ or ‘consumer neuroscience’ in the title, abstract or 
keywords. 
4 Chapter 1 
 
NeuroFocus Inc., the market leader in neuromarketing-driven consumer research, 
indicating the great commercial interest in the use of neuroscientific tools in 
marketing research (Nielsen Holdings, 2011). Also in the Netherlands the first 
neuroeconomic research and consulting company, Neurensics, recently started 
providing its services (Neurensics, 2011).   
Neuroeconomics and neuromarketing have also faced opposition and 
criticism. For instance, neuroeconomics has been criticized for hiding the lack of 
new (economic) insights by story-telling, for attempts to falsify economic theories 
by using inappropriate measures5 and for insufficient data analysis methods (Gul 
& Pesendorfer, 2008; Harrison, 2008). Some of these highlighted problems arise 
from an initial brain-centered approach of neuroeconomic studies, which was 
adopted to increase the understanding of the neural architecture related to 
decision making. To a large extent, neuroscientific methods do still hold promise 
for economics and that may be realized with continuing method development and 
more careful consideration of research questions (Clithero, Tankersley, & Huettel, 
2008; Harrison, 2008). In addition, the emergence of neuromarketing has come 
paired with debate on the ethical aspects, including consumer privacy rights and 
free will and also the use and storage of personal medical data (Ariely & Berns, 
2010; Fisher, Chin, & Klitzman, 2010; Murphy, Illes, & Reiner, 2008; Wilson, 
Gaines, & Hill, 2008). Some of this debate reflects science-fiction-like future 
scenarios where ‘mind reading’ is possible inconspicuously in everyday market 
situations as well as in the controlled laboratory environments used in current 
neuromarketing research. In addition to the academic debate on the usability of 
neuroimaging tools, there are also concerns that companies specialized in 
commercial applications of neuromarketing might be offering excessively high 
hopes to their clients at this early stage of academic research (Ariely & Berns, 2010; 
Fisher, et al., 2010). In 2010 these concerns led to the launch of a 
“NeuroStandards” project by the Advertising Research Foundation (ARF). 
Preliminary findings indicate that the quality of research varies between vendors 
and that further scientific development is necessary. The ARF concludes that the 
current neuromarketing methods can provide additional insights but do not 
replace the traditional research tools (Advertising Research Foundation, 2011).      
                                                          
5 The argument against neuroeconomics is that economic models do not make predictions 
about neural processes and thus brain imaging data cannot support nor refute the models. 
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This doctoral dissertation uses neuroscientific methods to investigate 
processes related to consumer decision making and judgment. The aim of this 
dissertation is to apply neuroscientific research methods to gain a better 
understanding of how prior experiences and social environment influence current 
choices and judgments. The dissertation contributes to the literature by 
highlighting the biological mechanisms that link prior experiences to current 
actions and social environment to judgment, which potentially informs future 
behavioral experiments and models of sequential choice and judgment. In the 
context of the present topic, the dissertation also discusses the previously stated 
concerns regarding neuroeconomics and neuromarketing. The next section 
introduces the research questions asked in the dissertation and after that this 
chapter concludes with an outline for the rest of the dissertation.   
1.1. Research Questions 
Imagine a woman who joins a group of friends for a night out at a local casino, but 
who has no intention of spending any money gambling. Rather than being drawn 
by the game play, she is motivated by the prospect of spending a relaxing evening 
with friends. Upon entering the casino, she experiences the uncomfortable feeling 
of being different from those around her: everyone else seems to be gambling. She 
finally relents, decides to join in and starts playing cautiously with small monetary 
bets. She enjoys a run of luck at first, which encourages her to take more risk by 
increasing her bets. After all, she has just won and, consequently, has ‘extra 
money’ to spend that she didn’t have at first. Over the course of the evening, she 
realizes that she has lost more money than she has won. In an attempt to get back 
to break-even, she chooses a game that offers the prospect of recouping all her 
losses. In doing so, she fails to recognize that this game involves more risk than 
she was willing to take earlier.  
Consumers make their judgments and choices often as a part of a 
sequence of events. In the example scenario, the actions of the consumer are 
motivated and reasoned on the basis of the surrounding environment and past 
events. First, she changes her mind about spending money on gambling after 
observing the behavior of others, then increases her bets ‘because she previously 
won some extra money’ and finally attempts to recoup her losses by increasing the 
level of risk she takes on. Most research efforts have, however, been directed to 
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consumer decision-making processes in isolated situations, both behaviorally and 
in neuroscience studies. Thus, this dissertation addresses the general question: 
How do social or financial experiences influence future judgments and 
choices? 
This general question is addressed in two different contexts. First, path 
dependence in choice is investigated in the context of risky decision making. As 
described in the example scenario above, in certain situations consumers’ risk 
appetite may fluctuate as a function of prior outcomes. The dissertation tests 
whether these changes in risk appetite are driven by modulations in the affective 
and deliberative processes that are evoked by prior gain and loss experiences.  
Are path-dependent behavioral adjustments in risky choice underlined by 
affect or cognitive deliberation?  
In addition to the above dual-process hypothesis on path dependence, the 
dissertation also considers another possible explanation for the path dependence 
in risky choice. In detail, the dissertation questions whether past lotteries function 
as a frame of reference for the evaluation of subsequent lotteries. If the valuation 
of the latter lotteries depends on the preceding ones, this naturally also modifies 
the perception of the general choice problem. Thus, the dissertation addresses the 
question whether prospects are valued in respect to the previous states instead of 
in absolute terms. 
Is valuation of risky prospects done relatively to past states or in an absolute 
manner? 
Second, the dissertation investigates how experiences in the social environment 
influence subsequent judgments. In other words, we study the mechanisms of 
social conformity that is illustrated in the example by the consumer’s willingness 
to change her opinion towards gambling after she had observed the gambling 
behavior of others. Specifically we ask whether conformity to the previously 
observed group opinion is driven by similar brain mechanisms to those operating 
in basic trial-and-error learning.  
Is social conformity driven by basic learning mechanisms? 
Introduction 7 
 
This dissertation does not only study the dependencies between past financial and 
social events and the subsequent behavioral patterns but its main goal is to study 
the mechanisms that lead to the observed behaviors. This interest is motivated by 
the idea that mechanism-level information can inform future development of 
effective and efficient interventions for such contextual effects. The dissertation 
explores the cognitive processes that contribute to path dependence in choice and 
environmental influence on judgments. In detail, the dissertation investigates 
whether the changes in choice behavior are driven by affect and cognitive 
deliberation and how judgments are influenced by basic learning mechanisms. 
The questions are investigated using an exploratory, neuroscientific approach. The 
idea is to test process-level hypotheses by recording brain activation while 
consumers are performing decision or judgment tasks.  
1.2. Outline 
This dissertation is divided into three parts. The first part introduces relevant 
background theory and methods in neuroeconomics. Chapter 2 gives a general 
overview of the field and its methods. The main body of the chapter concentrates 
on brain mechanisms that are related to valuation and decision making. Chapter 3 
elaborates on the details of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). fMRI is 
currently the most common method in neuroeconomic research and it is also used 
in the experiments of this dissertation. This chapter has two goals. First, it aims to 
give a short introduction to the basics of the method for those readers who are not 
familiar with fMRI. Second, it discusses the limitations and advantages of using 
fMRI as a research tool in neuroeconomics and elaborates on the additional value 
that fMRI can provide above other methods in neuroscience and behavioral 
economics. 
The second part presents an fMRI data set that explores path dependence 
and valuation in risky choice. Chapter 4 investigates the brain mechanisms that 
underlie increasing risk appetite after both previously experienced gains and 
losses. In detail, we use neuroimaging tools to test the hypothesis that gains and 
losses increase affective processing and decrease deliberative brain networks, and 
that the modulations in these two mechanisms drive the changes in risk appetite. 
Chapter 5 looks at the data from valuation perspective: we test whether identical 
risky lotteries are valued differently depending on past history. 
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The third part of the dissertation investigates how subjective judgments 
are influenced by the social environment. We study modulations in judgment in 
social context since it has been previously well documented that judgments are 
strongly influenced by the social environment (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). 
Chapter 6 reports fMRI findings on social modulation of facial attractiveness 
ratings where decision-makers adjust their ratings to conform to the average 
rating of other people. We test whether such changes in judgment are driven by 
reinforcement learning mechanisms, i.e. whether people experience that deviation 
from a general group opinion is an error in behavior that needs to be corrected. 
Chapter 7 concludes with a general discussion. First, the chapter 
summarizes the main findings of the fMRI experiments, and then analyzes the 
contributions and limitations of the research. The dissertation concludes with a 
consideration of interesting avenues for future research, both with regard to the 
present research topic as well as to the field of neuromarketing in general.    
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Theory and Methods 

 11 
 
Chapter 2  
A Neuroeconomic Perspective on Valuation 
and Choice 
Abstract 
Neuroeconomics is a developing field that utilizes methodologies 
from neuroscience, psychology and economics to study the brain 
networks that are activate during decision making. In this chapter, 
we outline the primary methods used by neuroeconomics and 
examine how this field can help build better models of decision 
making. First, we review research related to valuation processes that 
occur in the brain, and discuss the properties of the human reward 
circuitry which reacts to both the anticipation and receipt of financial 
and hedonic rewards. These reward areas also appear to encode the 
overall attractiveness of risky prospects, integrating value and 
probability information. Next, we discuss the balance between 
emotional and cognitive control areas in the brain, which have a 
central role to play in behavioral framing effects. We conclude with a 
discussion of how a better understanding of the brain processes can 
increase our knowledge of why decision making in the real world 
often strays quite far from the predictions made by standard utility 
maximization accounts.6 
2.1. Introduction 
In recent years neuroeconomics has emerged as an exciting interdisciplinary field, 
with the stated aim of combining knowledge from economics, psychology, and 
neuroscience in order to increase the understanding of decision-making behavior. 
The combination of these different disciplines has provided an opportunity to 
begin specifying the brain basis of decision making, as well as informing 
                                                          
6 An adapted version of this chapter, including all the illustrations, was published in the 
Wiley Encyclopedia of Operations Research and Management Science (Hytönen & Sanfey, 2011).  
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theoretical models of decision making. In addition, there is now the growing 
awareness that many of the findings from the field can potentially have 
implications for more practical decision analysis situations. 
According to the classical economic perspective (Bernoulli, 1738), 
decision-makers approach choice situations by analyzing the attainable outcomes 
and their associated probabilities. The well-known expected utility model of 
decision making under risk is a good formulation of this behavior, with this model 
based on an axiomatic foundation that reflects a rationality assumption on the part 
of the decision-maker (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). Despite the model’s 
theoretical elegance and normative appeal, it has been often demonstrated that it 
does not provide an adequate description of typical decision making, and 
neuroeconomic studies are beginning to demonstrate how a better understanding 
of the neural processes involved can help explain these discrepancies. 
In this chapter we will first provide some brief details about typical 
methods used in neuroeconomic studies, before examining how knowledge about 
the valuation system in the human brain can yield insight into how decisions are 
made, and how this knowledge can in turn help build better models of decision 
and choice. We will then discuss a particularly well-known behavioral anomaly, 
the framing effect, and how understanding of the brain’s emotional mechanisms 
can lead to better models of this behavior, before concluding with some general 
observations about the relevance of this new discipline for decision analysis.  
2.2. Methods 
One important approach to neuroeconomics has been to utilize the varied set of 
methods developed by neuroscientists to examine higher-level cognitive 
processes. These methods vary widely both in their use and in terms of what 
questions they can answer, but together they provide a highly flexible set of tools 
for examining the neural substrate of decision making. Broadly speaking, they can 
be divided into two types, those that observe the normal functioning brain and 
those that examine perturbations in these normal functions. 
The most frequently used methods measure the degree of ‘activation’ of 
various brain regions while people are making choices and decisions. For instance, 
the commonly-used method of fMRI7 leverages the physiological fact that changes 
                                                          
7 See Chapter 3 for further information on the method. 
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in neural blood flow leads to corresponding changes in local magnetic properties 
of the brain, which in turn can be detected by an MRI machine. These blood flow 
changes are thought to be directly related to regional neural activity, thus 
providing a measure which correlates with neural firing. The majority of the 
results we discuss in this chapter are based on fMRI studies, however other non-
invasive measuring techniques are used by neuroeconomists, such as those that 
measure electrical (electroencephalography, EEG) and magnetic field 
(magnetoencephalography, MEG) changes evoked by brain activity. A promising 
new method for future research is fast optical imaging (event-related optical 
signal, EROS), which measures changes in optical scattering that are caused by 
neuronal activations (Gratton & Fabiani, 2010).  
A different approach has been to examine the functioning of the disrupted 
brain to make inferences about normal behavior. Indeed, the study of decision-
making processes in the human brain was largely motivated by behavioral deficits 
that were apparent in patients with brain damage. For example, brain lesions in 
the frontal lobes of the brain appear to be associated with uncontrolled behavior: 
patients take excessive risks regardless of their intellectual capabilities or other 
demographic or psychological factors. The lack of an appropriate skin 
conductance response to emotional stimuli in this patient group set forth the idea 
that brain damage to the frontal lobe interfered with behavior through 
inappropriate integration of emotional knowledge in the decision-making process 
(Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997; Damasio, 1994), thus providing an 
important initial clue as to how the brain’s organization related to decision 
processes. In addition to examining the behavioral deficits of patient with lesions, 
there are also methods to temporarily disrupt neural processing using electrical 
and magnetic signals in healthy participants, such as Transcranial Magnetic 
Stimulation (TMS).  As an example, people’s risk attitude changes when the 
functioning of their dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is disturbed with TMS (Knoch et 
al., 2006).  
2.3. Preferences and Valuation 
2.3.1. Reward Processing in the Brain 
The functioning of the human brain and the nervous system is based on millions 
of brain cells called neurons, and in practical terms the brain is a vast network of 
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Figure 2-1. The striatum is located in basal ganglia at the center of the 
brain. The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is a subsection of the frontal cortex 
that is specialized in valuation. The figure indicates the approximate 
anatomical locations of the regions of interest. 
neurons that communicate with each other. The human brain can be structurally 
divided into separate regions, some of which appear to have some specificity to 
certain functions. 
Reward processing in the human brain is closely related to the 
neurotransmitter dopamine. Dopamine is mainly produced in the brainstem and 
then projected to multiple areas in the brain. Areas of the brain such as the 
striatum and the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) receive input from these domapinergic 
neurons and are thought to process the rewarding value of stimuli (see Figure 
2-1). Additionally, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) is often mentioned 
in this context as well. Since the anatomical definitions of the medial OFC and the 
VMPFC are somewhat overlapping, and indeed often used in parallel to refer to 
the same location, we adopt here for simplicity the notation of using OFC when 
we refer to a prefrontal region that reacts to rewards (medial OFC and VMPFC) 
and punishments (lateral OFC) (Kringelbach, 2005).  
The target regions of dopamine neurons have been shown to react to both 
primary and secondary rewards. Striatum activity increases with the receipt of 
primary rewards such as water and juice (Berns, McClure, Pagnoni, & Montague, 
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2001), and OFC activity reflects the rewarding value of stimulus in multiple 
different modalities like taste and olfaction (O'Doherty, 2004). In addition to 
primary rewards, both the striatum and the OFC react to the receipt of secondary 
rewards such as financial incentives (Delgado, Locke, Stenger, & Fiez, 2003; 
Knutson, Westdorp, Kaiser, & Hommer, 2000; O'Doherty, Kringelbach, Rolls, 
Hornak, & Andrews, 2001; Thut et al., 1997). The OFC is also sensitive to more 
subjective features of the stimuli, and is involved in the calculation of the hedonic 
value of rewards (de Araujo, Rolls, Kringelbach, McGlone, & Phillips, 2003; 
Kringelbach, 2005). The OFC even tracks modulations in the hedonic value that 
are driven by contextual information. One study indicates how the OFC correlates 
with the transfer of positive value from a celebrity presenter to a product (Stallen, 
et al., 2010). In another study where participants evaluated wine, the perceived 
pleasantness of the wine and the OFC activity varied as a function of retail price, 
though the actual wine consumed remained the same: high price increased the 
pleasantness estimation both in the brain and in the behavioral measures 
(Plassmann, et al., 2008). Of course, in terms of rational models, the consumption 
experience of identical wines should not depend on the surrounding context 
(price), but this research demonstrates that the brain’s computations are not fully 
in accordance with a classical utility calculation process. 
2.3.2. Anticipation and Evaluation of Future Rewards 
In order to choose the option that provides the highest level of satisfaction, 
decision-makers need to anticipate the rewarding value of each outcome in the 
relevant choice set. As this is clearly an important issue to economic decision 
making, anticipatory reward mechanisms were among the first topics that were 
widely researched in neuroeconomics. The research to date indicates that the 
reward circuitry in the brain demonstrates increased activation not only when 
rewards are obtained but also during the anticipation of rewarding outcomes 
(Knutson, Adams, Fong, & Hommer, 2001; Knutson & Greer, 2008; O'Doherty, 
2004). Importantly, these anticipatory patterns of activation are not just correlates 
of the subjective value of the reward, but also have an influence on future 
economic choices themselves. Negative anticipatory affect during decision making 
is related to an increase in risk aversion, and positive anticipatory affect in contrast 
is associated with an increasing risk seeking attitude (Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005). 
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In addition to anticipatory reward processing, decision-makers in risky 
choice scenarios must also take into account the probability of each outcome 
option in order to reach an overall estimate of the attractiveness of the prospects. 
In a typical experiment, participants encounter a series of uncertain prospects in 
turn, after which the prospects are resolved, revealing the gain or loss to the 
participant. As an example, in one task participants view eight cards face-down in 
random order, one of which is the target card. The task of the participants is to 
place a bet on the cards. If participant place the bet on the target card they win the 
bet, otherwise they lose an equal amount of money from their total earnings. The 
magnitude of the outcome is manipulated by providing the participants with 
either 1 or 5 Euros to bet with. The probability of receiving the reward is 
manipulated by allowing the participants to place the bet on either just one card 
(low probability) or on the corners of four adjacent cards (high probability). By 
using this paradigm, Yacubian and colleagues showed that both the striatum and 
the OFC encode anticipation of probabilistic rewards (Yacubian et al., 2006). The 
findings of this experiment indicate that both the reward magnitude and also the 
associated probabilities are directly encoded in the valuation network itself: the 
striatum and the OFC had higher activation levels in the high bet and high 
probability conditions than in the low bet and low probability conditions, 
respectively. Further, the results of this experiment show that the reward circuit 
also provides a measure for the overall desirability of a risky prospect as it 
encodes the expected value of a prospect, integrating the value and probability 
information for rewarding stimuli. Other fMRI experiments that have studied the 
valuation of risky prospects have reported similar findings in reward circuitry for 
manipulations of outcome magnitudes and probabilities as well as for the overall 
expected value of the prospect (Abler, Walter, Erk, Kammerer, & Spitzer, 2006; 
Knutson, Taylor, Kaufman, Peterson, & Glover, 2005; Preuschoff, Bossaerts, & 
Quartz, 2006; Tobler, O'Doherty, Dolan, & Schultz, 2007; Yacubian et al., 2007). 
These findings indicate that both the magnitude of the outcomes and probability 
of receiving them can be processed via the basic reward mechanisms of the brain, 
suggesting that the evaluation of risky prospects does not necessarily require high 
level ‘rational’ calculations.  
As prior research indicates, people do not react linearly to anticipated 
outcomes and their probabilities. The very early work of Bernoulli showed that 
outcomes are processed in a subjective manner rather than relying on the objective 
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numerical value (Bernoulli, 1738). Typically the utility associated with one 
additional unit decreases as the outcome level becomes higher.  Intriguingly, the 
activation in the striatum to anticipated monetary gains appears to have the same 
property: the incremental additions to the strength of the striatum activity become 
smaller as the magnitude of reward increases linearly (Pine et al., 2009). This 
property of the striatal response is in line with the decreasing marginal utility 
effect which is well-characterized at the behavioral level. This finding implies that 
the striatum might be involved in the calculation of subjective utility of the reward 
rather than simply reflecting the absolute reward value. Similarly to reward 
magnitude, the striatum does not react linearly to probabilities but instead it 
overweights small probabilities and underweights large probabilities (Hsu, 
Krajbich, Zhao, & Camerer, 2009). Similar nonlinear weighting pattern of 
probabilities is also apparent in the behavior of decision-makers (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). These results imply that the behavioral deviations from linearity 
may have their roots in the properties of the reward system, both in terms of the 
sensitivities of the valuation and probabilistic nature of rewards and punishments.   
Thus far we have discussed the anticipatory reactions related to the 
expectation of financial incentives. However, it is also the case that this 
mechanism may underlie decisions of a non-financial nature, suggesting that the 
basic reward system may be a mechanism for most, if not all, of the typical day-to-
day decisions we take. For instance, the striatum has been shown to reflect the 
preference for a variety of consumer products (Knutson, et al., 2007; Knutson et 
al., 2008), as well as encoding the anticipatory value of hedonic outcomes (Sharot, 
De Martino, & Dolan, 2009). The striatum activity also reflects modulations in the 
expected hedonic value in a similar fashion to the way the OFC encodes the 
influence of price on the experienced pleasantness of wines. In an fMRI study 
participants evaluated the expected hedonic value of several potential vacations, 
after which participants were forced to make a choice between two options of 
similar desirability to them (Sharot, De Martino, et al., 2009). Behaviorally, a 
commitment to one of these previously equally valued options increased the self-
reported hedonic value of the chosen option, and decreased the valuation of the 
unselected one. The change in the expected pleasure of the two vacation 
destinations was also reflected in the striatum, with higher activity here for the 
chosen option than for the rejected one. Another study indicated that the 
subjective hedonic expectations are indeed influenced by the basic reward 
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processing mechanisms, with a pharmacological manipulation which increases 
dopamine levels also increasing hedonic expectations for future life events 
(Sharot, Shiner, Brown, Fan, & Dolan, 2009).  
2.3.3. Reference Dependence of Valuation 
Normative decision-making models, such as the expected utility model, assume 
that valuation is done in respect to the total amount of wealth. One of the main 
insights of prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), a descriptive theory of 
decision making under risk, is that decision makers tend to value outcomes in a 
reference dependent manner. In accordance with this theoretical model, the brain 
seems to process positive and negative outcomes differentially. The most dramatic 
example of reference dependence is that the gains and losses activate different 
brain networks. For instance, the calculation of the expected value of a prospect 
has been suggested to be performed by the striatum when calculating the 
expectation of gains (Tobler, O'Doherty, et al., 2007; Yacubian, et al., 2006) and by 
more affective brain structures (amygdala) when calculating the expectation of 
losses (Yacubian, et al., 2006). In addition, the anticipation of a negative outcome 
has been linked to a brain structure (insula) that is often associated with 
processing of negative experiences such as pain, whereas anticipation of rewards 
is reflected in the reward circuitry (Knutson, et al., 2001; Kuhnen & Knutson, 
2005). 
The reference dependence of striatum activity has been implied by 
multiple studies. In one early neuroeconomics study, participants played lotteries 
while undergoing fMRI. One type of lottery consisted of positive and zero 
outcome options whereas another type of lottery consisted of negative and zero 
outcome options. When people received the zero outcome from the negative 
lottery (a relative gain), striatum activity was higher than when the zero outcome 
was received from the positive lottery (a relative loss) (Breiter, Aharon, 
Kahneman, Dale, & Shizgal, 2001). In general the striatum seems to process the 
outcomes in respect to subjective expectation (Hare, O'Doherty, Camerer, Schultz, 
& Rangel, 2008; Yacubian, et al., 2006) though some parts of the striatum have 
recently been shown to reflect reference independent calculation, together with 
some sub-regions of the OFC (De Martino, Kumaran, Holt, & Dolan, 2009). 
In addition to performing calculations with respect to other possible 
rewards, Tom and colleagues have shown that the striatum induces non-linear 
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reactions to gains and losses in a task where participants made choices accepting 
or rejecting mixed gambles (Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007). The researchers 
found a common network, including the striatum and the OFC, that was activated 
for gains and deactivated for losses. These areas also showed a pattern of loss 
aversion, namely that the slope of the deactivation for losses was greater than the 
slope of activation for gains in a majority of participants. Therefore, the striatum 
again demonstrates some of the properties of descriptive models of risky choice, 
showing loss aversion rather than the patterns predicted by classical expected 
utility maximization. Also of interest was that during decision making, no brain 
areas where found that were specifically activated by evaluation of increasing 
losses, in contrast to other studies that have reported increased activity in 
emotional regions, such as amygdala and insula, for losses (Kuhnen & Knutson, 
2005; Yacubian, et al., 2006). One possible explanation for this difference is that the 
Tom et al. study restricted analysis purely to the decision-making phase (decision 
utility), and excluded anticipatory effects (anticipated utility) by only resolving 
the lotteries after the fMRI scanning.  
Besides the set of possible outcomes, also other contexts influence the 
valuation process, such as social aspects (Fliessbach et al., 2007; Klucharev, et al., 
2008) and numerical representations of financial gains (Weber, Rangel, Wibral, & 
Falk, 2009). Fliessbach, et al. (2007) scanned two participants simultaneously with 
fMRI while they performed a simple visual counting task. Participants received 
monetary rewards of varying magnitudes for correct performance, whereas 
incorrect answers had no financial consequences, and participants were informed 
of the performance and rewards of both players. Of interest were trials where both 
were correct but one of the participants received a higher reward than the other. 
Across reward levels, participant’s striatum activity was higher when they 
received more than their partner relative to when they received less than the other 
player, demonstrating that participants evaluated their outcome relative to that of 
their partner, as opposed to purely evaluating the payoff.  
2.3.4. Summary and Implications 
Studies in neuroeconomics have indicated multiple properties in the valuation 
network of the brain that either support or contradict the assumption of rational 
evaluation of risky prospects. One important property of the reward circuitry is 
that it appears to anticipate the utility of future outcomes, providing the decision-
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maker with necessary information for comparing the possible outcome options 
and selecting the most attractive course of action. Further, this circuit also informs 
the decision-maker of the desirability of risky prospects by integrating the 
subjective value and probability of expected outcomes, thus reflecting the overall 
attractiveness of risky alternatives. These results suggest that the valuation of 
risky prospects is done in the basic reward circuitry of the brain in accordance 
with the principles of expected utility maximization. However, another part of the 
literature indicates that the reward circuitry does not always behave as predicted 
by expected utility maximization model when the outcome values and 
probabilities are manipulated. For instance, the probabilities are represented in a 
non-linear fashion in the valuation process, reward circuitry processes outcomes 
as gains and losses relative to a reference point, and even arbitrary contexts such 
as the rewards of others and the numerical presentation of the financial rewards, 
influence the valuation of outcomes. None of these properties meet the 
requirements of expected utility maximization but they are reflected in the 
behavior of decision-makers and accounted for in descriptive models of decision 
making under risk (see e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  
In sum, the brain evidence indicates that both the evaluation of the 
attractiveness of risky prospects and the behavioral biases observed in these 
estimations, are reflected in the reward circuitry of the brain. One implication of 
these findings is that the evaluation of risky prospects is not controlled by higher 
level deliberation, but that instead prospects are valued via more fundamental 
mechanisms, which also potentially explains the well-observed behavioral 
deviations from utility maximization. 
When interpreting neuroscience findings it is important to take into 
account the so-called ‘reverse inference’ fallacy, which refers to the difficulty of 
inferring mental states of the decision-maker based on the activated brain regions, 
as one specific brain region can be involved in multiple processes (Poldrack, 2006). 
While there is a growing amount of evidence implicating the striatum and the 
OFC in the processing of rewards, it should not be concluded that these areas are 
reward-meters, where activity can be read off and taken as a metric of positive or 
negative valence. Despite this caveat however, the investigation of how the brain 
computes and processes reward and punishments offers a very useful window 
into basic decision making.  
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2.4. Framing Effect and the Brain 
We have discussed above how behavioral findings such as loss aversion and 
reference dependent valuation can be observed at the neural level, and here we 
extend that by discussing another well-characterized behavioral anomaly, the 
framing effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). The framing effect is a phenomenon 
where decision-makers display different preferences in choice situations which are 
identical other than for largely irrelevant contextual effects. For example, consider 
two packages of ground beef, one of which claims “75% lean” and the other “25% 
fat”. Even though there is no difference in the actual product between these two 
packages, a majority of consumers prefers the “75% lean” beef over the one having 
25% of fat (Levin, Johnson, Russo, & Deldin, 1985). The framing of information 
also influences how people react on a preventive health behavior advocacy, such 
as on campaigns against coronary heart disease or skin cancer, with negative 
frame being particularly effective when people process the given information 
intensively (Block & Keller, 1995; Maheswaran & Meyerslevy, 1990).  
One explanation for the framing effect is that the decision-makers tend to 
be risk averse in the gain domain and risk seeking in the loss domain. For 
example, imagine the following two scenarios (see Figure 2-2). In the first scenario 
you are given $50 and then asked to make a choice between two options: keep $20 
of the initial endowment or play a lottery where you have 40% chance of keeping 
the whole endowment and 60% chance of losing everything. In the second 
scenario, after you first received the initial endowment of $50, you are asked to 
choose: either lose $30 or participate in a lottery identical to that of the first 
scenario. Importantly, both of these scenarios are equivalent—they provide a 
choice between gaining $20 for sure and having a 40% chance of receiving $50. 
However, when people answer these questions separately, they tend to prefer the 
sure option in the gain domain (scenario 1: risk averse) and the lottery in the loss 
domain (scenario 2: risk seeking). Thus, the framing of the choice options 
influences the risk attitude of the decision-maker and causes preference reversals. 
This violates the invariance principle of normative decision-making models which 
holds that the preference structure is independent of the phrasing of the choice 
options. The framing effect can be observed in multiple types of decision, and 
even in participants groups who are dealing with risk on a daily basis, such as 
financial planners (Roszkowski & Snelbecker, 1990). As a practical example, when 
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Figure 2-2. Example scenarios for the framing effect. The dashed lines 
indicate typical choices that people make in line with the framing effect. 
people consider selling their stock investments during an economic slump, it 
makes a difference whether they think about the money they can save or the 
money they will lose in case of selling. When people think about the money they 
could save by selling the stocks, they often prefer the safe option of selling the 
stocks and keeping the money (risk averse in gain domain), but when they think 
about the realized losses related to the sale, they prefer more risky courses of 
action (risk seeking in loss domain).  
One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that the presence of risk 
in the choice situations elicits emotional reactions which intrude in the decision-
making process (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001). Behavioral research 
suggests that increasing the emotional salience of the choice situation strengthens 
nonlinearities in the valuation process (Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004) which leads to 
further deviations from risk neutrality (Mukherjee, 2010), thereby strengthening 
the framing effects. This hypothesis of emotional involvement in framing effects 
was tested by De Martino et al. in an fMRI study where participants made choices 
similar to those described above (De Martino, et al., 2006). Choices where 
participants adhered to the standard bias (safe choice in the gain domain and 
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Figure 2-3. Framing effect is related to activity in amygdala and resisting 
the frame involves anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) activity. The image 
does not display the whole ACC (selection based on De Martino, 
Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006). The picture on the right is a slice of 
the brain that is cut along the midline of the head. The picture on the left 
is a parallel slice taken from the brain at the level of eyes. This picture 
indicates the anatomical locations of the regions of interest, but does not 
represent data from the actual measurement. 
lottery choice in the loss domain) were compared to those situations where 
participants chose in the opposite direction (lottery choice in the gain domain, and 
safe choice in the loss domain). This comparison showed activity in an area related 
to valuation and processing of emotional stimuli (amygdala), supporting the 
hypothesis that emotional processes contribute to the framing effects (Figure 2-3). 
The researchers also examined which brain mechanisms were related to resisting 
the framing effect, and found activity in a region that is commonly involved in 
conflict detection and cognitive control (anterior cingulate cortex; Figure 2-3). This 
implies that resistance to the framing bias requires detection of conflict between 
the rational course of action and an emotional tendency, and regulatory control of 
the emotional mechanisms to override the bias. 
Framing effects are not equally strong in all individuals. In a follow up 
study the researchers were interested in these differences between individuals 
(Roiser et al., 2009). They hypothesized that genetic variation might be able to 
24 Chapter 2 
 
explain these differences, and examined variation in a gene 5-HTTLPR, which has 
previously been shown to modulate amygdala and anterior cingulate function. 
The results showed that people with the short allele form of the gene 
demonstrated strong behavioral framing effects, which were also reflected in the 
activation in amygdala.  In contrast, the people with the long allele variant 
showed a weaker behavioral effect, which was not reflected in the pattern of 
amygdala activity. By performing a connectivity analysis between brain regions, 
the researchers were able to show that the coupling between anterior cingulate 
and the amygdala increased when participants with long alleles were countering 
the framing effect. This increase in the connectivity did not occur in the subjects 
with short alleles. Based on the results, the researchers claim that the participant 
group with the long alleles has more efficient dynamic regulatory control over the 
emotional amygdala reactions than the group with short alleles, which further 
leads to reduced behavioral framing effects. Thus, the results indicate both the role 
of emotional reactions and the regulation of those reactions in enhancing and 
controlling of behavioral framing effects, respectively, and how individual 
variability in the control mechanisms influences the sensitivity to the framing 
effects.  
2.4.1. Summary and Implications 
The fMRI experiments outlined here indicate the role of affective neural processes 
in driving the behavioral framing effects, and the importance of cognitive control 
in decreasing them. These findings imply that even when the decision situation 
does not have any clear emotional context, the presence of risky prospects can 
activate emotional brain regions. The effect of this emotional activation differs in 
positive and negative domains: in a positive frame involvement of emotional brain 
regions increases risk aversion, and in a negative frame the emotional activation 
leads to more risk seeking attitude. Additionally, the susceptibility of individuals 
to framing effects differs, and these differences can at least partly be explained by 
genetic variation. Overall, the findings support the idea that framing effects can be 
reduced either by decreasing the emotional reactions induced by risky prospects 
or by increasing the cognitive control during the decision process. 
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2.5. Conclusions 
In this chapter we have outlined the importance of both reward circuitry and the 
balance of emotional and cognitive control in the evaluation of risky prospects, 
and we have described how these mechanisms can be related to decision biases 
that have previously been observed in the behavior of decision-makers. As this 
existing research suggests, neuroscience studies can provide insights in the 
decision-making processes, and give potentially valuable information for further 
development of economical models. Further, a better understanding of the neural 
architecture underlying behavioral biases may provide opportunities to minimize 
the errors associated with these processes. 
This work also suggests that different biases may have different 
fundamental causes and so might differ in how easy they are to overcome. For 
example, biases associated with reward mechanisms might be more persistent 
than the biases that arise from the imbalance of emotional and control signals. 
Another important role for the striatum is as part of the learning mechanism in the 
brain (Schultz & Dickinson, 2000), which may imply that the biases that are 
reflected in the striatum activity are more difficult to overcome. One conception of 
the role of the striatum is that it is not engaged in the processing of rewards and 
punishments per se, but rather that it tracks so-called reward prediction error, that 
is, the difference between what we expect and what we receive (Hare, et al., 2008), 
thus computing gains and losses in respect to the reference point of expected 
outcome. If there is a bias in the calculation of the prediction error signals, these 
biases are continuously reinforced in the behavior, complicating efforts to 
overcome the resulting behavioral biases. For example, in a loss-aversion account, 
if outcomes that are worse than expected are followed by an exaggerated reward 
prediction error signal, this will lead to the learning of loss-averse behavioral 
patterns for choice situations involving losses.  
Despite this however, research indicates that either neural or intentional 
control mechanisms have the ability to reduce the behavioral biases in certain 
conditions (Paulus & Frank, 2006; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009). This may be because 
cognitive mechanisms can overcome more affective reactions that also enhance the 
biases. For instance, in the case of loss aversion there is evidence that points 
towards the role of emotions in enhancing the bias (De Martino, Camerer, & 
Adolphs, 2010; Knutson, et al., 2008), and that the decision-maker can reduce the 
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influence of this emotional reaction in their decision-making process by 
intentionally choosing to use an emotion regulation strategy, such as a reappraisal 
strategy focusing on reinterpretation of the situation (Gross, 2002; Sokol-Hessner, 
et al., 2009). As discussed earlier in this chapter, framing effects are also driven by 
emotional mechanisms. The tendency of decision-makers to be risk averse in gain 
domains and risk seeking in loss domains appears to be related to increased 
emotional brain reactions, whereas resisting the biases involves use of cognitive 
control mechanisms. Those individuals who have better control over their 
affective responses show smaller framing effects than other people. Thus, these 
results also indicate the importance of regulation of emotional signals in reducing 
biases in the decision-making process, and suggest that it is possible that the 
framing effects in risky decision making could also be reduced by exerting 
intentional control over the emotional reactions with existing emotion regulation 
strategies. Overall, the role of emotional reactions in inducing decision biases, and 
the possibilities to reduce these influences with simple instructions to the decision-
maker, are important aspects to take into account when designing decision 
support tools.  
An important future step for neuroeconomics is to increase the 
understanding of individual variability in the sensitivity to decision biases. For 
developing the most efficient methods to reduce and control for the decision 
biases on an individual level, it is important to learn more about individual 
differences in choice situations, which will lead to better understanding of the 
brain mechanisms central to decision-making biases. In order to achieve a more 
complete picture of the neural calculations on an individual level, more attention 
should be paid to the functioning of larger brain networks involved in decision 
making. Some initial steps towards this goal have already been taken, for instance 
by categorizing people in different groups based on their genotype. Though 
neuroeconomics is a young field, it offers enormous potential for the better 
specification of decision-making behavior, and as such promises to open up 
interesting new avenues for decision analysis in the near future. 
The literature outlined in this chapter represents a large body of 
neuroeconomic knowledge on valuation and reward-driven decision making. The 
later chapters of this dissertation build on this knowledge when discussing path 
dependence of risky decision making and social conformity. The first central 
theme in this literature review, valuation, is discussed in the second part of the 
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dissertation in the context of a task on sequential risky choices. In particular, 
Chapter 5 investigates whether the valuation of risky gambles is done in the 
striatum and the OFC in respect to prior events or in absolute terms. Valuation 
account is also present in the third part of the dissertation concentrating on social 
conformity. In Chapter 6 we test whether disagreement with a group opinion 
functions as a social punishment (‘negative reward’) which drives future behavior 
towards the general opinion. The second central theme of this chapter was 
framing effects and the related emotional and control mechanisms. Chapter 4 
continues this line of research and studies how emotion and cognitive control 
underlie path dependence in risky choice, i.e. how the frame of prior negative and 
positive events influences risky choice. Finally, Chapter 6 considers conflict areas 
in the brain when studying the conflict between participant’s opinion and the 
opinion of others.         
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Chapter 3  
Measuring Brain Activation with Functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging  
Abstract 
This chapter provides an introduction to fMRI as a tool in 
neuroeconomics studies and discusses the pros and cons of fMRI in 
comparison to other available methods for analyzing choice behavior. 
First, the chapter describes the origins of the fMRI signal, how the 
method restricts the experimental design, and the analysis 
procedures. The second half of this chapter discusses the limitations 
and advantages of fMRI in neuroeconomic studies in general and in 
the context of this dissertation.    
3.1. Introduction 
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) is a medical imaging technique that provides 
high spatial resolution images of arbitrary cross-sections of the human body. Since 
they were introduced commercially in the early 1980s, MRI techniques have 
become valuable imaging modalities for medical applications. Initially MRI 
techniques were used to obtain detailed anatomical information on the body 
structures but soon further technical developments enabled them to be used for 
functional measurements of brain activation. The basic structural MRI scans take 
multiple minutes to create precise photograph-like images of the brain structures, 
but nowadays the functional MRI measurements (fMRI) collect less detailed data 
from the whole brain within a couple of seconds, enabling the measurement of 
brain function. Since 1990s fMRI has revolutionized research in cognitive 
neuroscience by providing a non-invasive, radiation-free way of collecting 
functional brain data with high spatial resolution.  The availability of fMRI 
methods has also boosted the recent expansion in neuroeconomics studies. The 
growing interest in using fMRI in research is reflected in the increasing number of 
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Figure 3-1. A. Number of publications which mention “fMRI”, 
“functional MRI”, “functional MR” or “functional magnetic resonance 
imaging” in the title, abstract or keywords. B. Number of publications 
that mention words “neuroeconomics” or “neuroeconomic” in 
corresponding fields. The searches were conducted with Web of Science® 
search engine (www.isiknowledge.com) using Science Citation Index 
Expanded and Social Sciences Citation Index databases. 
publications which mention fMRI. Simultaneously the number of reports on 
neuroeconomics has been increasing substantially (Figure 3-1).  
The remaining parts of this dissertation report on neuroeconomic studies 
that use fMRI techniques. This chapter provides a general introduction to fMRI for 
those readers unfamiliar with the method. This chapter does not, however, aim for 
a comprehensive description of fMRI measurements and design. For more 
detailed information on these issues, please see for instance (Huettel, Song, & 
McCarthy, 2009). The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. First, Section 3.2 
introduces in brief the basic properties of fMRI signals and how fMRI 
measurements are done in practice. Thereafter, Section 3.3 describes the 
limitations and advantages of using fMRI as a tool in neuroeconomics. It also 
discusses the decision to use fMRI in this dissertation. The chapter ends with a 
short summary. 
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3.2. Technical Details 
3.2.1. Origins of fMRI Signal 
The MRI signal is based on a physical phenomenon called nuclear magnetic 
resonance that occurs when atomic nuclei interact with external magnetic fields. 
Each nuclear particle—a proton or a neutron—has a fundamental physical 
property called a spin, and a nucleus that has an uneven number of these nuclear 
particles, such as a hydrogen nucleus, possesses a net spin. The human body 
contains a lot of hydrogen nuclei and hence this is the most commonly used 
nucleus in medical imaging. Because a hydrogen nucleus has a net spin it gets a 
net magnetization when it is placed in an external magnetic field. In general, when 
a magnetic object is placed in a magnetic field, the object orients itself along the 
direction of the external magnetic field. However, MRI scanners are only able to 
detect the magnetized hydrogen nuclei when their magnetization direction is not 
along the direction of the external field. The MRI scanner thus first displaces the 
magnetization of hydrogen nuclei away from the direction of the external field 
(‘excitation’) and then starts registering the signal. With time the magnetized 
hydrogen nuclei return to alignment with the external field. The speed of this 
transition (‘relaxation’) depends on the properties of the surrounding tissue8. All 
in all, the formation of the structural images of the brain depends on the content of 
hydrogen atoms and other properties of the tissue. For instance, bones which have 
low hydrogen content are not clearly visible in MRI, and relaxation is in general 
faster in the vicinity of simple molecules, such as water, than close to more 
complex structures. MRI scanners have a strong constant magnetic field to achieve 
sufficient signal quality9 and they use radiofrequency pulses (excitation) and 
                                                          
8 Two different processes influence the speed of relaxation. First, a nucleus is in a higher 
energy state when it is not aligned with the external magnetic field. Relaxation depends on 
the speed of energy transfer from the nucleus to the surrounding tissue. Second, when the 
magnetization of the hydrogen nuclei is displaced from the direction of the external 
magnetic field, the nuclei start precessing in the same phase about the external magnetic 
field. Surrounding tissue causes small variations in the magnetic field, which reduce the 
phase coherence of the hydrogen nuclei. This loss of coherence reduces the observable 
magnetization signal.    
9 Typically 1.5 T, 3 T, or even 7 T in research. For comparison, the earth’s magnetic field is 
approximately 0.00003 – 0.00006 T. 
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weaker time-varying magnetic fields (localization gradients10) to create an 
informative signal.  
The fMRI measurements of brain activation during task performance do 
not directly record neuronal activation but rely instead on an indirect measure of 
brain activity which is based on vascular changes in the vicinity of activated brain 
cells. Neuronal activation boosts energy consumption and local blood flow which 
increases the concentration of oxygenated hemoglobin at the activated brain sites. 
Different magnetic properties of oxygenated and de-oxygenated hemoglobin 
enable the measurement of blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) contrast 
with fMRI. fMRI measures the activity within the whole brain at a high spatial 
resolution (e.g. 3 x 3 x 3 mm) with a fairly good temporal resolution in the order of 
seconds (~2s). Even though the temporal resolution of fMRI is low when 
compared to the high speed of electric activation in the brain cells or to the 
millisecond timescale of EEG and MEG, it is sufficient to capture the slow changes 
in the amount of oxygenated hemoglobin around the activated brain site.   
3.2.2. Event-Related Experimental Design and Measurement Conditions 
The use of fMRI imposes a number of requirements on an experimental design. In 
neuroeconomics the most commonly used design type is so-called event-related 
fMRI design11. Due to the slow nature of the dynamic changes in the blood flow in 
the brain (or hemodynamic responses), the fMRI signal changes that are caused by 
a neuronal activity are delayed (starts ~2 seconds after the stimulus and peaks ~6 
seconds after the stimulus) and blurred (one single short event can cause a 
response of ~10 seconds). Another typical feature of fMRI data is the noisiness of 
the signal. Therefore, it is often necessary to repeat the interesting events many 
                                                          
10 The localization gradients (time-varying magnetic fields) enable the localization of the 
signal source in the three-dimensional space. First gradient ascertains that only one ‘slice’ of 
the brain is excited at a given moment in time (z-dimension). The second gradient modifies 
the phase of rotation of the magnetized hydrogen nuclei (y-dimension) and the third 
gradient adjusts the rotation frequency during the data collection (x-dimension). Each 
‘brain slice’ can be separately reconstructed based on the phase-frequency space data.     
11 Another option would be to use a block design, where stimuli are presented in blocks of 
similar type of stimulus. The analysis is also based on comparing the activations of blocks 
to each other. Since neuroeconomics is generally interested in more transient events (such 
as observing a particular stimulus or making a choice), block designs are not very common. 
It is also possible to design an intermediate form of these two basic design options (‘mixed 
design’). 
Measuring Brain Activation with Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 33 
 
times to reduce the influence of noise12. To enable the statistical separation of the 
neuronal activities in different time points, the events need to be separated in time 
by delay periods and/or the stimuli need to be presented in randomized order. 
Furthermore, fMRI does not provide an absolute measure of activity level, 
introducing a need for a reference level or condition. While fMRI researchers 
collect a lot of data from one participant, fMRI experiments often include 
relatively small number of participants (12-30)13, depending on the expected 
strength and variability of the effect sizes. For instance, for basic research in visual 
perception even 12 participants might be a sufficient number whereas when 
studying higher level mechanisms researchers generally aim for approximately 
20-25 participants per experiment.  
fMRI measurements are conducted with an MRI machine. During fMRI 
measurements participants are situated on a movable examination table inside a 
magnet bore at a high external magnetic field. The participant’s head is placed 
tightly in position, e.g. with foam padding, to minimize artificial signal intensity 
changes due to head motion. While lying inside the MRI scanner participants can 
view visual stimulation from a screen at the end of the magnet bore with the help 
of a mirror system. Most research facilities also provide a range of MRI-
compatible response devices, such as button boxes and joysticks. Generally the 
fMRI measurements do not cause any noticeable sensations in the participants14, 
except for high acoustic noise. 
3.2.3. fMRI Data Analysis and Reporting 
After fMRI images have been reconstructed from the raw data collected by the 
MRI machine, the fMRI images are first pre-processed to correct for some known 
inaccuracies. For instance, the data from different points in the brain is collected at 
a different time point because the data is collected one ‘brain slice’ at a time. Thus, 
the data is corrected using the knowledge of the timing differences between the 
different brain slices. Another important correction is to reduce the distortions in 
                                                          
12 The number of repetitions depends on the size of the effect. Large effects may be detected 
even in one trial or block of stimuli whereas smaller effects require 15 or more repetitions. 
13 Also practical limitations influence this choice: fMRI scanning costs hundreds of Euros 
per hour and measurements take time because researchers can generally invite only one 
participant at a time. 
14 Some people might report e.g. ‘tingling’ or ‘tapping’ sensations due to harmless 
peripheral nerve stimulation. 
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the data that are caused by head movements of the participants15. The pre-
processing steps also prepare the data for group-level analysis by fitting the data 
of individual participants into a common brain coordinate system16. Often the last 
pre-processing step is spatial smoothing that is essential for making the statistical 
inferences using random field theory.   
The actual data processing generally begins with an analysis of each 
individual participant. The data from each point in space is modeled with a 
general linear model (GLM), using the expected data patterns as explanatory 
variables (‘regressors’). With this ‘first-level’ GLM analysis the researcher gains 
knowledge on the explanatory power of each regressor in each location of the 
brain. With the help of statistical tests17, the researcher finds out in which brain 
locations (or ‘voxels’, which correspond to three-dimensional pixels) the brain 
data co-varies with the expected brain activation pattern. A ‘second level’ of the 
fMRI data analysis uses summary statistics (contrast images) from the first-level 
analysis and tests which regressors are statistically significant in a certain brain 
location across the whole participant group. In practice, the second-level statistics 
test whether an effect observed in individual participants in a certain location is 
significant across the group of participants. The principle is similar to the standard 
statistical tests—the only differences are that the input to the statistical tests 
originates from the first-level statistics and not directly from the measurement 
data, and that many similar statistical tests need to be performed (one per voxel). 
Sometimes the research questions concern also individual differences in the brain 
activation between participants. If a researcher expects a correlation between the 
level of brain activation and one or more covariates, such as age, level of education 
or attitude to risk, the researcher can perform a multiple regression analysis on the 
second level or include the covariates in other appropriate models.   
The statistical inferences in the fMRI analysis are susceptible to the 
multiple comparisons problem. The multiple comparisons problem arises due to 
the large number of statistical tests involved—one test per voxel adds up to 
millions of tests when all voxels within the brain volume are analyzed (‘whole 
                                                          
15 The data is collected in the coordinate system of the scanner and not relative to the brain. 
Thus when the head moves the spatial locations in the data and in the brain do not 
correspond similarly to each other any more. 
16 There are multiple coordinate systems. Most common are Montreal Neurological Institute 
(MNI) space and Talairach space. 
17 Most often t-test. 
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brain analysis’). If each of these tests has a false positive rate of 5%, then 
understandably false positives are extremely likely in a whole fMRI data set. 
There are multiple ways of correcting for the multiple comparisons problem. A 
conservative way is to conduct a Bonferroni correction, by dividing the 
significance level D by the number of tests performed and using this corrected 
significance level for each individual test. This method is often too conservative 
for fMRI data sets because the fMRI data sets inherently have some level of spatial 
correlation, i.e. neighboring voxels are not independent of each other. The 
appropriate statistical threshold for a data set with spatial correlation can be found 
by dividing the significance level D by the number of independent observations 
instead of the number of tests. That is, the correction should be based on the 
number of independent data patterns rather than on the number of statistical tests. 
The lack of knowledge on the number of independent observations in an fMRI 
data set creates a challenge for this approach. A solution to this problem is to use 
mathematical random field theory which provides appropriate thresholds for 
smooth statistical maps18. In addition to the voxel-level inferences, the random 
field theory can also be utilized to cluster-level inferences19. For the cluster-level 
correction the researcher first needs specify an initial threshold to search for 
activated clusters of voxels (for instance, Z > 3.1 which corresponds to an 
uncorrected p-value of p < 0.001 on an individual voxel level). Based on the 
random field theory, it is possible to calculate the corrected cluster-level p-values 
taking into account the initial threshold and the size of the cluster. The cluster-
level statistics are more sensitive in detecting activations than the voxel-level tests 
but this increase in sensitivity reduces the localizing power: individual voxels or 
small clusters may not reach the cluster-level criteria.  
The statistical tests are often performed over the whole brain volume, i.e. 
for each voxel within the brain (whole brain analysis). In these cases the correction 
of the p-value also concerns the whole brain volume. Sometimes this is not 
reasonable, because the hypothesis does not concern the whole brain but only a 
certain brain area. In these situations it is possible to restrict the analysis to the 
                                                          
18 Random field theory utilizes a mathematical construct known as the Euler characteristic. 
Using information on the size, shape and smoothness of the statistical space, one can 
calculate the expected Euler characteristic for each threshold level. The expected Euler 
characteristic approximates the corrected p-value, i.e. family-wise error (FWE) rate.   
19 On the level of spatially connected voxels that show similar data pattern. 
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anatomical location of interest, or a region of interest (ROI). To ensure the validity 
of the statistical tests, the ROIs need to be defined by literature-based a priori 
hypotheses. It is worth noting that reducing the area of interest also diminishes 
the multiple comparisons problem and thus improves the statistical power of the 
test.   
Similarly to other research reports, fMRI research should be documented 
in such a manner that the reader is able to replicate the research based on the 
given information. A great challenge in fMRI research is to find an appropriate 
level of reporting to meet the needs of readers. In addition to neuroscientists the 
papers are of interest to medical doctors, biologists, psychologists, physicists, 
statisticians, marketeers, and economists. Probably due to the multidisciplinary 
nature of fMRI research, there has been a great variability in the level of reporting. 
Recently a discussion on more fixed guidelines for fMRI research has been 
initiated (Poldrack et al., 2008). The basic guidelines include giving detailed 
information on the participants, design, data analysis, and statistical results. The 
statistical results are often reported in data tables that give basic information on 
the brain activations (name of the anatomical region, coordinates of the location 
and cluster size) and information on the statistical inference. In general, it is 
advisable to report p-values that are corrected for the multiple comparisons 
problem. The corrected p-values can be reported either on the cluster level or on 
the voxel level. On the voxel level, the value of a suitable distribution variable is 
also reported, such as T or F scores20. Instead of T and F scores, it is also common 
to report their transforms to Z scores21. In addition to the corrected statistical 
inferences, for completeness researchers often publish also uncorrected results. 
For instance, researchers may use the uncorrected threshold of p < 0.001 for each 
individual voxel. In these cases there is no quantified control of the multiple 
comparisons problem and most often the threshold is more liberal than the 
corrected thresholds.   
                                                          
20 Often the highest score (peak value) within the cluster. 
21 The random field theory applies to the Z-score maps so the Z scores are quite 
informative. 
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3.3. Limitations and Advantages of fMRI 
3.3.1. Limitations  
Regardless of its success in cognitive neuroscience, fMRI faces multiple challenges 
that make it vulnerable to criticism. One drawback of the method is that the 
current technical restrictions for the experimental set-up (Section 3.2.2) steer the 
experimental conditions away from naturalistic situations. This is particularly 
challenging for experiments studying social decision making that requires direct 
interaction and communication with other people. Previously this problem has 
been solved by having one person outside the MRI scanner communicating with 
the fMRI participants through a computer interface (Rilling et al., 2002), by 
collecting opponent’s responses prior to the fMRI scanning (Halko, Hlushchuk, 
Hari, & Schurmann, 2009), or by providing artificial responses to the fMRI 
participant as opponent responses (Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 
2003). With two MRI machines it is also possible to record the brain activations of 
two interacting participants (King-Casas et al., 2005). One might argue that the 
environmental limitations in the MRI scanner are always particularly impactful 
when studying higher-level cognitive functions, such as decision-making 
processes. Inevitably studies with the current fMRI set-up cannot reach similar 
degree of generalizability than field experiments, but their external validity might 
be reasonably similar to traditional laboratory experiments. The MRI 
surroundings do include more distracting factors than normal laboratory 
conditions, such as high acoustic background noise during measurements and 
restricted body movement, but on the positive side all of these distractions occur 
similarly during each experimental condition, decreasing the likelihood that the 
experimental effects are driven by these external factors. In fact, it could even be 
argued that in an unnatural way the constant distractions in the fMRI setting 
simulate the continuous stream of task-irrelevant stimulation which surrounds 
decision-makers outside the behavioral laboratories.         
In addition to the limited generalizability, fMRI research is also 
challenged in its internal validity. In its typical form, fMRI research is correlative, 
and it indicates the brain regions that show design specific fluctuations but it does 
not imply a direct causal link between activity in the brain region and behavior. 
The interpretation of neuroimaging results also requires caution when inferring 
mental states or cognitive processes based on observed brain-activation patterns. 
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The inverse inference problem in fMRI research arises from poor functional 
specificity of brain regions to cognitive functions (Poldrack, 2006). Even though 
one particular brain area might be consistently activated in a certain cognitive 
task, the same brain areas might also be involved in other cognitive processes and 
tasks. For instance, even though the amygdala and insula are often found to 
process experienced and anticipated negative emotions, it might be misleading to 
imply that amygdala or insula activity is specific to negative emotions per se as 
parts of these structures can also be activated by positive events and emotions 
(Baxter & Murray, 2002; Craig, 2009). This limited functional specificity in 
contemporary fMRI research restricts the possibilities of inferring the mental state 
of decision-makers based on their brain activities22. This inverse inference problem 
should be kept in mind especially in neuroeconomics, where the temptation to 
draw conclusions on the mental states of decision-makers is high. 
The interpretation of fMRI results is also complicated by the lack of an 
absolute measure for the brain activity. Standard fMRI methods only register 
relative changes in the activation levels (or blood flow). This leads to the need for 
relative comparisons and to interpretation issues, such as whether a difference 
between conditions is caused by increased activity in one condition or decreased 
activity in another. For instance, if a study design includes trials where 
participants win money and trials where they lose money, significant brain 
activation in win > loss contrast can be due to increasing brain activation during 
the win trials or due to decreasing activation during the loss trials. Also a direct 
comparison of activity levels between different brain regions is challenged by the 
lack of an absolute measure of brain activity in fMRI.  Answering questions such 
as “which one of these regions is more activated by the stimuli?” are confounded 
by the lack of a common reference signal in the brain regions and by the fact that 
the vascular properties of the brain regions can differ, causing varying fMRI signal 
strengths with equivalent increases in the activation levels. 
                                                          
22 Inverse inference problem can potentially be decreased with time when the 
understanding of the function of each brain region increases with more fine-grained spatial 
resolution. Methods that provide better spatial resolution, such as single cell recordings in 
animal studies, are currently very useful tools for studying the functional specificity of 
brain regions.  
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3.3.2. Advantages of Neuroimaging over Behavioral Methods 
The questions asked in this dissertation concern mainly the cognitive processes 
that underlie context and history effects in choice sequences. Considering the 
previously discussed difficulties in interpreting brain imaging findings, in 
particular the inverse inference problem, it is quite obvious that the high-level 
implications based on neuroscientific data are currently speculative and debatable. 
Even though neuroscience cannot currently provide conclusive evidence on the 
causes of behavioral biases in human decision making, the implications of the 
studies can later be tested and verified, or rejected, by behavioral studies23. One of 
the strengths of using neuroscience in studying decision behavior is that it enables 
a more exploratory approach to the processes that underlie the behavioral 
anomalies than more traditional behavioral methods. This process-level 
information can give valuable suggestions for interesting directions for future 
research, which potentially reduces the amount of trial and error in behavioral 
research. That is, the interpretations of the brain data can function as a guide to 
interesting new research questions. Furthermore, when developing theoretical 
accounts to forecast individual choice behavior, understanding the biological 
processes that create the behavior might improve the predictive power of the 
models both in previously tested and in novel contexts (Clithero, et al., 2008). 
3.3.3. Advantages of fMRI over Other Neuroscientific Methods 
From the vast range of neuroscientific research methods, fMRI is currently the 
most common choice in neuroeconomics when studying human participants. In 
comparison to other available methods24, fMRI provides a combination of good 
spatial coverage and specificity as well as sufficient temporal precision25. Methods 
that register the electromagnetic fields caused by electrical signaling in the brain 
(EEG and MEG) provide much better time resolution in comparison to fMRI but 
those methods are poor in spatial localization, and they mainly provide 
information from the cortical (surface) layers of the brain. Nevertheless, most 
                                                          
23 Delgado, Schotter, Ozbay, & Phelps (2008) provide an example how understanding of the 
neural system can help in developing behavioral hypothesis and economical theory.  
24 See also Section 2.2. 
25 fMRI is also radiation-free, unlike some earlier methods that provide suitable spatial and 
temporal resolution. For instance, positron emission tomography exposes participants to 
ionizing radiation.  
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neuromarketing companies use currently EEG, due to its suitability for 
commercial analysis (high time resolution), and more flexible and natural 
experimental conditions.  One promising new technology, fast optical imaging, 
combines some of the positive aspects of fMRI and electromagnetic 
measurements—fast optical imaging reaches similar spatial resolution to fMRI 
and similar temporal resolution to EEG and MEG. However, optical 
measurements are spatially restricted to the surface layers of the brain26, and thus 
they cannot be used when studying deep brain structures. This is problematic for 
neuroeconomics, since many interesting brain structures, such as large parts of the 
reward circuitry, are located more centrally in the brain. Valuable information on 
neuroeconomics has been achieved by observing the behavior of patients with 
brain lesions (for instance Bechara, et al., 1997; Clark et al., 2008; De Martino, et al., 
2010; Shiv, Loewenstein, Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2005; Weller, Levin, Shiv, 
& Bechara, 2007), and by disrupting selected brain regions with magnetic or 
electric pulses (e.g. Fecteau et al., 2007; Klucharev, Munneke, Smidts, & 
Fernández, 2011; Knoch, et al., 2006). The advantage of these research methods is 
that they provide strong evidence on the causality between selected brain regions 
and behavior, but on the other hand these methods provide information only on a 
very limited number of brain sites, especially in comparison to fMRI that can 
provide whole brain coverage.  
This dissertation reports studies that utilize fMRI methodology. fMRI is 
selected as the most suitable neuroscientific research tool based on the 
requirements set by the research questions. The questions that are asked in this 
dissertation are exploratory, aiming to test which type of processes underlie 
temporal and context dependencies in decision making. The questions do not 
make strong statements about the causal relations between a certain brain region 
and behavior (where lesion studies and/or electromagnetic stimulators would be 
most suitable) but instead suggest that multiple brain regions might be involved 
in a particular behavioral phenomenon. Furthermore, some of these regions of 
interest are located more centrally in the brain, which limits the possibility of 
using EEG, MEG and fast optical imaging that might otherwise be suitable, due to 
their superb temporal resolution. In sum, fMRI is best suited for the research 
                                                          
26 Optical imaging does not reach deeper than 3 cm below the head surface (Gratton & 
Fabiani, 2010). 
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questions in this dissertation that require exploration of brain activation patterns 
simultaneously in large portions of the brain. 
3.4. Summary 
This chapter discussed fMRI as a tool in neuroeconomics and described the central 
limitations and advantages of using fMRI. When comparing fMRI to other 
neuroscientific methods, fMRI provides a good compromise between brain 
coverage, spatial and temporal accuracy. The weaknesses of fMRI include the 
indirect way of measuring the brain activations (relies on blood flow changes) and 
correlative nature of the data. Also the measurement conditions in the 
contemporary fMRI scanners are much more restricted than in standard 
behavioral laboratories, and, due to noisy data, multiple within-subject repetitions 
of each condition are most often needed. In general, the interpretation of 
neuroscience findings has been criticized for the inverse inference problem: due to 
the lack of one-to-one mapping between brain regions and cognitive functions, it 
is not possible to infer mental states from neuroimaging data with certainty. 
Regardless, due to the possibilities of measuring signal changes from the whole 
brain, fMRI is a useful tool for exploring the biological mechanisms that underlie 
choice behavior. Even though the interpretation of these biological changes might 
be debatable, the neuroimaging data does objectively inform us of the reactions 
related to the experimental setting and of the brain processes that occur during 
decision making. These explorative findings, in turn, can motivate and guide 
future research.  
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Chapter 4  
Path Dependence in Risky Choice: 
Affective and Deliberative Processes in 
Brain and Behavior 
Abstract 
Decision-makers show increased risk appetite both when they 
gamble with previously won money, the house money effect, and 
when they have a chance to win back a prior loss, the break even 
effect. To study the origin of these well-documented effects, we use 
functional magnetic resonance imaging to record the brain activities 
of decision-makers, while they make sequential risky choices. Our 
behavioral data indicates that the two behavioral effects are persistent 
in a within-subject design in spite of many repetitions and the short 
timeframe required for neuroimaging experiments. Our brain data 
shows that the path dependence of risk attitudes is closely related to 
increases in affective mechanisms and decreases in deliberative brain 
networks. Moreover, in between-subject analyses, the strength of 
activation in these two brain networks explains the strength of both 
the house money and the break even effect. Interestingly, we also find 
that from gain/loss experience to subsequent choice, affective and 
deliberative processes appear to follow different time dynamics. This 
research illustrates how modern neuroimaging techniques can 
currently be utilized in behavioral economics and what kind of 
insights the neuroscientific research can provide for further 
exploration of path dependency.  
4.1. Introduction 
Over the past 25 years or so, behavioral experiments have convincingly 
demonstrated that the risk attitudes of decision-makers are often influenced by the 
outcomes of previous choices, indicating path dependence in choice behavior. 
Most notably, Thaler and Johnson (1990) show that decision-makers tend to take 
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more risk if they have a chance to win back a prior loss, i.e., the decision-maker is 
willing to accept higher risks than she would otherwise do, in order to restore her 
previous level of wealth, also known as the ‘break even effect’ (BEE). Similarly, the 
decision-maker also has a greater risk appetite after experiencing a gain that is 
large enough to cover the potential losses in the current risky prospect (‘house 
money effect’, HME). As an example, reconsider the earlier scenario where a 
consumer was playing at a casino. After winning some money, she continued 
taking high risks with the money she had just won, because she felt that the 
money was not hers to begin with. It was casino’s money, ‘house money’. 
Prior research indicates that path dependence of risk attitude is pervasive 
also outside the behavioral laboratory, and with large monetary stakes. For 
example, horse race gamblers display an increasing propensity to bet on long 
shots at the end of the racing day, presumably in an attempt to recover earlier 
losses (McGlothlin, 1956). Similarly, Chicago Board of Trade proprietary traders 
display a greater risk appetite in afternoon trading sessions after morning losses 
(Coval & Shumway, 2005)27. Moreover, Barberis, Huang, & Santos (2001) show 
that path-dependency can have a large effect on asset returns. The increase in risk 
appetite after a history of gain and loss experiences is also observed in the 
behavior of contestants in the popular TV game show “Deal or No Deal”, where 
contestants make a series of choices over time between cashing out with a certain 
lump sum, or by taking a risk to continue playing the game, with uncertain 
consequences (Post, van den Assem, Baltussen, & Thaler, 2008). Another recent 
paper studying the behavior of online poker players indicates that the path 
dependence in risky choice extends to gaming situations where decision-makers 
are experts in the domain. Specifically, the study shows that experienced poker 
players have an increased level of risk appetite after big losses (Smith, Levere, & 
Kurtzman, 2009).   
The present research uses an exploratory approach to study the 
mechanisms that underlie these behavioral anomalies. By employing modern 
neuroimaging techniques, we aim to provide a starting point for constructing a 
biologically plausible model of the processes that are driving the HME and BEE. 
By increasing our understanding of the mechanisms behind behavioral patterns, it 
                                                          
27 Locke & Mann (2009) find the same behavioral effect in the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
but they challenge the interpretation and hypothesize that the effect is due to 
improvements in work-effort in order to reach a daily income target. 
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will be possible in the long run to provide more accurate forecasts of behavior in 
both existing and novel contexts. Furthermore, process-level understanding of 
these choice phenomena can explain behavioral differences between decision-
makers, thus allowing more detailed predictions of individual behavior (Clithero, 
et al., 2008).  
We design a within-subject experiment that aims to capture both the HME 
and the BEE, while controlling for all potential confounds in the choice problems 
and employing large real incentives. On the process level, we expect that gain and 
loss experiences induce an increase in affective mechanisms and a decrease in 
deliberative processes, and that these brain responses drive both the HME and the 
BEE. To test this hypothesis we use functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
to record the brain activities of decision-makers while they make sequential 
choices. We also aim to disentangle the time dynamics of these two processes at 
different stages of sequential choices. Specifically, we examine the role of affective 
and deliberative processes when decision-makers are informed of an outcome, 
and further, how active these processes are when the decision-makers make the 
subsequent decision. Additionally, we test whether the brain activity can forecast 
future behavioral choices.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we 
introduce the theoretical background of path dependence in risky choice and 
formulate our hypotheses on affective and deliberative brain mechanisms. Section 
4.3 describes our neuroimaging experiment. Section 4.4 reports both the 
behavioral and the neuroimaging results, providing insights into the dynamics of 
affect and deliberation and how these processes are related to choice behavior. In 
Section 4.5 we discuss the implications of our findings. Finally, in Section 4.6 we 
conclude with the final remarks on the contribution of our neuroimaging findings 
to behavioral economics.  
4.2. Path Dependence, Affect and Deliberation 
4.2.1. Theoretical Framework 
Path dependence in risky choice was first proposed by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) when they introduced prospect theory. One distinguishing feature of the 
descriptive prospect theory relative to more normative expected utility theory 
(von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947) is the reference-dependent valuation of 
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Figure 4-1. Picture presents a coin toss game where participant can win 
or lose one euro. Black square and circle present the actual prospect; Grey 
square and circle present the prospect after the integration of a prior 
outcome. A, Perception of the game following a gain of one euro. If the 
previous gain is integrated in the prospect, the prospective loss 
(indicated with the black up-down arrow above ‘Losses’) ‘disappears’ 
while the prospective gain increases (grey up-down arrow vs. black up-
down arrow above ‘Gains’). B, Similarly after a loss, the prospective loss 
increases and the gain ‘disappears’. Note also that after a loss the 
participant has a possibility to gain back the loss which provides a larger 
improvement in value than a gain of one euro.  
outcomes. In general, people tend to show moderate risk-averse behavior in the 
gain domain and risk-seeking behavior in the loss domain (framing effect; Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1981), as well as relatively strong risk aversion for mixed gambles 
due to a greater sensitivity to losses than to gains (loss aversion). These behavioral 
properties are captured in prospect theory by the shape of the value function, with 
diminishing sensitivity to increments in gains and losses, and also by having a 
steeper slope for losses than for gains of a similar size.  
The increase in risk appetite after both gains and losses can be explained 
by insufficient adaptation of a reference point after prior outcomes (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Thaler & Johnson, 1990). After a positive outcome, when the next 
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prospect contains losses that are smaller than the previous gain, decision-makers 
may integrate the initial gains with the outcomes of the future prospect, thus 
decreasing the influence of loss aversion in the future choice (Figure 4-1). After a 
negative outcome, when only the risky gamble provides a possibility to win back 
the previous loss (‘break even’), decision-makers will integrate their prior losses 
with the current gamble, thereby promoting the risk-seeking tendency which 
predominates in the loss domain (Thaler & Johnson, 1990). Therefore, both the 
HME and the BEE can be interpreted as consequences of the nonlinearities in the 
value function, which account for loss aversion and domain-dependent risk 
attitude differences. 
In the initial formulation of prospect theory the shape of the value 
function is assumed to reflect general psychophysical features of chance 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) but recently the shape of the value function has been 
hypothesized to be more dynamic. The value function is now proposed to reflect a 
combined result of affective and deliberate processing systems, with the affective 
system driving the nonlinearities in valuation and the deliberative system valuing 
outcomes linearly (Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004; Mukherjee, 2010). This new model 
proposes that the shape of the value function can vary depending on how strongly 
the two systems are involved in the processing of the decision problem. In general, 
converging evidence suggests that decisions are indeed influenced by an affective 
system, which is assumed to be fast, effortless, automatic, and associative, as well 
as by the deliberative system, characterized by slower and more effortful 
processing (Kahneman, 2003; Sloman, 1996).  
The recent dual process expansion of prospect theory is supported by both 
behavioral and brain imaging findings. Behaviorally, affect-rich stimuli increase 
the curvature of the value function, which can be accounted for by assuming 
increasing use of a nonlinear affective processing system (Hsee & Rottenstreich, 
2004). Neuroimaging research suggests that framing effects, which also relate to 
the nonlinear curvature of the value function, are also driven by affective neural 
processes whereas cognitive control mechanisms are more active when decision-
makers act against the common framing biases (De Martino, et al., 2006). 
Interestingly, the functioning of these brain networks relates to between-subject 
differences in the strength of behavioral framing effects: A recent study by Roiser 
et al. (2009) finds that a participant group that exhibits only weak behavioral 
framing effects has increased connectivity between control and affective brain 
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regions, suggesting the presence of an efficient dynamic regulatory control over 
the emotional reactions, whereas a participant group exhibiting large behavioral 
effects has weaker connectivity between the brain networks. These fMRI findings 
imply that a risky choice situation, without an obvious emotional valence, can 
evoke emotional processing, which may drive nonlinearities in valuation.  
Similarly, loss aversion has been related to affective mechanisms in the 
brain. An fMRI experiment by Tom et al. (2007) indicates that the valuation 
mechanisms of the brain have a higher sensitivity to loss than to gain outcomes. 
Another study by Knutson et al. (2008) suggests that affective reactions in the 
brain (specifically in the insula) might increase the endowment effect and thus 
increase aversion for losses in selling situations. Further, patients who have a 
brain damage in another affect-related brain region (the amygdala) show a 
dramatically lower level of risk aversion than healthy people (De Martino, et al., 
2010).  
Given that path dependence in risky choice can be accounted for by 
nonlinearities in valuation, if we assume insufficient updating of a reference point, 
and given the recent research suggesting that nonlinearities in valuation might be 
particularly driven by affective mechanisms, we argue that the path dependence 
of risky choices is promoted by affective mechanisms, while deliberative 
mechanisms suppress path-dependent behavior. In detail, we propose that a high 
involvement of affective processes and a low involvement of deliberative 
processes in gain and loss experiences underlie path dependence in sequential 
risky choice28. 
Behavioral research on risk perception and planning provides initial 
support for this proposition, while also opposing findings have been reported. 
Monga & Rao (2006) report that positive affect following gain outcomes mediates 
positive expectations towards future risks and negative affect related to loss 
                                                          
28 It is to some degree still an open question as to whether ‘affective process’ is a unitary 
system in response to both gains and losses, or whether there is a complex network of 
affect-related mechanisms that are different for gain and loss situations. Similarly, we 
consider it an open question whether the ‘deliberative process’ is truly a single mechanism, 
or rather an aggregate description for a network of different processes involved in 
controlling behavior. Additionally, we have no a priori prediction on the timing of the 
affective and deliberative processes, but instead explore this as an empirical question and 
also test separately the processes that occur when gains and losses are revealed, and when 
the subsequent choices are made.     
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experiences creates more negative expectations, which might lead to risk aversion 
after losses. Indeed, Sullivan & Kida (1995) find that decision-makers do not show 
increased risk-seeking attitude after prior losses that could be regained but instead 
they persist on risk-averse attitude. In contrast, Andrade & Iyer, (2009) provide 
evidence for increasing risk appetite after negative outcomes. In their experiment, 
the negative emotion following a loss outcome correlates with increased risk-
taking behavior in respect to prior plans of the decision-maker. In detail, the 
results indicate that the increase in risk appetite after actual losses depends on the 
strength of the negative emotion experienced during the decision-making process. 
However, this study does not find any differences in the risk taking behavior in 
respect to previous plans after gain experiences. 
4.2.2. Hypotheses on the Brain Activity Patterns 
While the human brain consists of structurally separable brain areas, the 
functional specificity of a single brain region is not clear-cut. Further, since the 
different brain regions are heavily connected with each other, a single cognitive 
process is often performed by a network of interacting brain areas. Here we limit 
our review to two central neuronal networks that relate to affective processing 
(the affective salience network) and deliberation (the executive-control system).  
Increases in Affective Salience Network with Gains and Losses 
The neuroscience literature indicates some specificity to the processing of positive 
and negative events. The processing of positive events and rewards is closely 
related to the functioning of the neurotransmitter dopamine. The dopaminergic 
neurons in the midbrain project to multiple brain areas, such as the striatum and 
the medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC), which are often reported to reflect 
valuation. For instance, these brain regions are known to activate for the receipt of 
both primary and secondary rewards, such as drinks (Berns, et al., 2001; 
Plassmann, et al., 2008) and financial rewards (Delgado, et al., 2003; Knutson, et 
al., 2000; O'Doherty, et al., 2001; Thut, et al., 1997), and they also reflect the 
hedonic value of rewards (de Araujo, et al., 2003; Kringelbach, 2005; Plassmann, et 
al., 2008). In line with the behavioral reference dependence of valuation, the 
reward circuitry also processes outcomes largely in a reference dependent 
manner, and a variety of contextual aspects have been shown to influence the 
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evaluation of received outcomes, such as other possible outcomes (Breiter, et al., 
2001) and the outcomes of others (Fliessbach, et al., 2007)29. 
Dopamine has an important role in guiding behavior (Schultz & 
Dickinson, 2000). In general, increased dopamine activity at the time of the receipt 
of rewards, as reflected in the midbrain and the striatum, reinforces the behaviors 
that lead to the rewarding outcomes. Indeed, recent neuroscience literature 
already provides some initial evidence that the reinforcement signals in the 
dopamine system (or the striatum) are linked to future risky choices (Cohen, 2008; 
Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005). Thus, based on the role of dopamine both in receipt of 
rewards and in guiding future behavior, the dopamine system and related brain 
regions are a good candidate for driving the increases in risk appetite after prior 
gains.   
The negative affective brain mechanisms are less consistent across 
different studies in neuroscience. Multiple experiments show that the lateral parts 
of the OFC have increased activity when punishments are received (see 
Kringelbach, 2005 for a review). In contrast, other studies report that negative 
monetary outcomes decrease activity in the reward structures, such as the 
striatum (Tom, et al., 2007), or may even evoke activity in other affective brain 
structures such as the amygdala or the anterior insula (Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005; 
Yacubian, et al., 2006). The negatively valenced insula reaction also predicts an 
increase in risk aversion (Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005), which is suggested to indicate 
the role of negative affect in guiding future choice behavior.    
Though the insula is often related to negative experiences, converging 
evidence indicates that the anterior insula reflects also positive affective arousal. 
This reaction in the anterior insula when experiencing subjective emotions co-
occurs frequently with emotional parts of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). As 
summarized by Craig (2009), this network is consistently activated in studies that 
include affective arousal with a vast range of different types of emotions, ranging 
from love and happiness to anger, disgust, and social exclusion. Similar to other 
affective brain regions, also the anterior insula and the ACC have been linked to 
risky decision making in multiple studies, though there is little convergence in the 
conclusions—while some researchers report a positive correlation between 
anterior insula activity and safe choices (Campbell-Meiklejohn, Woolrich, 
                                                          
29 See Section 2.3 for more detailed information. 
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Passingham, & Rogers, 2008; Knutson & Bossaerts, 2007; Liu et al., 2007), others 
find a negative correlation (Clark, Lawrence, Astley-Jones, & Gray, 2009; Paulus, 
Rogalsky, Simmons, Feinstein, & Stein, 2003; Platt & Huettel, 2008; Xue, Lu, Levin, 
& Bechara, 2010). For the ACC the results seem to be more consistent, pointing 
towards positive correlation between activity level and risky choices 
(Christopoulos, Tobler, Bossaerts, Dolan, & Schultz, 2009; Cohen, Heller, & 
Ranganath, 2005). 
Earlier we proposed that high involvement of affective processes increases 
path dependence in risky choice, and that the affective reaction related to gains 
and losses increases risk appetite. Based on the review of the neuroscience 
literature on affective brain mechanisms, we form the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1a: The affect-related, interconnected affective salience 
network, consisting of the midbrain, striatum, insula, parts of ACC, 
thalamus, and amygdala (Seeley et al., 2007), has stronger activity 
when experiencing gains and losses than when the outcome is 
relatively neutral.  
Hypothesis 1b: The activity in the affective salience network 
correlates positively with risky choices.   
Decreases in Executive-Control Mechanisms with Gains and Losses 
The brain has an interconnected network of brain regions that exert control over 
behavior. This network, including brain areas such as the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC), the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC), and lateral parietal 
cortices (Seeley, et al., 2007), is related to multiple controlling actions, ranging 
from inhibiting the execution of planed motor responses (Liddle, Kiehl, & Smith, 
2001) to exerting self-control over dietary choices (Hare, Camerer, & Rangel, 2009). 
Previous research in neuroeconomics indicates the relevance of this network for 
controlling risky choices. For instance, Campbell-Meiklejohn et al. (2008) report 
increased activity in the parietal cortices when people decide to stop the risky 
behavior of chasing previous losses, thus indicating the role of the control network 
for increasing risk aversion in behavior. Moreover, two recent experiments show 
the causal relation between the right DLPFC and decreasing risk appetite. Knoch 
et al. (2006) temporarily block brain activity in the right DLPFC by using magnetic 
54 Chapter 4 
 
field pulses (transcranial magnetic stimulation, TMS). This disruption in the 
activity of the right DLPFC leads to a decreasing number of safe choices in 
comparison to a control group with intact activity in the right DLPFC. Fecteau et 
al. (2007) enhance the activity in the right DLPFC by using direct current 
stimulation technique, which lead to an increasing amount of safe choices. 
In line with the second part of our proposition, we ask whether gain and 
loss experiences are related to decreased level of deliberative processes relative to 
more neutral outcomes and whether this decrease in deliberate processes is 
related to stronger path dependence in risky choices. In other words, we expect to 
see more activity in the executive-control network after neutral outcomes than 
when gains and losses are experienced. Hence, we form the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a: The deliberation-related, interconnected executive-
control network, consisting of DLPFC, VLPFC, and lateral parietal 
cortices (including intraparietal lobule), has stronger activity related 
to neutral outcomes than when experiencing gains and losses.  
Hypothesis 2b: The activity in the executive-control mechanisms 
correlates positively with safe choices.   
4.3. Experimental Setup 
In order to conduct an investigation of the processes that underlie path 
dependence in choice behavior, we utilize fMRI methodology to record brain 
activity of decision-makers while they engage in risky choice situations (see 
Chapter 3 for details on the method). 
4.3.1. Experimental Design 
We developed an fMRI compatible sequential choice paradigm based on previous 
behavioral research by Post et al. (2008). In our paradigm the decision-makers do 
not experience actual gains and losses, but rather they experience relative changes 
in the expected value of a previously chosen prospect by means of an elimination 
of one prize option from the prospect. As growing literature suggests that 
reference points for gains and losses are expectation-based (Koszegi & Rabin, 
2006; Koszegi & Rabin, 2007), we assume that once participants are initially 
endowed with a prospect, any changes (i.e. prize eliminations) in this prospect 
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will be evaluated relative to the initial prospect. Based on previous research by 
Post et al., we expect that this type of relative changes and clear path dependence 
in risky prospects promote increases in risk appetite after relative gain and loss 
experiences, i.e. the HME and the BEE, respectively. 
In detail, the participant’s task was to choose between risky lotteries (risky 
choice: L) and ‘sure-thing’ amounts of money (offer choice: O) in the fMRI 
scanner. Each sequential choice problem (trial) consisted of either one or two 
choice stages depending on participants’ behavior (Figure 4-2A). In the first stage 
of a trial, participants chose between a three-prize lottery and a riskless offer. An 
offer choice aborted the trial, with the participant proceeding to a new trial, while 
a risky lottery choice was followed by a random removal of one prize from the 
three-prize lottery. To increase participants’ awareness that one of the prizes is 
removed from the lottery, they were asked to indicate one of three numbered 
pictures of identical briefcases, knowing that a randomly assigned and hidden 
prize inside will be removed from the lottery (33% chance of removing each 
prize). In the following outcome phase, participants were informed which prize 
was removed and which two prizes were still remaining in the lottery. After the 
outcome screen, participants entered a second choice stage where they chose 
between the reduced two-prize lottery and a new ‘sure-thing’ offer. Participants 
were not informed about the outcome of the two-prize lottery to avoid carry-over 
effects between the choice problems. At the end of the experiment, one of the 
planned 108 trials (participants may have repeated some trials twice, see below) 
was randomly selected and participants were paid the monetary outcome of that 
trial (on average 46 Euros). If the selected game had ended with a lottery choice on 
the second stage, the final outcome was resolved with a dice.  
The choice problems were designed so that participants faced a set of 24 
different lottery-offer pairs in the second choice stage three times, with each pair 
occurring in three different conditions (trials of interest; Figure 4-2B): once after a 
previously experienced gain (smallest prize removed), once after a neutral 
outcome (middle prize removed), and once after a loss (largest prize removed). 
Thus, this design enabled the comparison of choices between a two-prize lottery 
and an offer that were identical in numerical value, but which had different 
historical paths. The prizes in the three-prize lotteries varied from 1 Euro to 116 
Euros, with the smallest and largest prize differing by 12 to 56 Euros. The middle 
prize was always equal to the expected value of the prospect. In addition to the 
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Figure 4-2. Sequential choice paradigm. A. After choosing the three-prize 
lottery (L) participants proceed to the random removal of one prize from 
the lottery. In the outcome phase participants learn which prize is 
removed from the lottery and thereafter they proceed to the second 
choice stage. In the data analysis we concentrate on brain activities that 
occur during the outcome screen and the second choice stage, and on the 
behavioral choices that are made on the second choice stage. B. The 
design enables the comparison of identical choices in the second choice 
stage. The conditions differ only in outcome history: gain, neutral or loss 
outcome. Each of the 24 different two-prize lottery–offer pairs is 
employed once after each type of outcome. 
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choice problems that were matched on the second stage lottery-offer pairs, the 
experiment also included 36 filler choices in order to keep the probabilities at the 
prize-elimination stage unbiased.  
The offer amounts were set in the first choice stage to be considerably 
below the expected value of the lottery so that participants were encouraged to 
select the lottery and therefore would frequently proceed to the prize removal and 
second choice stage. To ascertain that the first stage choices were not trivial to an 
individual participant, the offers were dynamically adjusted to be as high as 
possible so that the participant still more frequently selected the lottery. If a 
participant aborted a trial of interest in the first choice stage by selecting the fixed 
offer, that trial was repeated once at the end of the experiment with a lower 
riskless alternative. The offers for the second stage choices were set at a level 
where an average participant would be indifferent between the lottery and the 
offer. The certainty equivalents of the lotteries were based on results from 
independent pretests with 20 participants. However, for some fMRI participants, 
these estimates did not work well. To avoid ceiling and floor effects in the second 
stage choice data, we excluded participants that gave less than 10% of lottery or 
offer answers on the trials of interest across all conditions (five participants did 
not pass this criterion). In 12 trials the offer amounts in the choice stages were 
manipulated to be either extremely low or extremely high in order to ensure that 
the participants kept paying attention to the trials. If participants were not 
successful in detecting at least half of these catch trials, they were excluded from 
further analysis (four people did not pass this criterion, one of whom also chose 
the same option too frequently in the second stage choice). 
Prior to the scanning, participants read written instructions on the task, 
had a training session of ~7.5 minutes outside the scanner, and an additional short 
training session inside the scanner. The experimental trials were divided into two 
~25-minute fMRI scanning sessions30 that were separated by a ~5 minute break 
outside the fMRI scanner. The stimuli were presented with Presentation software 
(Neurobehavioral Systems). The choice problems were separated from each other 
by a jittered 4-5 second delay period. In the choice stages participants had 5.5 
seconds to respond (after a forced delay of 1.5 seconds), using one of two response 
buttons (left for the lottery and right for offer choice). Participants had 2.5 seconds 
                                                          
30 The technical details of the fMRI data acquisition are described in Appendix 4.A. 
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to use one of three buttons to indicate which of the randomly hidden prize was to 
be removed from the lottery (Figure 4-2A). The evaluation screen was shown for 4 
seconds, and it was separated from the other screens by jittered 1-2 second delay 
periods. These jittered time periods are necessary to disentangle the brain 
activities related to the outcome phase from the activities that are induced by the 
choice stages. 
4.3.2. Participants  
Twenty-nine healthy students from the local universities participated in the study. 
Ten participants were excluded from the analysis due to the following reasons: 
participant did not complete a sufficient amount of choices in an experimental 
condition for fMRI analysis, i.e., less than 12 successful repetitions of a condition 
(1 participant), technical problems during scanning (1 participant), a high bias 
towards risky or safe choices (5 participants31), and lack of attention (3 
participants). A group of 19 participants (9 males; mean age, 22.1 years; SD 2.2) 
were included in the actual analysis.  Additionally, one participant was partially 
excluded from the behavioral analysis (see Section 4.4.1). 
4.4. Results 
4.4.1. Behavioral Results  
We model the behavior in the second choice stage by comparing sets of decision 
problems where the lottery-offer pairs are matched across conditions (same set of 
options after a prior gain, neutral, and loss outcome; Figure 4-2). Thus, we are able 
to measure how prior outcome history influences the risk attitude on the next 
choice independently from other variables in the choice problem. The data is 
modeled with a mixed logit model (a generalized linear mixed model for 
binomially distributed data; Jaeger, 2008). The explanatory variables included in 
the model are history, expected value, and risk (modeled as standard deviation / 
EV). The participants are treated as a random effect with varying intercept and 
effect sizes. Prior to running the generalized mixed linear model on the data, we 
excluded one outlier participant from the analysis, who rarely selected the lottery 
on the second stage across all trials (15% of the time) and never after a loss. The 
                                                          
31 One participant also showed insufficient attention on the task. 
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Figure 4-3. Percentage of lottery choices after each type of outcome 
history (including all 19 participants). The error bars depict the standard 
errors of the means. 
inclusion of this participant in the model would cause an artificial increase in the 
estimate of variability in the BEE across participants. For HME estimates, there 
were no such outliers. To ensure that leaving out this one participant does not 
cause drastic effects on our analysis, we also compute another model containing 
all participants without the random slope in the model (i.e. fixed effects assumed 
for the history effects). The results of this analysis are very comparable to those 
reported below32. 
In agreement with the HME, participants’ risk-appetite increases when the 
lowest prize is removed from the lottery, as compared to the removal of the 
intermediate prize, i.e., the amount of lottery choices increase significantly after a 
gain experience (E = .45; z = 2.13; p = .034). In addition, and in line with the BEE, 
we find a significant increase in lottery choices after the removal of the highest 
prize, again as compared to the removal of the intermediate prize (E = .49; z = 2.15; 
p = .032). Overall, the results indicate that gain and loss experiences, induced by 
                                                          
32 The conclusions on the behavioral data remain similar also when the data is analyzed 
with repeated measures ANOVA, probit model or structural equation model either 
including all trials with non-biased choices or matched trials-of-interest. Further evidence 
for the dependencies between the two choice stages is provided by prospect theory based 
analysis that indicates insufficient adaptation of the reference point after prior outcomes. Of 
all these additional models the linear probit model provides the best fit of the behavior data 
for 17 out of 19 participants. This supports the use of linear models also in the analysis of 
the fMRI data.  
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the removal of a prize from a lottery, increase risk-appetite in the future choices, in 
accordance with the house money and break even effect (Figure 4-3). We also 
tested whether there was a difference in the number of lottery choices between 
gain and loss experiences, but this comparison did not yield any significant 
results. The expected value and risk also do not significantly explain the choice 
behavior of the participants. Importantly, the current design allows for the 
induction of the HME and the BEE within-subject, which also enables the 
measurement of individual effect sizes for both behavioral biases.   
4.4.2. fMRI Results: Outcome Phase33  
To test whether the elimination of a prize from the initial three-prize lottery 
(leading to gain, neutral, and loss experiences) evokes activity in the affective 
salience and executive control networks of the brain, which potentially underlies 
the increase risk appetite after relative gains and losses, we compare the brain 
activities during the gain and loss experiences to those that occur during the more 
neutral outcomes. Note that in our setup the remaining lottery prizes are matched 
between the conditions (gain, neutral, and loss outcome), implying that reported 
brain activities are independent of EV and risk. Table 4-1 shows the results and the 
statistical details of all the contrasts in the outcome phase. The table provides 
statistical information on the significance of the activations both on a cluster level 
(strength and extent of the activation) and on a single voxel (measurement point in 
the brain) level. All clusters reported in the table are significant on the cluster 
level. The p-values are corrected for multiple comparisons problem by using 
random field theory. The table also reports peak coordinates indicating the 
location of the most strongly activated voxels in MNI coordinates.  
                                                          
33 Details of the fMRI data analysis are described in Appendix 4.B. Though not necessary 
for the understanding of the results, the appendix may be informative for those readers 
who are familiar with the fMRI method or who want to learn more in detail how the data is 
modeled in this experiment. 
Path Dependence in Risky Choice  
Affective and Deliberative Processes in Brain and Behavior 61 
 
Table 4-1. Activated brain areas in the outcome phase.  
Anatomical region 
Cluster-level   Voxel-level   Peak coordinates    
Cluster size p (corr)     Z p (corr)   x y z   
Gain > Neutral          
ACC 3715 0.000  5.85 0.000 -4 40 4  
L anterior insula 397 0.000  5.31 0.005 -32 20 -16  
R anterior insula 802 0.000  5.22 0.008 32 18 -16  
Midbrain, striatum, 
globus pallidus 
564 0.000  5.93 0.013 8 -12 -12 
 
          
Loss > Neutral          
ACC 254 0.005  4.03 0.612 -2 38 4  
L anterior insula 189 0.021  4.05 0.586 -34 26 -12  
R anterior insula 155 0.046  4.14 0.478 34 18 -16  
L anterior insula 56 0.020  4.24 0.009 -36 8 0 + 
          
Gain > Neutral & Loss > Neutral         
ACC 220 0.010  4.03 0.612 -2 38 4  
L anterior insula 156 0.044  4.05 0.586 -34 26 -12  
R anterior insula 70 0.013  4.14 0.013 34 18 -16 + 
          
Neutral > Gain          
left IPL 130 0.013  4.30 0.049  -32 -48 40 + 
right IPL 82 0.0496  4.28 0.052  44 -40 54 + 
          
Neutral > Loss          
left IPL  1570 0.000  5.79 0.000 -16 -56 50  
right IPL 827 0.000  5.03 0.018 44 -40 54  
dorsal striatum 172 0.030  4.60 0.109 -14 22 8  
right DLPFC 242 0.006  4.21 0.392 58 14 38  
Occipital gyrus 348 0.001  4.26 0.349 30 -92 0  
Paracentral lobule 742 0.000  5.19 0.009 16 -32 62  
Precuneus 224 0.009  3.96 0.703 28 -68 38  
          
Neutral > Gain in areas activated by Neutral > Loss      
left IPL 130 0.003  4.30 0.009 -32 -48 40 + 
right IPL 82 0.011  4.28 0.009 44 -40 54 + 
dorsal striatum 64 0.019   4.24 0.011 -14 22 6 + 
+ Significant only in ROI analysis (statistics from the ROI analysis; see Appendix 4.B.)   
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Increases in Affective Salience Network for Gains and Losses (Hypothesis 1) 
We first test whether gain and loss experiences induce higher activity levels in the 
affective salience mechanisms than the neutral outcomes (Gain > Neutral). When 
we compare the differential activations between gain and neutral outcomes we 
find increased activity levels for gain outcomes in the left and right anterior insula, 
ACC, and in a cluster including parts of the striatum, midbrain, globus pallidus 
and amygdala. Hence, we find activity in the network of brain regions that has 
previously been related to affective processing.  
Next, we test which brain areas have higher activity during loss outcomes 
than neutral outcomes (Loss > Neutral). We find significant activity in the left and 
right anterior insula and the ACC. Strikingly, these activated regions overlap with 
bilateral anterior insula and ACC activations that are observed in the gain versus 
neutral comparison: indeed, a strict conjunction analysis indicates that 
overlapping parts of the left and right anterior insula and the ACC are 
significantly activated in both contrasts (Gain > Neutral & Loss > Neutral), as 
shown in Figure 4-4. In line with our Hypothesis 1a, we find that gain and loss 
outcomes evoke activity in the affective salience network. Further, our data 
indicates that the affective mechanisms evoked by the two outcomes are partially 
overlapping.   
Next, we test whether the activity in this common affective salience 
network during gain and loss experiences predicts the future lottery choices, as 
stated in Hypothesis 1b. To do this we categorize the trials into lottery and offer 
trials based on the choices made in the second choice stage, and extract the 
average data of each cluster for these trial types from the outcome phase which 
precedes the decision-making stage. The analysis indicates that the ACC has a 
significantly higher level of activity during the outcome phase of the task in trials 
where participants later on select a lottery than when they select a ‘sure-thing’ 
offer, as shown in Figure 4-4B. Thus, the ACC shows increased activity levels 
during gain and losses experiences, with this increased activity predicting 
subsequent lottery choices and hence increases in risk appetite. These results 
indicate that the ACC may be driving the behaviorally observed HME and BEE. In 
contrast, the activation cluster in the midbrain/striatum does not significantly 
predict future lottery choices (p = 0.18, n.s.), nor does the anterior insula (p = 0.69, 
p = 0.84 for left and right sides respectively). 
Path Dependence in Risky Choice  
Affective and Deliberative Processes in Brain and Behavior 63 
 
 
Figure 4-4. Affective salience network, consisting of the left and right 
(bilateral) anterior insula (A) and the ACC (B), activates for both gains 
and losses. B, The average activity of the ACC cluster is significantly 
higher for subsequent lottery choices than for offer choices. Note that at 
this time point participants know only the lottery option and not the 
riskless alternative of the following choice, thus this predictive activity 
for lottery choices is purely based on the evaluation of the lottery and the 
changes in it. * p < 0.05. 
Decreases in Executive Control Network for Gains and Losses (Hypothesis 2) 
We hypothesized that gain and loss experiences are associated with a decreased 
amount of activity in the executive control network relative to neutral outcomes. 
In other words, we expect that the neutral outcome has higher level of activity in 
the executive control regions than the gain and loss outcomes. First, relative to 
gain outcomes, the neutral outcomes (Table 4-1; Neutral > Gain) evoke higher 
activity in both the left and right intraparietal lobule (IPL; part of parietal cortices 
that are related to control). Second, when comparing neutral outcomes to loss 
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Figure 4-5. A, During neutral outcomes activity in the parietal cortices 
and in the right DLPFC increases relative to loss outcomes, reflecting the 
increasing executive control. B, Also the dorsal striatum is more activated 
for neutral outcomes than for losses. 
outcomes (Neutral > Loss), we also find activity in the executive control network 
for the neutral outcomes (Figure 4-5A). More specifically, we find activation in the 
parietal cortices, including the left and right IPL, and in the right DLPFC. 
Additionally, we find increased activity in the dorsal striatum (Figure 4-5B) and in 
the occipital lobe. The activity in the occipital lobe (visual processing) may reflect 
the differences in the visual screens (even though it did not reach statistical 
significance in other comparisons regardless of similar differences in the screens), 
whereas the increased striatum activity may reflect satisfaction of receiving the 
neutral outcome relative to the loss outcome. 
To test whether there is a network of brain areas that is specifically 
activated for neutral outcomes, we perform a region of interest analysis by testing 
whether the neutral outcome has higher activation than the gain outcome within 
those regions that are active in the neutral versus loss contrast (Neutral > Gain in 
areas activated by Neutral > Loss )34. Indeed, we find that the left and right IPL, 
and also the dorsal striatum, are significantly activated in this analysis, indicating 
that this set of regions has higher activity during neutral experiences when 
compared to both gains and losses. Consistent with Hypothesis 2a, we find 
increased activity in the executive-control network for neutral outcomes relative to 
both gain and loss outcomes. The striatum activity may relate to the expectation of 
                                                          
34 This test is less conservative than a strict conjunction analysis.  
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choosing, and receiving, a ‘sure-thing’ amount of money in the following choice 
stage, as the striatum is known to show anticipatory activity for future rewards. 
Next, we test whether the activity in this executive control network 
predicts future sure-thing offer choices similarly to the analysis in the affective 
salience network (Hypothesis 2b). All the parietal clusters, besides for the left IPL 
that is activated in the neutral versus gain contrast (p = 0.18),  show a trend 
towards having higher activity during the outcome phase when participants later 
on selected an offer than when they selected a lottery (p < 0.10). This suggests that 
high activity level in the cognitive control regions, which are more active during 
neutral outcomes than gain and loss outcomes, might be promoting future offer 
choices. 
4.4.3. fMRI Results: Second Choice Stage  
Next, we compare the brain activations after gain, neutral, and loss outcomes 
during the phase when the second-stage choices are actually made, and test our 
two hypotheses in this time window. That is, in this phase the decision-makers are 
already informed of the updated sure-thing choice option, and they are able to 
select between the sure-thing and the lottery with the remaining two prizes. Recall 
that the choice problems that participants face are equivalent across the 
comparisons, and only differ in the prior history of having a gain, neutral or loss 
experience. Table 4-2 provides an overview of the statistical information on the 
activated clusters in this time window (statistics reported similarly to Table 4-1).  
Affective Salience Network for Choices after Gains and Losses (Hypothesis 1) 
To test Hypothesis 1a, we compare the brain activations between choices that have 
a history of gain/loss and neutral outcomes. When we compare the decision-
making stage after prior losses to the stage after a neutral outcome (Loss > 
Neutral), we find increased activity in the affective part of the ACC in line with 
our hypothesis. This activation is only slightly overlapping with the activation 
found in the outcome stage (overlap of 7 voxels based on a region of interest 
analysis within the activation maps of the outcome phase), indicating that the 
activity pattern is not similar between the two stages. In contrast to the findings in 
the outcome stage, the ACC activity does not differentiate between lottery and 
offer choices (p = 0.16), as suggested by Hypothesis 1b. The gain trials do not 
show any significant increases in activation in comparison to the neutral trials.  
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Table 4-2. Brain regions that are differentially activated during the 
decision making phase after prior gain, neutral, and loss outcomes. 
Anatomical 
region 
Cluster-level 
  
Voxel-level 
  
Peak 
coordinates    
Cluster 
size 
p 
(corr)   
   Z p (corr) 
  
x y z 
  
Loss > Neutral           
ACC 243 0.008 4.06 0.557  6 34 18  
          
Neutral > Gain          
Occipital 505 0.000 4.59 0.105  -6 -88 20  
left IPL 130 0.015 4.56 0.017  -36 -56 42 + 
right IPL 119 0.020 4.38 0.034  34 -54 34 + 
          
Loss > Gain          
Occipital 415 0.000 4.53 0.135  -6 -94 12  
ACC 186 0.027 4.51 0.141  8 34 18  
Right Thalamus 255 0.006 4.49 0.155  14 -18 6  
Left Thalamus 202 0.019 4.37 0.236  -26 -22 4  
Claustrum 228 0.011 4.25 0.334  -38 -4 0  
Insula 334 0.001 4.16 0.440  -48 4 10  
Ventrolateral 
PFC/ lateral OFC 415 0.000 3.95 0.696  30 58 10  
Superior 
temporal gyrus 191 0.024 3.91 0.736  58 -42 16  
+ Significant only in ROI analysis (statistics from the ROI analysis)       
Executive Control Network for Choices after Gains and Losses (Hypothesis 2) 
When we compare the brain activities during decision making after previous 
neutral and gain outcomes (Neutral > Gain), we find increased activity in the right 
and left IPL, and in the occipital cortex following neutral outcomes. While the IPL 
is known to be a part of the executive-control network, the occipital activity most 
likely reflects slight differences in the visual displays between conditions (history 
information). In contrast, when we compare the activities between choices 
following neutral and loss outcomes, we do not find any significant increases in 
activity for neutral trials. Thus, we find evidence for Hypothesis 2a in the gain 
Path Dependence in Risky Choice  
Affective and Deliberative Processes in Brain and Behavior 67 
 
Figure 4-6. A, Differential activations during decision making after loss 
and gain outcomes. A, The lateral OFC, which is related to negative 
outcomes, is active after prior losses. B, The insula activates after losses. 
trials, but not in the loss trials. When we compare the trials with lottery and offer 
choices in the activated IPL clusters, we do not find support for Hypothesis 2b. 
Since one prior behavioral study indicates the importance of negative 
emotions during the decision making for increasing risk appetite (Andrade & Iyer, 
2009), we also calculate an additional contrast in the decision-making stage. 
Instead of using the neutral trials as a reference level for loss trials, we compare 
the loss trials to the gain trials, in order to attain a maximum difference in the 
emotional valence across the comparison. In this analysis (Loss > Gain), we find 
increased activity in the affective salience network for loss trials, including the 
insula, thalamus, and ACC (Figure 4-6). Additionally, we find activity in a cluster 
that consists of the VLPFC and the lateral OFC. The lateral OFC has previously 
been related to experiencing negative outcomes (Kringelbach, 2005) while VLPFC 
is part of the executive control network. The comparison reveals no brain regions 
that are significantly more active following a gain outcome. In sum, during the 
decision-making phase, the affective brain regions are particularly strongly active 
after negative outcomes whereas executive control network shows significantly 
decreased activity only following positive outcomes. These findings suggest that, 
after similar affective and deliberative reactions in the outcome phase, the gain 
and loss trials employ the two mechanisms differentially during the subsequent 
decision-making phase.  
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Figure 4-7. Correlations between brain activities and corresponding 
behavioral measures. The strength of the BEE is measured as the 
difference in percentage lottery choices after losses and neutral outcomes 
(loss – neutral). Similarly, the HME is measured as the difference in 
percentage lottery choices after gains and neutral outcomes (gain – 
neutral). The correlation in the insula (A) is marginally significant (p<0.1) 
and the other correlations (B, C) are significant at p<0.05 (2-tailed). 
4.4.4. Brain Activity and Changing Risk Appetite 
Overall the results indicate higher levels of affective processing in gain and loss 
trials than in neutral trials. In contrast, the neutral trials are associated with higher 
level of executive control activity. Next, we ask whether these affective and 
executive control networks can explain individual variability in the changes of risk 
appetite after gains and losses in line with Hypotheses 1b and 2b. To do this, we 
correlate the average brain activities of the affective and executive control regions 
with the sizes of corresponding behavioral effects35. We restrict our analysis to the 
                                                          
35 We measure the effect sizes as percentage changes in the amount of lottery choices 
between the conditions. The effect sizes could also be estimated with logistic regressions 
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affective salience and to the executive-control networks that have been activated 
in the previous analysis.  
In the outcome phase, we find that a loss-specific part of the left anterior 
insula36 has a marginally significant negative correlation with the behavioral 
increase in lottery choices after losses (Figure 4-7A), in line with previous findings 
by Paulus et al. (2003). This finding indicates that even though the anterior insula 
shows an overall increase in activity during loss experiences, participants with the 
strongest insula reactions for losses show the smallest increases (or even 
decreases) in risk-appetite after losses (i.e., opposite behavior to the BEE). Also the 
left IPL, a part of the executive control network that is specifically activated for 
neutral outcomes, correlates negatively with BEE (Figure 4-7B). That is, 
participants who have the largest decrease of activity in the cognitive control 
network during loss trials show the strongest behavioral BEE, in line with our 
expectation. Note however, that one participant demonstrates particularly strong 
BEE. If this participant is removed from the analyses, the direction of the 
correlation remains, but the correlations are longer significant. 
In the second choice stage we find that the left anterior insula, which 
showed increased activity for gain and loss outcomes in the outcome phase, 
correlates negatively with the behavioral HME effects (Figure 4-7C). Thus, the 
participants who showed a high level of insula activity during the decision-
making stage after a previously experienced gain tended to select the safe option. 
This opposes the general finding that affective reactions drive increases in risk 
appetite. 
4.5. Discussion 
4.5.1. Behavioral Findings 
Previous theoretical accounts on the HME and the BEE suggest that the effects are 
driven by insufficient updating of a reference point, and thus by the integration of 
                                                                                                                                                  
calculated separately for each participant. Due to the outlier participant in this analysis (see 
behavioral results), we use the more simple measure in order to include all participants in 
the analysis. The two effect-size measures are also highly correlated (0.93 and 0.98 for the 
HME and the BEE, respectively; 18 participants).   
36 Significantly active only in loss versus neutral contrast and not in the gain versus neutral 
contrast. 
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the previously received outcomes to the current choice problems. This occurs 
especially when the choices are processed within one mental account (Thaler & 
Johnson, 1990). In the present study, we encourage the integration of prior 
outcomes and the current choice problems by having a structure where two prizes 
of the first stage lottery proceeded to the second choice stage. Our experimental 
setup indeed leads to a clear path dependence of second stage choices, uniquely 
showing both HME and BEE in a controlled within subject design. Importantly, in 
the present study the choice problems are identical across the three different 
conditions (history of gain, neutral and loss outcomes), thus excluding the 
possibility that any other variability in the choice problems could be driving the 
behavioral results besides for the differing outcome history. Furthermore, by 
having multiple repetitions of all three conditions for each participant, we are able 
to measure the strength of the two effects for each individual decision-maker. 
These findings demonstrate the robustness of the HME and the BEE by showing 
that the two effects can be elicited within a reasonably short timeframe in a single 
within-subject design. The findings extend the prior studies on the HME and the 
BEE that use aggregate data across groups of decision-makers without 
concentrating on individual effects, and/or report only one of the effects and lack 
control over multiple variables in the decision problems. 
4.5.2. Affect and Deliberation in Path Dependence 
Affective Processing during Gains and Losses  
We proposed that path dependence in risky choices is driven by increased 
affective processing and decreased deliberative processing related to gain and loss 
experiences. In other words, we expected that the amount of affective processing 
for positive (increase in EV) and negative (decrease in EV) outcomes is higher than 
for more ‘neutral’ (no change in EV) outcomes. When we compare the brain 
activities during the outcome phase of the task, we strikingly find increased 
activity in partially overlapping networks of brain areas for the gain and loss 
conditions compared to the neutral condition. These activated brain regions are 
known to be part of an interconnected affective salience network (Seeley, et al., 
2007). Interestingly, a part of the common network has also higher level of activity 
when participants later on selected a lottery over a ‘sure-thing’ amount of money, 
indicating the relevance of this early affective reaction to the subsequent choice 
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behavior. These findings provide evidence for the hypothesis that path 
dependence in risky choice is underlined by affective processing in the brain, and 
suggest that the affective processes related to gain and loss experiences share 
common mechanisms.  
One might argue that the previous finding is not surprising because the 
gain and loss experiences are inherently emotional relative to a ‘neutral’ outcome, 
and thus experiencing gains and losses should naturally induce affective 
processing. Importantly, the ‘neutral’ condition in the present study is not 
affectively neutral, since in this condition the risk related to the lottery relatively 
increases after the removal of the middle prize whereas in the gain and loss 
conditions the risk becomes relatively smaller after the removal of the smallest 
and largest prizes, respectively. In general, the brain network which has higher 
activity for gains and losses than neutral outcomes is not purely related to positive 
and negative outcomes, but it is involved in a wide range of emotionally arousing 
situations (Craig, 2009). In fact, prior research indicates that the observed insula-
ACC network has increased activity also for the arousal caused by uncertainty and 
risk. For instance, one early study indicates that the ACC and insula activities are 
modulated by the risk of receiving a reward or a punishment. In addition to 
correlating with the risk level, the ACC activity is also modulated by the related 
affective arousal as measured by galvanic skin conductance (Critchley, Mathias, & 
Dolan, 2001). More recently, in addition to replicating the earlier finding of insula 
activity reacting to risk, Preuschoff, Quartz, & Bossaerts (2008) show that the 
anterior insula also activates when participants make ‘errors’ in the prediction of 
risk. In fact, also in the current data set we find significant positive correlation 
between ACC activity and the risk level of each lottery during the second stage 
choice. Thus, one might expect that the relative increases in risk in the neutral 
outcome condition would drive increases in insula and ACC activity. Instead, we 
find an increase in this affective salience network for gains and losses which 
indicates that these two conditions with increasing risk appetite involve affective 
processing system more than the ‘neutral’ condition, irrespective of the emotional 
salience of all three conditions. 
Decrease in Deliberation during Gains and Losses  
The second half of our proposition claims that gain and loss experiences decrease 
the use of deliberation mechanisms. In line with this expectation, we find a 
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decreased level of activity in the executive control network in the brain during 
gain and loss experiences. Similarly to the affective mechanisms, also here we find 
evidence for an overlap in the control areas between the gain and loss conditions, 
indicating that similar type of control processes might have a decreased level of 
functioning in the gain and loss conditions. Furthermore, a part of this common 
network also explains between-subject variability in the strength of the BEE: the 
decision-makers with the lowest level of control function have strongest tendency 
to select a lottery after losses. Additionally, in multiple parts of the executive 
control network we find a trend for a lower activity level in the outcome time 
window in trials where decision-makers later on selected a risky lottery. Taken 
together, these findings indicate that decreased activity in the cognitive control 
network increases lottery choices, and that both gain and loss outcomes induce 
decreased use of these control mechanisms. 
Time Dynamics of Affect and Deliberation 
So far we have discussed our findings concerning the outcome window of the 
task, i.e. the brain activities that occurred prior to the final decision-making stage. 
While in the outcome window we find overlapping activation in the affective 
system for gain and loss outcomes, as well as similar deactivation in the 
deliberative system, the subsequent choice stage with gain and loss histories have 
differential patterns of brain activation. In detail, the results indicate a higher level 
of affective salience network activity in the loss domain than in the gain domain. 
First, when we compare the decision-making stage after a loss experience to that 
after a neutral experience, we find increased activity in one region of the affective 
network which is not significantly present in the corresponding comparison for 
gain condition. Second, when we directly compare the loss and gain conditions we 
find that a large portion of the affective salience network is activated during the 
decision making after loss outcomes. In contrast, when we compare the gain 
condition to the neutral condition, the only significant activation is in an area that 
is part of the executive control network. In sum, the data seems to indicate more 
similar processing in the outcome stage for the gain and loss conditions whereas 
in the next choice stage the affective processes are more active after loss than gain 
experiences. The presence of affective processing during decision making after 
losses is well in line with prior behavioral research which indicates the importance 
of affect during decision making for inducing increasing risk appetite after prior 
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losses in respect to prior plans (Andrade & Iyer, 2009). Together these findings 
suggest that especially after experiencing losses, it is important to first neutralize 
the emotional state before proceeding with further decision-making tasks in order 
to avoid excessive risk taking. To achieve this, the decision-maker could for 
instance employ cognitive reappraisal strategies which are known to decrease 
decision biases related to negative moods (Heilman, Crisan, Houser, Miclea, & 
Miu, 2010) and loss aversion (Sokol-Hessner, et al., 2009). As for the gain 
outcomes, the present data suggests that the decision-makers might use 
insufficient level of deliberation in the decision-making stage which may lead to 
carefree behavior in the form of increased risk taking. Increasing self-regulation by 
giving careful and thoughtful consideration to the decision problem might induce 
better control over behavior during emotional arousal (Leith & Baumeister, 1996), 
thus potentially reducing the HME.   
In addition to indicating differential involvement of affective and 
deliberative systems in the outcome and choice stages, the data suggests that 
affective mechanisms explain individual choice behavior in different time 
windows for gains and losses. During the outcome phase, decision-makers with 
high activity in one part of the affective network, which is specifically activated for 
loss experiences, show decreased amount of risk taking in the subsequent choice 
stage37. Even though this finding seems contradictory to the general argument that 
the activity of affective mechanisms increase risk appetite after losses, it is in line 
with prior accounts suggesting that earlier losses may sensitize decision-makers to 
future losses (Thaler & Johnson, 1990), and create more negative expectations 
towards future outcomes (Monga & Rao, 2006). Similarly, in the following choice 
stage, decision-makers with high activity in a corresponding part of the affective 
network select more often safe choices after a prior gain outcome than decision-
makers with smaller affective reaction. These seemingly contradictory results in 
respect to our prior findings might relate to a more general discrepancy in 
neuroeconomics literature, where it has been argued that emotions are necessary 
for rational decision making (Damasio, 1994; Shiv, Loewenstein, et al., 2005) and 
that affective processes bias decision making away from rationality (De Martino, 
et al., 2006; Roiser, et al., 2009). Possibly the influence of affective processes is 
somewhat context dependent. In the case of path dependence, our data suggests 
                                                          
37 Note however that this result was only marginally significant. 
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that generally gain and loss outcomes induce more affective processes and less 
deliberative evaluation which are related to increase in risk appetite. However, 
some decision-makers might be particularly sensitive to specific emotional 
reactions, such as particularly high negative arousal to a loss or a strong fear of 
losing a previous gain, which may decrease the risk appetite of these decision-
makers against the general bias.   
4.6. Conclusions  
The present work indicates how neuroscience methodology can currently be used 
in testing hypothesis on economic behavior. The main contribution of the present 
study is to provide insights into the mechanisms that underlie path dependence in 
risky choice behavior which can inform future research in path dependence. The 
brain imaging findings clearly distinguish two separate networks that promote 
path dependence: increased affective processing and decreased deliberation 
during gains and losses are generally related to future tendency to select risky 
prospects. Interestingly, the fMRI data suggests different time dynamics for these 
processes for gain and loss outcomes. These findings indicate that emotion 
regulation might be particularly important after prior losses in order to prohibit 
excessive risk taking in future choices whereas after gain experiences decision-
makers should pay special attention on sufficient deliberation. In contrast, 
individual sensitivity to negative loss experiences, as well as a fear of losing a 
previous gain during decision making, might lead to increasing risk aversion. In 
general, the data indicates that path dependence is promoted by emotional 
arousal, which suggests the possibility of reducing the biases with emotion 
regulation strategies, such as cognitive reappraisal. Additionally, especially after 
prior gain experiences, the decision-maker might benefit from careful, analytical 
considerations of decision problems.  
The present study contributes to the theoretical basis of path dependence 
by indicating the role of affect and deliberation in respectively enhancing and 
decreasing the risk appetite after gains and losses. Moreover, the implied 
differences in the dynamics of these two mechanisms might promote differential 
susceptibility to external interventions in the house money and break even effects. 
Overall, the current findings suggest that the models of path dependence should 
also account for situational factors that promote or suppress affect and 
deliberation in sequential choice situations.  
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All the previous implications to path dependency in risky choice behavior 
which are ‘read’ from the pattern of brain activations are speculative by nature 
and they need to be verified and supported by behavioral experiments prior to 
claiming their practical relevance with high level of certainty. The prospects for 
future research are discussed more in detail in the general discussion of the 
dissertation in Chapter 7. We hope that these insights into the cognitive 
mechanisms that underlie path dependency will inspire future research and 
model development that considers the dynamics of affect and deliberation in 
sequential risky choice. Eventually this development may lead to better policies 
that help decision-makers to intervene in a chain of losses before the magnitude of 
the increasingly growing losses become too extensive and also to ascertain that the 
previously gained money is not spend too light heartedly. 
  
76 Chapter 4 
 
Appendix 4.A. MRI Data Acquisition  
We recorded functional MRI brain scans during the task performance, as well as a 
separate anatomical brain scan after the task. The functional brain scans, or blood 
oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) signals, were measured with ascending slice 
acquisition using a T2* weighted echo-planar imaging sequence (Avanto 1.5 T, 
Siemens, Munich) with the following imaging parameters: 32 axial slices; 2.34 s 
volume repetition time (RT); 35 ms echo time (TE); 90° flip angle; 64 x 64 slice 
matrix; 3.5 mm slice thickness; 0.35 mm slice gap; and 212 mm field of view. For 
the structural scan, we acquired a T1-weighted GRAPPA sequence: 176 sagittal 
slices; 2.25 s TR; 2.95 ms TE; 15° flip angle; 256x256 slice matrix; 1.0 mm slice 
thickness; 0.5 mm slice gap; and 256 mm field of view. 
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Appendix 4.B. fMRI Data Analysis 
Image analysis was performed with SPM5 (Wellcome Department of Imaging 
Neuroscience, London, UK). The first four EPI scans were discarded to allow for 
stabilization of magnetic properties (T1 equilibration). The remaining images were 
analyzed in two steps. First we performed the standard preprocessing steps 
necessary for fMRI data analysis, followed by modeling the design specific brain 
activations in the preprocessed data and performing statistical analysis.    
When preprocessing the data we first corrected for the head motion of the 
participants and differences in the slice acquisition time across different parts of 
the brain. Next, we transformed the data to the standard Montreal Neurological 
Institute (MNI) coordinate system, first coregistering the functional data to the 
anatomical scan, and then spatially normalizing the anatomical scan to MNI T1 
template. Finally, we resampled the data into 2x2x2 mm3 voxels, and spatially 
smoothed the data (Gaussian kernel of 8 mm full-width at half-maximum).  
The statistical analysis was performed in an event-related manner using 
the general linear model approach (Friston, Frith, Turner, & Frackowiak, 1995), 
whereby a linear model consisting of expected data patterns was fitted to all brain 
locations where the data was measured (voxels). Before calculating group 
statistics, we first modeled the brain data on a single subject-level with expected 
activation patterns elicited by different phases and conditions of the task. The 
model included three regressors of interest for the outcome phase, where 
participants learned which prize was removed from the three-prize lottery. We 
modeled each type of outcome separately (gain, neutral, and loss outcomes), and 
included only the trials where the lotteries were matched across the conditions to 
allow a clear comparison of the conditions without any differences in the expected 
value (EV) and risk of the remaining two-prize lottery. Due to the similarity of the 
two-prize lotteries across the different conditions, the EV of the initial three-prize 
lotteries was different (gain trials: low EV; neutral trials: average EV; loss trials: 
high EV). To account for the possible confound of differential reaction to the initial 
three prize lotteries, we included one regressor for the EV of the three-prize 
lotteries. For the second-stage choice, we created similar regressors for each 
condition.  
To account for additional fluctuations in the data, we included some 
regressors in the model that were not of interest to our analysis. The model 
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included these regressors of no-interest for first stage choices, button presses, as 
well as for outcome screens and second stage choices that were not matched in the 
lottery prizes. We also included realignment parameters to model potential 
movement artifacts. To account for additional variance in the data, we also 
included EV and risk (modeled as standard deviation / EV) regressors in the 
model in the outcome and choice stages (outcome phase included only the first 
stage EV modulator which is highly correlated with the second stage EV, r = 0.84). 
 Before fitting the general linear model to the fMRI data, we first 
constructed each regressor based on the properties of the expected fMRI signal. 
The decision stages of the task were modeled with a boxcar function with the 
duration of 1.5 seconds starting at the time of the stimuli appearance (forced delay 
before responding) and the outcome screens and button presses were modeled at 
the time of onset with a peak function. The regressors were convolved with a 
canonical hemodynamic response function to model the delayed reaction in the 
fMRI signal.   
After fitting the general linear model separately on each individual subject 
to each brain location, we entered contrast maps from different condition to a 
second level group analysis. On the group analysis, we used repeated measures 
ANOVA (3 levels: gain, neutral, loss) separately for the outcome and second stage 
choices. We also included the behavioral HME and BEE (difference in % lottery 
choices between conditions) in the models as covariates. Within the ANOVA we 
calculated planned contrasts between the different outcomes (gain > neutral, 
neutral > gain, loss > neutral and neutral > loss). To find possible common areas 
that were activated both by gains and losses relative to neutral outcomes, we used 
a conservative conjunction analysis with a conjunction null of the two separate 
contrasts (gain > neutral and loss > neutral). To account for multiple comparisons 
(due to the large number of voxels), we used the family-wise error correction on 
the basis of random field theory (p<0.05). We report activation that reached 
significance either on the voxel-level (with a ten voxel extent threshold) or on the 
cluster-level. In the cluster-level inferences the statistical maps were thresholded 
at Z > 3.1 (corresponding to p < 0.001 uncorrected). This same threshold is used 
when creating the illustrations of brain activations. In addition to a whole brain 
corrected analysis, we also run a region of interest (ROI) analysis where the search 
volume consisted of anatomically defined parts of the affective salience and 
executive control networks, such as the insula, ACC, parietal cortex, and DLPFC 
Path Dependence in Risky Choice  
Affective and Deliberative Processes in Brain and Behavior 79 
 
(WFU PickAtlas), or activation maps from other contrasts (see results). All the 
results which are based on ROI analysis are indicated in the result tables. For 
additional analysis on the activation patterns, we extracted the mean data of the 
significantly activated clusters with MarsBar toolbox (the Marseille region of 
interest toolbox for Statistical Parametric Mapping). 
In addition to the above model, we also calculated another fMRI model on 
the data where the trials were categorized into second-stage lottery and offer 
choices, instead of gain, neutral, and loss conditions. By using this model we were 
able to extract the data for the trials with lottery and offer choices, either from the 
outcome phase or from the second decision-making phase, and to test whether a 
region had a higher activity in trials where participants chose the lottery or the 
offer on the second stage.  
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Chapter 5  
Path-Dependent Valuation of Risky 
Prospects 
Abstract 
Risky environments, such as financial markets, are often dynamic 
over time. Recent research in neuroeconomics has studied the 
valuation of risky prospects but largely ignored how the history 
affects the current valuation of the prospect. We conducted a 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study on the valuation 
of identical risky prospects resulting from different historical paths. 
Our results indicate that both the bilateral striatum and the medial 
orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC) value risky prospects relative to their 
prior states as opposed to their absolute values. Specifically, the 
mOFC and the striatum demonstrated sensitivity to perceived gains, 
with higher sensitivity to perceived gain observed in the ventral than 
in the dorsal striatum. Additionally, both the ventral and dorsal 
striatum discriminated perceived losses in the historical paths. These 
findings support the role of the striatum and the mOFC in reference 
dependent valuation, and suggest that path dependence may be 
important for generating different reinforcement signals for identical 
risky prospects. 
5.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the role of emotion and deliberation in path-
dependency of risky choice. The findings in Chapter 4 support the hypothesis that 
increasing emotional reactions and decreasing level of cognitive deliberation are 
related to increasing risk appetite after gain and loss experiences. In addition to 
these affective and cognitive influences on the subsequent choice, the history may 
also bias the way we value the present risky choice options. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the reference dependence of valuation posits that people evaluate 
achieved prizes in respect to the previously available options. The question arises 
whether people also value the current risky prospects in respect to the previously 
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available prospects, i.e. evaluate how good the present prospect is in respect to the 
previous one.  
Real-world decision-making environments are in many cases time 
dynamic, where both outcomes and their associated probabilities are continuously 
changing. In this type of changing environment risky prospects may be framed 
and valued relative to their prior states (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), which can 
lead to the demonstration of differential preferences between economically 
identical prospects. For instance, imagine an investor who has two stocks in his 
portfolio that are currently considered to be equivalent, both in terms of their 
value and their future risk. Now assume that one day earlier, due to random noise 
in the market, one of these stocks had improved to the current value whereas the 
other had decreased in value to reach the present state. Even though the two 
stocks are currently equivalent, the investor might experience a more positive 
valuation of the improved stock and a more negative valuation of the stock that 
had recently declined. Thus, he might value the stocks in his portfolio differently, 
in a path-dependent manner, instead of according to their actual present value. 
The goal of this chapter therefore is to examine whether path dependence can 
influence the process underlying the evaluation of risky prospects.   
It is well established that valuation is in many cases context dependent. 
Behaviorally, people do not value outcomes in an absolute manner but rather tend 
to evaluate outcomes relatively to some reference point (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979). Recent neuroimaging evidence has suggested that brain’s reward circuitry, 
consisting of dopamine target regions such as the striatum and the orbitofrontal 
cortex (Delgado, 2007; Kringelbach, 2005), might also value outcomes in a relative 
manner in a variety of contexts, with the evaluation of outcomes shown to be 
influenced by other possible outcomes (Breiter, et al., 2001), the outcomes of others 
(Fliessbach, et al., 2007), and the scaling of the numerical representations of 
financial gains (Weber, et al., 2009)38. In particular, the striatum has been shown to 
process an outcome in respect to subjective expectation (Hare, et al., 2008) though 
the dorsal striatum has been shown to reflect also absolute value calculations 
(Tobler, Fletcher, Bullmore, & Schultz, 2007). Similarly, the mOFC has been 
implicated in relative value calculations (Elliott, Agnew, & Deakin, 2008) as well 
as in absolute valuation (Hare, et al., 2008).  
                                                          
38 See Section 2.3 for further details. 
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Research has also examined the neural reward circuitry as it computes a 
value for risky gambles. Some work has claimed that the striatum reflects the 
actual expected value of risky prospects (Preuschoff, et al., 2006; Tobler, 
O'Doherty, et al., 2007; Yacubian, et al., 2006), suggesting that the valuation 
network in this instance computes an absolute, non-relative value for a risky 
prospect. In contrast however, one experiment studying the influence of 
ownership on the pricing of lottery tickets found that the ventral striatum 
evaluated buying and selling prices of these tickets relative to the ownership 
status, thus reflecting context dependent valuation in the ventral striatum (De 
Martino, et al., 2009). Based on this experiment, the absolute expected value of the 
lottery is computed in the mOFC and the dorsal striatum. Therefore, there is still 
some disagreement on whether risky prospects are evaluated in an absolute or in 
a relative manner by the brain’s reward system. 
Here we extend the investigation into the nature of relative versus 
absolute evaluation of choices by examining historical path dependence in the 
evaluation of risky prospects. This question will allow us to answer whether 
people use the past to evaluate the present, and whether this is computed 
neurally. In particular, we test whether risky prospects are processed in a 
reference dependent or independent fashion in the striatum and the mOFC.  More 
specifically, we will use our previous fMRI data set to study how participants 
react to changes in the set of possible prizes in a lottery, and whether numerically 
identical risky prospects are valued differentially depending on the prior set of 
available prizes. We hypothesize that  
Hypothesis 1a: Lotteries are evaluated in the context of prizes that 
were previously available, so that a lottery consisting of the highest 
prizes from a previous prize set activates the striatum and the mOFC 
more than an identical lottery that consists of the lowest prizes of a 
previous prize set.  
Alternatively of course prospects may be evaluated via their objective values.  
Hypothesis 1b: Brain activation in the striatum and in the mOFC 
correlates with the expected value of the current lottery and there is 
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Figure 5-1. Experimental design.  
no differential activation in these rewards areas when comparing 
identical prospects.  
5.2. Experimental Data 
We test the hypothesis with the fMRI data set described in Section 4.3. The current 
analysis concentrates on the outcome window of the task. That is, in this phase the 
participants were only informed of the two lottery prizes that remained in the 
lottery, and they were not able to make their next choice yet. Importantly, the 
choice problems in the sequential choice paradigm were designed so that 
participants faced 24 sets of two-prize lotteries in the evaluation phase, with each 
set seen three times, once after each type of prize removal (removal of low, 
medium and high prize options). Thus, this design enabled the comparison of 
two-prize lotteries in the evaluation phase that were identical in numerical value 
(and thus identical in expected value), but which had different historical paths 
(Figure 5-1).  
Here we excluded six participants (out of the twenty-nine scanned 
participants) from the analysis due to the following reasons: too small a number of 
trials in one experimental condition (1 participant), technical problems during 
data acquisition (1 participant), and lack of attention to the task (4 participants). 
The behavioral criterion used in Chapter 4 is not critical for the current analysis 
because the present question concerns valuation mechanisms instead of behavioral 
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Table 5-1. Brain regions that are differentially activated during the 
outcome phase for relative gain and loss experiences. The table provides 
both voxel and cluster level information. The p-values are corrected for 
multiple comparisons problem by using random field theory. The table 
also reports peak coordinates indicating the location of the most strongly 
activated voxels in MNI coordinates.   
Anatomical 
region 
Cluster-level 
  
Voxel-level 
  
Peak MNI 
coordinates    
Cluster size p (corr)        Z p (corr)   x y z   
R ventral 
striatum 
500 0.000  6.35 0.000 
 
14 6 -10 
 
L ventral 
striatum 
378 0.000  5.69 0.001 
 
-14 2 -10 
 
R dorsal striatum 178 0.025  4.97 0.022  18 16 10  
L dorsal striatum 72 0.003  4.86 0.001  -14 12 12 * 
mOFC 157 0.041   4.40 0.217   6 38 -12   
* Significant only in ROI analysis (statistics from the ROI analysis)      
All clusters were significant in the ROI analysis with FWE corrected voxel threshold of p < 0.05  
changes39. Thus, a group of 23 subjects (13 males; mean age, 21.9 years; SD 2.1) 
were included in the final fMRI analysis.  
5.3. Results40 
The time window of most interest for the current study is the outcome phase 
(Figure 4-2A), that is, the point at which participants were informed which pair of 
prize options remained in the lottery. The primary comparison is computed 
between the neural evaluations of identical two-prize lotteries that differed only in 
the preceding three-prize lotteries (Figure 5.1). Our primary hypothesis was that 
identical two-prize lotteries are valued in the context of previously available 
prizes, that is, reference dependent as opposed to absolute valuation (Hypothesis 
1a). Neuroimaging evidence supports this hypothesis, as analysis demonstrates 
that a two-prize lottery consisting of the highest prizes from the three-prize lottery 
(‘relative gain’) evokes higher activity in the bilateral striatum and mOFC than an 
                                                          
39 Results are effectively the same even though we would exclude four more participants 
based on the behavioral criterion of Chapter 4. 
40 Technical details of the data analysis are presented in Appendix 5.A.  
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Figure 5-2. Striatum (A) and mOFC (B) activity increases on trials where 
the two prize lotteries consists of the two highest prizes of the three-prize 
lottery (relative gain) compared with trials where they have the two 
lowest prizes (relative loss). Maps are thresholded at p < 0.001 
uncorrected; all displayed clusters reach the corrected threshold in 
cluster-level inference and/or in the ROI analysis (see Table 5-1). C, 
mOFC is specifically activated for trials where two highest prizes remain 
in the lottery (relative gain). D, E, Striatum differentiates between all 
three conditions (relative gain, neutral and relative loss). * p < 0.05, **p < 
0.01, ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed paired T-test).  
identical two-prize lottery consisting of the two lowest prizes from the previous 
three-prize lottery (‘relative loss’; Table 5-1 and Figure 5-2 A and B present the data 
of Gain > Loss contrast41). The opposite contrast does not reveal any significant 
activation. 
                                                          
41 Note, the analysis in Chapter 4 concentrated on finding similar activities in Gain and Loss 
conditions relative to Neutral condition, whereas here we are interested in finding relation 
Gain > Neutral > Loss. As a first step we compare the extremes Gain > Loss. 
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Figure 5-3. Ventral striatum activates more to relative gain experiences 
than dorsal striatum. + p < 0.1, **p < 0.01 (two-tailed paired T-test).  
Next, we extract the average BOLD responses from the activated regions 
in the striatum and in the mOFC to study the activation patterns in respect to the 
exact composition of the two-prize lotteries. We find that the mOFC was 
particularly sensitive for the lotteries containing two highest prizes as compared 
to both the set containing the two lowest prizes and the set with the 
highest/lowest combination (relative gain > ‘neutral’ outcome; relative gain > 
relative loss; p<0.001), but did not differentiate between the lotteries with extreme 
and lowest prizes (neutral vs. relative loss; p = 0.51, n.s.; Figure 5-2C). Also the 
activity level in the striatum reflects reference dependent valuation of lotteries. 
The greatest activity is observed for the lotteries containing the two highest prizes 
from the previous stage, followed by the combination of highest and lowest, 
followed by the two lowest prizes (relative gain > neutral > relative loss; p<0.05; 
except for the left dorsal striatum that does not reach significance in highest vs. 
extreme prizes contrast p = 0.18 n.s.; see Figure 5-2 D and E). Furthermore, a 
repeated measure ANOVA analysis (dorsal/ventral striatum x hemisphere (2 
levels) x historical path (3 levels)) reveals a significant interaction effect between 
the dorsal/ventral striatum and historical path (F(2, 44) = 3.55, p<0.05), reflecting a 
higher sensitivity for relative gain experiences in the ventral striatum (relative 
gain ï neutral) than in the dorsal striatum (Figure 5-3).  
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Finally, we directly test the alternative Hypothesis 1b, that is, whether the 
expected value of the remaining two prizes is encoded in an absolute, reference-
independent fashion. Our model included one ‘parametric’ regressor whose 
amplitude for each trial was based on the expected value of the lottery. This 
parametric analysis did not demonstrate any significant activation in the whole 
brain nor in the ROI analysis. 
5.4. Discussion 
Results from the study confirm the hypothesis that risky prospects are 
valued in a path-dependent manner in a dynamically changing environment, with 
this activation pattern evident specifically in the striatum. When evaluating 
identical two-prize lotteries, striatal activity differentiates between trials in which 
the two-prize lottery consisted of either the two highest, the two lowest, or the 
highest and lowest prizes of the preceding three-prize lottery. In contrast, the 
mOFC shows increasing activity only for trials with the two highest prizes 
remaining in the lottery, in line with previous findings of specificity to positive 
rewards in the mOFC (Kringelbach, 2005).  
Some previous studies have suggested the role of the striatum in the 
calculation of an absolute expected value of a risky prospect (Tobler, O'Doherty, et 
al., 2007; Yacubian, et al., 2006), though these studies have attracted criticism for 
their potentially confounded differentiation between reference dependent 
calculation (value relative to an expected prospect) and absolute valuation of 
expected value (Hare, et al., 2008). The unique feature of our study design is that 
the sequential structure of the paradigm and the large variation in prize amounts 
across lotteries enables the differentiation of reference dependent reward-signals 
and absolute expected value signals from each other. We find strong evidence for 
reference-dependent valuation of risky prospects, and the data does not support 
the hypothesis of absolute expected value calculation in the striatum. The current 
results additionally provide support for relative value calculation in the mOFC, an 
area also previously proposed to compute either absolute (De Martino, et al., 2009; 
Hare, et al., 2008) or relative value (Elliott, et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, our data suggests a distinction in the sensitivity to relative 
positive and negative experiences in the striatum, most prominently along the 
dorsal-ventral axis. Comparison of the activated clusters indicates that the dorsal 
striatum is less sensitive to relative gain experiences than the ventral striatum 
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(extending to globus pallidus). The dorsal-ventral distinction in the striatum has 
previously been linked to actor-critic models of reinforcement learning, with 
suggestions that the ventral striatum reacts to outcomes in active and passive 
stimulus-reward tasks (critic), whereas the dorsal striatum contributes only to 
stimulus-response learning (actor) (O'Doherty et al., 2004). The presence of both 
the dorsal and ventral striatum in the current active task is in accordance with this 
model. Indeed, the current results provide some further evidence for specific 
sensitivity to relative gains along the dorsal-ventral axis, with decreased 
sensitivity to gains in the dorsal striatum. An earlier report showed higher 
sensitivity in the ventral/dorsal striatum for actual losses than for actual gains, 
and linked this activation pattern to behavioral aversion for losses (Tom, et al., 
2007). Together with these results of Tom et al. and the actor-critic model, the 
current findings suggest that with respect to decreased sensitivity to gains in the 
dorsal striatum, participants are less sensitive to gain experiences in active than in 
passive tasks, giving relatively more weight to the negative loss experiences and 
loss aversion. 
In addition to valuation, there are at least two alternative theoretical 
accounts that may be related to the current data. First, the evaluation phase might 
involve feelings of regret and rejoicing related to the previous choice. 
Interestingly, the mOFC has consistently been activated by experienced and 
anticipated regret (Coricelli, Dolan, & Sirigu, 2007; Sommer, Peters, Gläscher, & 
Büchel, 2009). However, the mOFC has shown positive correlation with the level 
of regret, in contradiction with the current data where the mOFC has increased 
activity for trials with positive outcomes, which more likely evoke rejoicing rather 
than regret. Second, even though a few recent studies disentangle reward-
specificity of striatum activity from behavioral errors and prior expectations (de 
Bruijn, de Lange, von Cramon, & Ullsperger, 2009), the striatum is generally 
considered to reflect reinforcement learning signals (Hare, et al., 2008; Schultz & 
Dickinson, 2000). We suggested that the striatum computes a path-dependent 
value for risky prospects, but instead the observed activity pattern may well be 
interpreted as a prediction error signal, i.e. a difference between the value of the 
two-prize lottery and the expectations created by the preceding three-prize lottery. 
Overall, the results indicate that the striatum evaluates the prospects relative to 
their prior states, which can be interpreted both as calculation of prediction error 
signals as well as path-dependent valuation. However, the striatum activation 
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does not predict here the behavioral pattern in line with reinforcement learning 
hypothesis42.      
To conclude, the main contribution of this study is that risky prospects are 
valued path-dependently instead of in an absolute manner. That is, after a 
removal of a potential outcome from a lottery, the remaining possible prize 
options are evaluated relative to the initial lottery. This is associated with 
differential activation in the striatum and in the mOFC when comparing 
numerically identical lotteries, with these areas responding to the relative gains or 
losses depending on the historical path. This is important, as it suggests that 
corresponding valuation on a behavioral level may lead to suboptimal evaluation 
of choice situations. Indeed, behavioral research indicates that the historical path 
of risky lotteries does influence later choice behavior (Post, et al., 2008). 
Reconsider the example of our hypothetical private investor, who holds two 
stocks in his portfolio, one of which has previously improved to the current value 
whereas the other has recently decreased in value. Having experienced the 
random changes in these stocks, the investor might be tempted to evaluate these 
stocks in a path-dependent fashion leading to retaining the stocks for too long or 
selling them too early, thus displaying path-dependent behavior which is common 
among his peers in the stock market (‘disposition effect’; Odean, 1998; Shefrin & 
Statman, 1985), especially when concentrating on the gain and loss history of one 
stock at a time (Kumar & Lim, 2008). 
  
                                                          
42 After a risk related negative reinforcement the risk appetite should decrease instead of 
increasing (see Section 4.4.1). Trial-based striatum activation also does not predict the 
behavior on that particular trial in line with reinforcement learning models.  
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Appendix 5.A. fMRI Data Analysis 
Image analysis was performed with SPM5 (Wellcome Department of 
Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK). Preprocessing steps were identical to the 
analysis presented in Appendix 4.B.  
Statistical analysis was performed in an event-related manner using the 
general linear model approach (Friston, et al., 1995). In the subject-level model, 
events in the evaluation phase were modeled as peaks at the time of screen onset 
and the regressors were convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response 
function. We run two separate first-level models on the data. The first model was 
quite identical to the model that was run in Chapter 4, and thus the analyses differ 
mainly in the second level comparisons that are described in the results section. 
The model included three regressors of interest for evaluation of identical two-
prize lotteries in three different path conditions. In each condition the lottery 
consisted of two of the three initial prizes: medium and high prize (relative gain); 
low and high prize (neutral); or low and medium prize (relative loss). The non-
matched trials were modeled with an additional regressor. Due to the matching of 
the lottery prize options in the evaluation phase across history conditions, the 
three history conditions differed in the EV of the initial three-prize lotteries 
(relative gain: relatively low first stage EV; neutral: average first stage EV; relative 
loss: relatively high first stage EV). To account for the possibility that the 
comparisons between history conditions could reflect a difference in the valuation 
of the first stage gambles, we included one parametric regressor that models the 
expected value of the three-prize lottery. In order to test reference independent 
valuation of the two-prize lottery in the evaluation phase, we also ran a second, 
otherwise identical model, where this three-prize expected value regressor was 
replaced by a two-prize expected value regressor (the two EV regressors could not 
be used within one model due to a high correlation, corr = 0.84). In addition, both 
models included regressors of no-interest for button presses and decision stages, 
and the realignment parameters were also included to model potential movement 
artifacts.  
The second level group analyses were performed with one-way ANOVA 
(three levels), and with one-sample T-tests for parametric modulation. To account 
for multiple comparisons, we used the family-wise error correction on the basis of 
random field theory (p<0.05). We report activation that reached significance either 
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on the voxel-level and/or on the cluster-level. In the cluster-level inferences the 
statistical maps were thresholded at Z > 3.1 (corresponding to p < 0.001 
uncorrected). In addition to a whole brain analysis, we also ran one region of 
interest (ROI) analysis where the search volume consisted of anatomically defined 
putamen, caudate, medial parts of bilateral superior frontal gyrus (incl. 
orbitofrontal cortex), and bilateral gyrus rectus (WFU PickAtlas). These areas were 
chosen a priori as they have been well-established as showing activity for reward-
related processes. For additional analysis between the activated regions, we 
extracted the mean data of the clusters with MarsBar (the Marseille region of 
interest toolbox for Statistical Parametric Mapping). 
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Chapter 6  
Conflict with Others Modulates Judgments 
through Basic Reinforcement Learning 
Mechanisms  
Abstract 
Not only our choices but also the current judgments are influenced 
by contextual factors. For instance, we often change our judgments to 
conform to normative group behavior. Here we show, using 
functional magnetic resonance imaging, that these changes in 
judgment are based on mechanisms that comply with principles of 
reinforcement learning. We found that individual judgments of facial 
attractiveness are adjusted in line with group opinion. Conflict with 
group opinion triggered a neuronal response in the rostral cingulate 
zone and the ventral striatum similar to the ‘prediction error’ signal 
suggested by neuroscientific models of reinforcement learning. The 
amplitude of the conflict-related signal predicted subsequent 
conforming changes in judgment. Furthermore, the individual 
amplitude of the conflict-related signal in the ventral striatum 
correlated with differences in conforming behavior across 
participants. These findings, together with results of control studies, 
provide evidence that the social environment influences our future 
judgments via learning mechanisms reflected in the activity of the 
rostral cingulate zone and ventral striatum.43 
6.1. Introduction 
Subjective values and attitudes that guide human behavior are not constant in 
time, but instead they are influenced by the surrounding environment. For 
instance, we adjust our behaviors and judgments by the perceived behavior of 
others, in particular by social norms (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). The persuasive 
                                                          
43 An adapted version of this chapter was published in Neuron by Klucharev, Hytönen, 
Rijpkema, Smidts, & Fernandez (2009). 
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power of the social environment also directs consumer behavior. For instance, it 
has been known already for a long time that the purchase choice of products and 
brands is influenced by reference group behaviors (Bearden & Etzel, 1982). Also 
more recent research indicates the role of normative group opinion in consumer 
behavior and how even simple information about the behavior of reference group 
members can be used as a tool to guide consumption choices. For instance in 
hotels, informing the guests that the other people who have previously stayed in 
the room reused their towels, increases the towel reuse rate significantly (from 
37.2% to 49.3%) in comparison to standard environmental motivators (Goldstein, 
Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008). People conform to group opinion even when it is 
financially harmful for them: when consumers learned that other people in their 
neighborhood used more energy than they did, they increased their own energy 
consumption (Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007). 
Consumers who learned that others used less energy indeed decreased their own 
energy use. Trespassing on the social norms and on the legitimate rules can also 
spread disorderly behavior to other related social norms. For instance, when 
people observe inappropriate behaviors like graffiti or parking bikes in prohibited 
areas, they are more likely to conduct disorderly behaviors, such as stealing or 
littering (Keizer, Lindenberg, & Steg, 2008). These examples indicate that very 
simple messages about the behavior of others can guide consumer choices in 
economically and environmentally profitable direction—or to the opposite 
unprofitable behaviors.   
Conformity refers to the act of changing one’s behavior and opinions to 
match the responses of others (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). The behavior and 
judgment of other people provides information on the normal and expected 
behavior in these circumstances and what is typically approved or disapproved. 
The effect of group opinion on individual judgments and decisions have been 
robustly replicated (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004) since Solomon Asch’s pioneering 
work on the line-judgment conformity experiments in which a third of the 
participants conformed to the erroneous majority opinion of the confederates, 
even when the majority claimed that two lines different in length by several inches 
were the same length (Asch, 1951). Conformity has been extensively studied in 
social psychology and three central motivations for conforming behavior are 
suggested: a desire to be accurate by properly interpreting reality and behaving 
correctly, to obtain social approval from others, and to maintain a favorable self-
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concept (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Whereas psychological studies emphasize 
the rewarding value of social approval or affiliation with others (Cialdini & 
Goldstein, 2004), behavioral economics focuses more on the effects of punishment 
for violation of the norm (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). In fact, both approaches may 
suggest that conforming changes in judgment are underlined by reinforcement 
learning, i.e. social norms selectively reinforce certain behaviors. Here we utilize 
the cognitive neuroscience approach (Phelps & LeDoux, 2005) to provide a useful 
framework for studying reinforcement learning mechanisms of conformity effects 
in judgment. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 outlines the theoretical 
background information on the principles of reinforcement learning and the 
corresponding neural correlates. Section 6.3 describes the experimental design and 
Section 6.4 presents the results of the conducted behavioral and fMRI experiments. 
The general discussion on the results is presented in Section 6.5. Appendix 6.C 
elaborates on the possibility of range effects and on the effects of stimulus 
properties in conformity. Since social studies have robustly demonstrated that 
social influence is most effective in an ambiguous situation (Cialdini & Goldstein, 
2004), we test how the categorization ambiguity related to the stimulus influences 
the tendency to change judgments.  
6.2. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
Recent neuroscientific and computational models assume that goal-directed 
behavior requires continuous performance monitoring (Montague, King-Casas, & 
Cohen, 2006). Successful behavioral patterns are reinforced while errors call for 
adjustments of behavior. Many reinforcement learning models include a 
‘prediction error’—a difference between the expected and obtained outcome 
(Schultz, 2006). Reward prediction error guides decision making by signaling the 
need for adjustment of behavior. Importantly, a conflict with social norms is not a 
usual behavioral error, i.e. it is not a typical behavioral mistake but rather any 
action that deviates from the behavior of the majority. Conformity with social 
norms requires neural signals related to deviations from it (Montague & Lohrenz, 
2007). Here we propose that a perceived deviation from group norms triggers a 
neural response that is similar to prediction error in reinforcement learning, 
indicating a need to change individuals’ future judgment in line with group 
norms.  
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Event-related brain potential and fMRI studies suggest that the rostral 
cingulate zone (RCZ; sometimes referred to as the ACC in the literature), has a 
specific role in reinforcement learning and generation of feedback- and error-
related responses (Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993). The RCZ is the 
region on the border of Brodman areas 6, 8, 24 and 32 (Picard & Strick, 1996). 
Cognitive neuroscience provides strong evidence to imply that activity of the 
RCZ, the region in the posterior medial frontal cortex, indicates the need for 
adjustments both when the action goal was not achieved and when the likelihood 
of failure is high (Cohen & Ranganath, 2007; di Pellegrino, Ciaramelli, & Ladavas, 
2007; Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuiss, 2004). The magnitude of 
the RCZ activity has also been shown to predict the strength of subsequent 
behavioral adjustments during simple choice decisions (Cohen & Ranganath, 2007; 
Kerns et al., 2004). The reinforcement learning theory of performance monitoring 
suggests that the RCZ activity is modulated by a midbrain dopaminergic signal 
which indicates whether an action outcome is worse or better than expected, 
regardless of the primary cause of the deviation from the prediction (Holroyd & 
Coles, 2002). The RCZ is not alone in monitoring behavioral outcomes. In fact, a 
growing body of research has identified a distributed neural network involved in 
this process which includes the ventral striatum, i.e. the nucleus accumbens44 
(NAc). Indeed, unpredictable reward modulates the activity of the human NAc 
(Berns, et al., 2001; McClure, Berns, & Montague, 2003; O'Doherty, 2004). The NAc 
has also been implicated in social learning (Rilling, et al., 2002). Overall, previous 
studies have demonstrated that the NAc is involved into gain prediction in 
response to reward cues (Knutson & Wimmer, 2007). Importantly, the cell bodies 
of the majority of dopamine neurons that show an actual prediction error signal 
are located in the midbrain (substantia nigra and ventral tegmental area; Schultz, 
2006). These midbrain neurons project heavily to the NAc and the RCZ. Thus, 
assuming that the BOLD signal may primarily reflect inputs (and local 
computation), it is possible that with human fMRI such a full prediction error 
signal would show up primarily in the NAc and the RCZ rather than in the 
midbrain where it originates. 
                                                          
44 NAc is a subpart of the ventral striatum. See also Chapter 2 for a general discussion on 
the role of striatum in valuation. 
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In line with our proposition that conformity is based on reinforcement 
learning, we form the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: A conflict with group opinion triggers a ’prediction 
error‘ response manifested in activity of the RCZ and the NAc.   
Hypothesis 2: When conflict occurs, RCZ and NAc activity predicts 
the subsequent adjustment of the behavior, i.e. social conformity.  
6.3. Experimental Setup for the Main Experiments 
To test our hypothesis, we designed a paradigm in which the participant’s initial 
judgments of facial attractiveness were open to influence by group opinion. Facial 
attractiveness is a highly important social characteristic (Langlois et al., 2000) and 
an everyday target of normative influence, for example by fashion magazines and 
cosmetics commercials. During fMRI female participants rated the attractiveness 
of female faces and after each rating they were informed of an ‘average European 
rating’ of the face—group rating (Experiment N1). Actual group ratings were 
systematically manipulated during the experiment. We assumed that group 
opinion (group ratings) signaled the normative opinion (a ‘descriptive norm’ 
representing typical behavior; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004) about the attractiveness 
of each individual face. Thus, with our procedure, we introduced a conflict 
between the participant’s own judgment and the normative group opinion. To 
identify subsequent conforming changes in judgment, participants rated the same 
set of faces again after the fMRI session. We also conducted an fMRI control 
experiment (Experiment N2) to examine the relevance of social environment by 
using a non-social version of the task in which group normative opinion was 
replaced with computer-generated ratings. Before reporting the fMRI results, we 
first present behavioral pilots on the design indicating the social nature of the task. 
6.3.1. Detailed Description of the Experiment 
Participants were informed that they were participating in a pan-European project 
“Seeing Beauty” to study human perception of attractiveness. They were told that 
the project team was conducting the same studies in France (Paris), Italy (Milan) 
and Netherlands (Nijmegen). The logos of European ‘collaborators’ (Milan School 
of Design, French Institute of Beauty, and Dutch Royal Academy of Art) were 
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included at the bottom of the written instructions. During the fMRI session45 
participants were exposed to a series of 222 photographs of female faces (stimuli 
duration=2 s, inter-trial interval (ITI)=3-5 s, see Figure 6-1). Participants were 
instructed to rate the face on an 8-point scale, ranging from very unattractive (1) to 
very attractive (8). Participants indicated their rating by pressing the appropriate 
button. Eight buttons were used, four for each hand. The participant’s rating 
(initial rating, green rectangle frame) was visualized on screen immediately after 
the face stimulus. Three to five seconds later, at the end of each trial, the 
participant was informed (by red rectangle frame) of the rating of the same face 
given by an ‘average European female participant from Milan and Paris’ (Group 
rating). The difference between the participant’s and the group rating was also 
indicated by a score shown above the scale (0, ±2 or ±3 points). Importantly, the 
frame and the number indicating the conflict with group opinion were present 
during both ‘conflict’ and ‘no-conflict’ trails. Actual group ratings were 
programmed using the following criteria: in 33% of trials, group ratings agreed 
with participant’s ratings, whereas in 67% of trials group ratings were pseudo-
randomly above or below participant’s rating by ±2 or ±3 points, i.e. using an 
adaptive algorithm that kept the overall ratio of ‘more negative’ or ‘more positive’ 
group ratings approximately equal during the experiment. Participants were told 
that group ratings which matched with their own rating to within ±1 points 
produced the frame of the group rating visually overlapping with the frame of the 
participant’s own rating. Participants were not informed about the real purpose of 
the experiment and the manipulation of the group ratings. All photographs were 
randomized across participants and conditions. Importantly, the sign of the 
difference between individual and group ratings does not play a role similar to 
positive and negative prediction error. In our experiment any difference between 
individual and group ratings (positive or negative) indicated a deviation of the 
individual opinion from the group norm irrespective of the sign, i.e. the prediction 
error was always negative. Otherwise, those trials where group gave a more 
positive attractiveness rating for the stimulus than the participant should be 
rewarding, whereas group’s more negative rating should be punishing. 
Thirty minutes after the fMRI session in an unexpected (unannounced) 
subsequent behavioral session participants were instructed to rate again—at their 
                                                          
45 fMRI scanning parameters are described in Appendix 6.A. 
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Figure 6-1. The task (fMRI session) evoking a conflict with group ratings 
followed by the behavioral session. The sequence of the events within a 
trial is shown. During the fMRI session (Experiment N1), participants 
rated the attractiveness of female faces and were subsequently presented 
with the group ratings that could be similar (no conflict with group 
ratings), below or above (as is shown in the figure) participants’ rating 
(conflict with group ratings). Thirty minutes after the fMRI session 
participants rated again the same faces during the Behavioral session in 
order to identify the subsequent conformity effects. The control 
experiment (Experiment N2) had the same trial structure, but a different 
cover story. 
own pace—the attractiveness of the same faces presented in a new randomized 
order without the normative ratings (subsequent rating, Figure 6-1). At the end of 
the experiment participants were questioned using the Self-Monitoring scale on 
interpersonal influence (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986). 
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Our set-up imitates social psychological studies investigating persuasion, 
where participants are informed of a dominant behavior in a group (Cialdini & 
Goldstein, 2004). Social psychology suggests two types of social norms which can 
influence judgment (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004): (1) injunctive norms have a moral 
tone and characterize what people should do, whereas (2) descriptive norms 
represent typical behavior or what most people actually do, regardless of its 
appropriateness. In the current study we investigated the descriptive social norms 
that send out the message, “If a lot of people are doing this, it’s probably a wise 
thing to do”. It is also important to note that in our study participants were not 
involved in a standard reinforcement task, i.e. they could not learn correct 
answers or a correct evaluation criteria because there was no correct answer, the 
normative feedback was pseudo-random.  
6.3.2. Stimuli 
A set of 222 digital photos of European females (aged 18–35 years, from free 
internet sources) were used as stimuli. Color portraits of moderately attractive 
(mean 4.2, SD=1.2 of the 8-point scale) females and moderate smile (rated 
AU6A/C+AU12B/C in accordance with the Facial Action Coding System (FACS) 
by a certified FACS coder; Ekman & Friesen, 1978) were selected from a set of 1000 
stimuli, all made with a highly similar photographic style and appearance. 
Attractiveness is a socially important facial feature (Langlois, et al., 2000); 
judgments of facial attractiveness are fast, effortless and consistent across 
participants (Willis & Todorov, 2006). Therefore, a mismatch of individual 
judgments of facial attractiveness with group opinion should create a strong 
normative conflict. Social standards of female facial attractiveness are also 
constantly influenced by social norms, e.g. via fashion magazines and cosmetics 
commercials. Previous studies showed that individuals adjust their judgments of 
attractiveness in various situations (Geiselman, Haight, & Kimata, 1984; Kenrick & 
Gutierres, 1980). Ratings of facial attractiveness are modulated by social 
environment (Jones, DeBruine, Little, Burriss, & Feinberg, 2007; Little, Burriss, 
Jones, DeBruine, & Caldwell, 2008) and thus it makes them an optimal and 
important model for studying social conformity. 
Only female portraits and female participants were selected. Cross-gender 
rating of attractiveness is related to mate selection that has very specific neural 
mechanisms (Cloutier, Heatherton, Whalen, & Kelley, 2008). In contrast, within-
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gender ratings of attractiveness can be generalized to other types of conforming 
behavior. One participant was excluded from the analysis due to reported 
homosexual orientation and motion artefacts. 
6.3.3. Participants  
A total of 46 young right-handed women participated in the social (Experiment 
N1) and non-social control (Experiment N2) neuroimaging experiments with two 
experimental sessions: an fMRI session and a behavioral session, separated by 
approximately 30 minutes. None of the participants reported a history of drug 
abuse, head trauma, neurological or psychiatric illness. Twenty-four healthy 
students (aged 19–27 years, mean 21.8 years) participated in the social version of 
the experiment (Experiment N1). Two participants were rejected from the study 
due to large head motions exceeding 3 mm, one participant was excluded due to 
her reported suspicion about the cover story of the experiment. Twenty-two 
healthy students (aged 19–29 years, mean 22.1 years) participated in the non-social 
control study (Experiment N2). The average age of participants was not 
significantly different from those in experiment N1 (t(1,20)=1.6, p=0.1). One 
participant was rejected from the study due to large head motions exceeding 3 
mm.  
6.4. Results 
6.4.1. Behavioral Pilot Test: Group Saliency and Conformity 
Before reporting the fMRI results, we present the data of a pilot behavioral 
experiment testing whether the paradigm described in Section 6.3.1 is truly social 
in nature. One might question whether the behavior and brain reaction in the 
design are indeed the result of social conformity instead of being simple error 
reactions. The participant could for instance interpret the group opinion on the 
screen as a ‘correct’ attractiveness rating. That is, participants could perceive the 
task so that the feedback rating on the screen is an objectively correct 
attractiveness rating that they should also be able to report themselves (similarly 
than people can learn to categorize animals to different species based on 
correcting feedback). Thus to test the social nature of the task, we first report a 
behavioral study to demonstrate the relevance of the social environment in our 
experimental task.  
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Figure 6-2. Behavioral control study: conformity effects (adjustments of 
ratings after a positive or negative conflict relative to no-conflict trials) 
for normative information coming from (1) peer group of fellow students 
attending the same session; (2) average European female; (3) computer 
script. See the text for the details of the statistical analyses.  
For this behavioral test we recruited 62 young female participants 
(age=19-26; mean=22.7; SD =3.2). The participants were divided into three groups. 
Each group received a different cover story. The feedback on the screen was told 
to be: (1) average rating of the peer group (fellow students from the same 
university, attending the same experimental session and present in the same lab 
room); (2) average rating of European females from Milan and Paris, as described 
in the main fMRI design; (3) output of a computer script. Participants performed 
the task in separate cubicles in the behavioral lab. All other aspects of the 
paradigm and experimental set-up were identical to the fMRI design (instructions, 
task design and analysis).  
In this data we find a significant interaction effect: social task (peer group, 
averaged European and computer) x conformity (MANOVA, F(2,61)=3.8, p=0.001) 
due to a stronger conformity in social conditions (see Figure 6-2). Moreover, we 
find a significant correlation between the conformity effects and the level of 
externally manipulated social relatedness (r=0.68, n=128, p=0.001). Overall, 
participants change their opinion more after a conflict with a social group than 
after a conflict with a computer. Thus, these results demonstrate the social nature 
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of the fMRI design using ‘average European ratings’. We also find weak conformal 
adjustments of judgments after a conflict with computer feedback. Previous social 
psychological studies reliably demonstrate that individuals mindlessly apply 
social rules and expectations to computers (see Nass & Moon, 2000 for a review): 
for example, individuals apply gender stereotypes, show politeness towards 
computers, demonstrate reciprocity to computers, show ingroup/outgroup effects 
and even ethnically identify with computer agents. Therefore, it is not surprising 
to find a weak behavioral adjustment to computer rating but, importantly, the 
effects are stronger with social feedback and become even stronger with higher 
social relatedness. 
6.4.2. Experiment N1: Behavioral Results  
In agreement with our expectations, participants change their ratings of 
attractiveness, aligning themselves with group ratings (Figure 6-3): On average, 
participants decrease their attractiveness ratings when group ratings have been 
more negative than their own initial rating, whereas more positive group ratings 
are associated with more positive re-evaluation of faces. Participants do not 
change their ratings significantly if group ratings match their initial ratings (no-
conflict trials). One-way ANOVA analysis (three-level factor of group ratings) 
reveals a significant main effect of the factor group ratings on changes in 
attractiveness ratings (F(2,20)=31.1 p=0.0001). Therefore, group opinion effectively 
modulates judgments of individuals even when the group is not physically 
present and so cannot directly affect participants46. The conformity effect was 
especially strong for highly ambiguous faces: for faces whose initial ratings varied 
most across participants (standard deviation  1.621, see Appendix 6.C and Figure 
6-12 for details). 
To establish an even closer relationship between group ratings and 
individual behavior, we perform a correlation analysis between the magnitude of 
the conflict (i.e., the difference value between participants’ own and group ratings 
during the fMRI session) and the subsequent change in the perceived facial 
attractiveness separately for each participant. We find a significant correlation 
among all participants (mean values: r=0.21, n=222, p=0.005, SD=0.06, min value: 
r=0.13, max value: r=0.33), except for one participant who shows a correlation that 
                                                          
46 See also Appendix 6.C for a discussion on the possibility that the results are driven by 
different scale use in the fMRI and behavioral sessions. 
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Figure 6-3. Mean behavioral conformity effects. On average the 
attractiveness ratings changed in line with the group ratings. The picture 
illustrates the change of the faces’ attractiveness measured during the 
behavioral session as compared to the initial ratings during the fMRI 
session. Bars indicate the standard error of the mean. 
just failed to reach statistical significance (r=0.126, p=0.07). The larger the conflict 
with group opinion, the more pronounced the conformity effect is, even at the 
level of individual participants. We later use the individual correlation coefficients 
as conformity scores (i.e., a measure of the individual tendency to conform, 
thereby distinguishing conformists from nonconformists), and correlate them with 
individual fMRI conformity effects. 
To test whether inter-individual differences in a trait measure of self-
monitoring are associated with experimental behavior as assessed by changes in 
attractiveness ratings, we conducted an additional correlation analysis. The self-
monitoring scale explains individual differences in the (self-)control of expressive 
behavior and refers to a person's ability to adjust his or her behavior to external 
situational factors (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986). High self-monitors are ‘social 
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chameleons’, adjusting their behavior to social situations. We did not find a 
significant correlation between the size of subsequent change in the perceived 
facial attractiveness (i.e. persuasive effect) and the self-monitoring index.  
Our study therefore reveals that conformity leads to the transmission of 
facial preferences from the group to the individual. Overall the behavioral results 
indicate that the manipulation of social normative influence is successful in 
inducing conformity effects in the judgment of facial attractiveness.  
6.4.3. Experiment N1: fMRI Results47 
To identify the neural activity related to ‘social (normative) conflict’ we first 
compare the brain responses in all trials in which the group rating differed from 
the participant’s rating (conflict trials) with all no-conflict trials. To model 
subsequent conformity effects in judgment we then calculate a contrast within 
conflict trials: conflicts with group ratings followed by conformity (i.e. where 
perceived facial attractiveness subsequently changes in line with group ratings) 
vs. conflicts with group ratings not followed by conformity (where perceived 
facial attractiveness does not change).  
Neural Correlates of Social Conflict (Hypothesis 1) 
To study brain activity associated with the perception of ‘social conflict’, we 
compare neural activity occurring during all trials in which the group rating 
conflicts with the participant’s rating with all trials in which the group rating does 
not conflict with the participant’s rating—the conflict contrast. As expected, the 
conflict with group opinion activates the RCZ (Figure 6-4). The location of the 
cluster maximum (x=-3, y=14, z=48) matches closely the results of a previous 
meta-analysis on error monitoring (x=1, y=15, z=43, for details see Ridderinkhof, 
et al., 2004). In addition, conflict trials activate more strongly than no-conflict trials 
(Table 6-1) the insular cortex, the precuneus, the cerebellar tonsil and the middle 
frontal gyrus, all areas known to be engaged in general error processing 
(Diedrichsen, Hashambhoy, Rane, & Shadmehr, 2005; Ridderinkhof, et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, the conflict deactivates (i.e., more activity for no-conflict than 
conflict trials) the ventral striatum (NAc) and the posterior cingulate cortex, brain 
areas that are known to be involved in reward processing and error detection 
                                                          
47 Details on the fMRI data analysis are described in Appendix 6.B. 
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Figure 6-4. Social conflict effects: neural response to group ratings in 
conflict vs. no-conflict trials. Left: z-maps of activations (A) and 
deactivations (B) induced by a conflict with group ratings. Right: the 
signal change of the hemodynamic response for conflict and no conflict 
trials.  RCZ – rostral cingulate zone; N.Ac. – nucleus accumbens; R – right 
hemisphere. All maps are thresholded at p<0.001, the clusters are 
significant at p<0.05 (FDR corrected). Bars indicate standard error of the 
mean. 
(McCoy & Platt, 2005; Schultz, 2006). Our results thus indicate that a mismatch 
with group opinion triggers a neural response in the RCZ and the NAc that is 
similar to prediction error signal.  
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Table 6-1. Significant activation clusters for social conflict contrast. 
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Figure 6-5. Midbrain activity: the effects of social conflict. Z-map of 
activations. The midbrain activations with three local maxima (x,y,z: 10, -
21, -14; -3, -15, -3 and 3, -27, -3). The map is thresholded at p<0.001. 
The posterior cingulate cortex has been implicated into the ‘default’ 
network (Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008)—a specific, anatomically 
defined brain system preferentially active when individuals are not focused on the 
external environment. The deactivation of the cingulate cortex in the current study 
could therefore indicate an additional cognitive demand triggered by the conflict 
with the group opinion. Interestingly, a recent study showed that the posterior 
cingulate cortex is affected by dopamine depletion (Nagano-Saito et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, animal studies have demonstrated that neurons of the posterior 
cingulate monitor the omission of expected reward, suggestive of a prediction 
error-like signal (see McCoy & Platt, 2005 for a review).  
Prediction error signals are intimately associated with dopamine neurons 
in the midbrain (Schultz, 2006). We therefore conduct an ROI analysis in the 
midbrain dopaminergic region covering the entire area, including substantia 
nigra, ventral tegmental area (VTA) and other structures. The spherical ROI has a 
radius of 15 mm and is centered at the coordinate -1, -18, -9 (x, y, z) (Aron et al., 
2004). We find significant clusters of activity in the midbrain triggered by conflict 
with the group opinion (see Figure 6-5) and no significant deactivations. The 
activity of the midbrain, the RCZ and the NAc could reflect a degree of the social 
conflict with normative group opinion or a degree of reward participants 
experienced when their ratings match the normative ratings in no-conflict trials.  
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Figure 6-6. Conformity effects: the social conflicts followed by the 
subsequent change of facial attractiveness in line with group ratings (i.e. 
conformity) vs. the normative conflicts that were not followed by changes 
in attractiveness ratings (i.e. no conformity). Left: z-maps of activations 
(A) and deactivations (B) predicting the conformity with group ratings. 
Right: the signal change of the hemodynamic response for trials followed 
by conformity and by no conformity. RCZ – rostral cingulate zone; N.Ac. 
– nucleus accumbens. All maps are thresholded at p<0.001. Bars indicate 
standard error of the mean.  
Conforming Adjustment in Judgment (Hypothesis 2) 
Given the fact that no-conflict trials are not followed by behavioral changes in 
judgment we focus our further analysis on conflict trials that triggered conformity. 
We hypothesize that the social conflict response in the RCZ and the NAc is 
predictive of changes in participants’ opinions on facial attractiveness. The 
activation of the RCZ and deactivation of the NAc should therefore be particularly 
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Table 6-2. Significant activations clusters for the social conformity 
contrast. 
strong during those conflict trials that effectively change participants’ judgments, 
i.e. are followed by conformity. To test this hypothesis we compare brain activity 
during those conflict trials that are followed by changes in perceived 
attractiveness of faces in line with group ratings with conflict trials where there 
are no such changes—the conformity contrast. Indeed, the activation of the RCZ 
region of interest predicts subsequent conformity: the activity in the RCZ elicited 
by the conflicts with group opinion that are followed by conformity is stronger 
than that elicited by conflicts that are not followed by conformity (Figure 6-6A). 
Furthermore, the deactivation of the NAc region of interest during the perceived 
conflict with group opinion also predicts conformity (Figure 6-6B). In addition, we 
conduct a whole-brain analysis of conformity effects and find that the conformity-
related suppression of activity in the NAc is significant, even without small 
volume correction. In the global search we find that conformity is also predicted 
by a deactivation of extrastriate visual cortex (BA 18,19) and parahippocampal 
cortices (Figure 6-6B, Table 6-2). We also check conformity effects in the fusiform 
gyrus, a region implicated in face and attractiveness processing (Iaria, Fox, Waite, 
Aharon, & Barton, 2008). We do not find statistically significant effects in the 
selected ROIs (for fusiform gyrus: spheres of radius 10 mm, x, y, z: 34,-54,-21 and -
32,-42,-25, based on a previous study by Iaria, et al., 2008). These null-findings 
might indicate that observed conformity effects are not triggered by an immediate 
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Figure 6-7. Results of the conjunction analysis of social conflict and 
conformity effects. Both the conflict with group ratings and the 
subsequent conformity activated RCZ (left part of the figure: local 
maxima at x=6, y=16, z=46) and deactivated the NAc (right part of the 
figure: local maxima at x=6, y=6, z=-2). Maps are thresholded at p<0.001, 
clusters are significant at p<0.05 (FDR corrected).  
perceptive re-evaluation of facial attractiveness. ROI analysis of conformity effects 
in the midbrain also do not reveal effects reaching the level of statistical 
significance. Thus, the midbrain shows a nonspecific conflict-related signal in 
contrast to the neural signal at the RCZ and the NAc that is predictive of 
conformity effects. 
To control the specificity of conformity effects in the RCZ and the NAc for 
conformal changes in judgment we conduct an additional analysis by calculating 
subsequent ‘anti-conformity’ effects—contrasting conflict trials followed by 
changes against the group vs. conflict trials followed by unchanged ratings. 
However, we do not find any significant effect (thresholded at p<0.001), even 
using an ROI analysis centered in the RCZ and the NAc. Furthermore, a direct 
contrast of conflict trials followed by changes in line with the group vs. conflict 
trials followed by changes against the group show significant activation of the 
RCZ (x, y, z: 8,5,40) and deactivation of the NAc (x, y, z: 1,4,-5) ROIs. These results 
indicate that observed conformity effects are specific for conformal adjustments in 
judgment and not related generally to changes in behavior. 
To support more directly the hypothesis that adjustment in judgment in 
social environment are indeed triggered by social conflict-related neural activity in 
the RCZ and the NAc, we conduct a conjunction analysis (testing the conjunction 
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null hypothesis, see Nichols, Brett, Andersson, Wager, & Poline, 2005, for details), 
aiming to identify those brain regions that are activated in both the conflict and the 
conformity contrast. The conjunction analysis reveals the activation of the RCZ and 
the deactivation of the NAc in both contrasts (Figure 6-7). Thus the very same 
brain regions in the medial prefrontal cortex and the ventral striatum are sensitive 
for social conflict and predict conformity with group opinion.  
To link individual performance differences to individual differences in 
brain activity we compare neural responses of conformists (i.e., people conforming 
easily to group opinion) with nonconformists (see Section 6.4.2 for details). We 
split participants in two groups using a median split on conformity scores: 
conformists (mean r=0.26, n=11) and nonconformists (mean r=0.16, n=10). We 
hypothesize that individual differences in levels of conformity are based on 
variability in response to social conflict, e.g. conformists generally show a greater 
degree of conflict-related activity than nonconformists, and for that reason the 
conflict-signal of the conformists reaches more easily the hypothetical threshold 
that triggers conformity. The current view on the functional role of the neural 
prediction error signal seems to suggest a threshold for error-related activity 
(Schultz, 2006; similar to perceptual and motor decision-making models, e.g. 
Schall, Stuphorn, & Brown, 2002 that triggers the adjustment of future behavior). 
Only an activity that crosses such a threshold evokes a change of behavior.  
This mechanism of conformity predicts that (1) the neural conflict-related 
signal is stronger in conformists than nonconformists and (2) the difference in 
conflict-related signal in trials that are and are not followed by conformity 
(conformity effects) has to be weaker in conformists due to a higher chance of any 
conflict-related response crossing the hypothetical threshold, assuming that the 
threshold is similar across participants. Figure 6-8A shows that the conflict-related 
response in the NAc is stronger for conformists than for nonconformists 
(prediction 1). This observation is supported by a MANOVA (conformists/ 
nonconformists as a between-subject factor, subsequent conformity as a within-
subjects factor): we find a significant effect of the conformists/nonconformists factor 
(F(1,20)=19.9, p=0.0003). Furthermore, the neural conformity effect is weaker for 
conformists than for nonconformists (prediction 2). We find a significant 
interaction between conformists/nonconformists and conformity factors (F(1,20)=6.1, 
p=0.023), due to the smaller difference in the conflict-related signal in trials that 
are  and  are  not  followed  by  conformity  for  conformists  in  comparison  to 
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Figure 6-8. Nucleus accumbens (NAc) recruitment during a conflict with 
group opinion predicts individual differences in conformity. A, 
Conformists (participants easily conforming to group ratings) showed 
the stronger conflict-related deactivation of the nucleus accumbens. Error 
bars indicate standard error of the mean. Grey rectangular area indicates 
a putative threshold of conformity. B, Significant correlation of the neural 
conformity effect with the individual level of conformity. Due to a higher 
probability of any conflict to trigger conformity, conformists showed a 
smaller difference (conformity effect) between neural responses to the 
conflicts with group ratings followed by conformity and those that were 
not followed by conformity. 
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Table 6-3. Significant activations clusters for the non-social control study.  
nonconformists (see Figure 6-8A). Moreover, Figure 6-8B illustrates the significant 
negative correlation of the neural conformity effect (conformity contrast) with the 
individual level of conformity (r=-0.5, n=21, p=0.021). The NAc has been 
previously linked to individual differences (Cohen, 2007; Schonberg, Daw, Joel, & 
O'Doherty, 2007; Tobler, Fletcher, et al., 2007) in reinforcement learning and thus 
could also mediate individual differences in conforming behavior.  
6.4.4. Experiment N2: Assessment of the Social Relevance of the Results  
Even though the data reported in Section 6.4.1 indicates that behaviorally the task 
is sensitive to the social relatedness of the reference group, the brain reactions 
might still reflect standard error reactions without a social dimension. To assess 
the social relevance of our fMRI findings, we employ a non-social version of the 
experimental paradigm in which the normative group ratings are replaced with 
computer ratings—a method commonly used in social cognitive neuroscience (e.g. 
Spitzer, Fischbacher, Herrnberger, Gron, & Fehr, 2007; Zink et al., 2008). All other 
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Figure 6-9. Comparison of social and non-social (control) fMRI studies. A, 
Conflict x social task interaction. White circles indicate RCZ (local 
maxima at x=3, y=16, z=43) and NAc (local maxima at x=12, y=16, z=-2). 
B, Conformity x social task interaction. White circles indicate RCZ (local 
maxima at x=10, y=22, z=43) and NAc (local maxima at x=8, y=6, z=-3). 
The maps are thresholded at p<0.001. 
aspects of the paradigm and experimental set-up are identical to the original fMRI 
design (task design and analysis).  
The primary analysis of the control experiment shows that the mismatch 
with the computer activated the right insula, precuneus and precentral gyrus, in a 
similar way to the conflict with social group opinion (Table 6-3). We find conflict-
related effects in the RCZ (x, y, z: 3,12,44) and the NAc (x, y, z: 18,14,-6 and -10,12,-
7 ), only using a looser statistical threshold for the SPM analysis (p<0.006). In 
statistical comparisons of data from both the original and control fMRI experiment 
we find an interaction between the conflict factor (within group factor: conflict vs. 
non conflict) and the social task factor (between group factor: social vs. computer 
feedback) at the RCZ, NAc and midbrain region (see Table 6-4 and Figure 6-9A). 
Thus, the activity of the RCZ, NAc and midbrain is significantly more strongly 
affected by a conflict with social group opinion than by a conflict with a computer. 
The conflict-related effects are thus strongly attenuated in the non-social 
experiment. 
To explore further these results we study the conformity x social task 
(between-group: social vs. computer feedback) interaction. We find a significant 
conformity x social task interaction in the RCZ and the NAc (see Table 6-4 and 
Figure 6-9B). Our results indicate that conformity-related neural effects in the RCZ 
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Table 6-4. Comparison of social (Experiment N1) and non-social (control 
Experiment N2) experiments.   
and the NAc are particularly strong for the social version of the task. Overall, the 
behavioral and fMRI results confirm that the observed effects in the RCZ and the 
NAc (sites receiving substantial dopamine inputs) are related to social conformity 
and are modulated by social factors.  
Next, we study the main effect of congruent behavioral adjustments in the 
control study by comparing neural responses for all conflict trials that are 
followed either by congruent behavioral changes (i.e. facial attractiveness 
subsequently changed in accordance with the computer rating) or by no 
behavioral changes (facial attractiveness ratings not changed). We find activation 
predicting adjustments in accordance with computer ratings (RCZ; x, y, z: 1,4,49 
and NAc; x, y, z: 8,3,-7 and -10,8,-5) only with a decreased threshold (p<0.003). 
Thus, the reinforcement mechanisms in both experiments are rather similar but 
the effects are strongly modulated by the social context. By and large, social 
descriptive norms of facial attractiveness are stronger and more effective 
reinforcers than computer-generated ‘norms’.  
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Figure 6-10. Behavioral conformity effects (adjustments of ratings after a 
positive or negative conflict relative to no-conflict trials) for normative 
information coming from average European female (N1) or computer 
script (N2). 
In addition to distinct neural results, the social and non-social conditions 
are also dissociable behaviorally (see Figure 6-10). Overall, participants change 
their opinion more after a conflict with a social group than after a conflict with a 
computer (MANOVA, F(3,38)=5.5, p=0.004), both when group opinion is more 
negative and more positive than participants’ opinion (t(1,20)=2.23, p=0.03 and 
t(1,20)=2.46, p=0.01). To establish an even closer relationship between computer 
ratings and individual behavior, we performed a correlation analysis between the 
magnitude of the conflict and the subsequent change in the perceived facial 
attractiveness separately for each participant. We find a weak correlation (mean 
values: r=0.15, n=222, p=0.05, SD=0.02, min value: r=-0.01, max value: r=0.28). 
Importantly, 12 out of 21 participants do not show a significant correlation. 
Moreover, the correlation is significantly weaker in the computer condition than 
in the social one (t(1,20)=3.8, p=0.001). Thus the results demonstrate the social 
nature of the experimental paradigm. 
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Overall, the results of all studies support the hypothesis that social 
conformity is based on neural mechanisms similar to those implemented in 
reinforcement learning. A conflict with social normative opinion triggers a 
conflict-related response at the RCZ and the NAc that is similar to prediction error 
in reinforcement learning; if the conflict-related signal exceeds a ‘learning’ 
threshold then social conformity is triggered. Furthermore, the NAc activity 
shows a correlation with individual levels of conformity that indicates a close link 
of observed neural effects with actual behavior. The observed effects were 
particularly strong in the social context. 
6.5. Discussion  
6.5.1. Behavioral Results 
We found a robust behavioral effect of group opinion on perceived facial 
attractiveness. A conflict with a normative opinion triggered a long-term 
conforming adjustment of participants’ own rating. This result is in line with a 
recent study that demonstrated the social influence of others on an individual's 
face preferences (Jones, et al., 2007). Furthermore, our results could explain the 
finding that there is considerably greater agreement in attractiveness ratings 
between individuals who share a close relationship (Bronstad & Russell, 2007): the 
ratings are homogenized within groups due to the strong conformity that is 
known to exist within social groups.  
One might argue that the present behavioral findings are driven by 
intentional behavioral strategies aiming to match the judgments of others. During 
the debriefing participants did not report any specific strategy such as a matching 
strategy (an attempt to predict group ratings). It is also important to note that 
during the fMRI session participants could not learn correct answers or a correct 
evaluation criterion48 because the normative feedback was pseudo-random. 
Furthermore, a matching strategy cannot explain why participants subsequently 
changed their own opinion about facial attractiveness in a systematic way. A 
matching strategy during the fMRI session should lead to random (nonsystematic) 
subsequent changes of participants’ initial ratings due to the pseudo-random 
algorithm of normative rating generation in our study. In contrast, our results 
                                                          
48 For instance, learn to pay attention on particular facial features that are associated with a 
high or low score. 
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indicate systematic adjustments of participants’ opinion between the fMRI and the 
subsequent behavioral sessions. Finally, ratings during the first and second 
session were highly correlated (r=0.73, SD=0.06), clearly indicating that responses 
were not simply random predictions of normative scores.  
A demand effect in the current study is also highly unlikely. The 
instructions stressed that the study focused on participants’ own opinion. All 
participants were debriefed after the experiment. Only one participant reported 
any suspicion about the cover story and was excluded from the study. The large 
number of stimuli (n=222) and a long break between sessions ensured that ratings 
during the second session were indicative of participants’ own opinion, because 
contamination by explicit memory is extremely unlikely. Overall, a demand effect 
would suggest that during the two hours of the experiment, a participant 
remembered 222 faces with their associated ratings and the conflict with group 
opinion. Taking into account that the participants were not forewarned of the 
second session, we can conclude that a simple demand effect cannot be entirely 
excluded but is nevertheless highly unlikely. 
6.5.2. Neural Correlates of Conflict and Conformity 
Social norms prescribe behaviors that a member of a group can enact, and norms 
are thought to exist "if any departure of real behavior from the norm is followed 
by some punishment" (Homans, 1950). Indeed, social norms reward or punish 
people (Bendor & Swistak, 2001) and can be seen as positive or negative 
reinforcers for socially appropriate or inappropriate behaviors. In other words, a 
conflict with social norms indicates an error that is similar to a reinforcement 
learning signal calling for an adjustment of the behavior. In the present study, we 
examine neural activity during a conflict with group opinion to test the hypothesis 
that the reinforcement learning signal guides conforming changes in judgments in 
a social environment. Our results are consistent with the reinforcement learning 
hypothesis of social conformity.  
We find that a conflict with group opinion activates the RCZ and 
deactivates the NAc, both of which are known to be involved in the computation 
of the prediction error. Human neuroimaging studies consistently implicate the 
RCZ in monitoring response conflicts and errors and in differential processing of 
unfavorable outcomes such as monetary losses, abstract performance feedback, 
primary negative reinforcers (see Ridderinkhof, et al., 2004 for an extensive 
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review). Overall, the RCZ is engaged when the need for adjustments of the 
behavior becomes evident. It has been shown that the RCZ is activated by an 
unfair offer in an ultimatum game (Sanfey, et al., 2003), by social exclusion 
(Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003) and by the incorrect prediction of 
social rejection (or acceptance) by others (Somerville, Heatherton, & Kelley, 2006). 
Furthermore, RCZ has been found to predict attitude change in times when prior 
attitudes conflict with own actions (‘cognitive dissonance’; Izuma et al., 2010; van 
Veen, Krug, Schooler, & Carter, 2009).  RCZ activity is also modulated by the 
moral character of the partner in the trust game (Delgado, Frank, & Phelps, 2005) 
and by moral judgments (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004). 
Furthermore, a recent study by (Pochon, Riis, Sanfey, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008) 
indicates a role of the RCZ in situations of choice difficulty: greater RCZ activation 
is found when participants choose between alternatives of similar desirability 
(indicating a high decision conflict) than when they make easier (low decision 
conflict) decisions. Our findings suggest a new interpretation of the role for the 
RCZ in social cognition: the RCZ is monitoring the incongruence of our judgments 
with social descriptive norms that are normally negatively reinforced by social 
rejection, exclusion, and moral or even physical punishment.  
Activity of the NAc represents the value of the expected reward (Knutson, 
et al., 2005; Knutson & Wimmer, 2007) and thus decreases for aversive stimuli 
(Besson & Louilot, 1995; Singer et al., 2006). In line with the previously reported 
inhibitory response to aversive stimuli, we find that the NAc activity during a 
conflict with group opinion is deactivated relative to a no-conflict situation. We 
investigate the social relevance of conflict-related effects in the RCZ and the NAc 
using a non-social control experiment. These effects are modulated by the social 
context, suggesting a social nature of the conflict. By and large, our findings 
indicate that the NAc, together with the RCZ, participates in the generation of the 
neural response indicating a conflicting judgment with group descriptive norms.  
Recent learning theories have revealed the role of error monitoring in 
subsequent performance adjustments: errors indicate a need for behavioral 
changes (Schultz, 2006). Even though the present experimental paradigm with 
random feedback prohibits us from analyzing the data with the formal 
reinforcement learning model, the present study shows that the amplitude of the 
conflict-related responses in the RCZ and the NAc predicts the subsequent 
conforming change in judgment in line with learning theories. We demonstrate 
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that the conflict-related activity in RCZ in the trials that are followed by 
conformity is stronger than in trials that are not followed by conformity. The 
pattern is reversed in the NAc. Our finding indicates that when the conflict-related 
signals are strong enough, the performance is adjusted and participants conform 
to the group normative opinion. These results establish a link between conflicts 
with descriptive norms and conformity. In addition, conjunction analysis reveals 
the clear spatial overlap of the neural activity underlying the conflict-related 
signal and conformity. Importantly, the effects predicting behavioral changes are 
strongest for the social version of the experiment. In accordance with our 
hypothesis, the conflict and conformity effects found may be enhanced by social 
situations rather than representing a specific social mechanism. 
A previous study demonstrated that the magnitude of feedback-related 
negativity (FRN), whose neural generators are located in the RCZ (Herrmann, 
Rommler, Ehlis, Heidrich, & Fallgatter, 2004), predicted whether participants 
would change decision behavior on the subsequent trial of a simple computer 
strategic game (Cohen & Ranganath, 2007). Other studies have linked the 
magnitude of FRN to overall learning or decision making (Frank, Woroch, & 
Curran, 2005; Yeung & Sanfey, 2004) and to changes in reaction time on the 
subsequent trial (Gehring, et al., 1993). Cingulate lesions in monkeys impair their 
ability to use previous reinforcements to guide decision-making behavior 
(Kennerley, Walton, Behrens, Buckley, & Rushworth, 2006). The role of the RCZ in 
behavioral adjustment is also consistent with the ‘conflict-monitoring hypothesis’ 
(Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, Carter, & Cohen, 1999). This hypothesis suggests that 
the cingulate cortex is activated by the occurrence of response conflict during the 
so-called Stroop or Simon tasks. The monitoring of response conflict by the RCZ 
serves as a signal that aims to minimize the amount of conflict on subsequent 
performance. Indeed, the RCZ activity during response-conflict tasks predicted 
the adjustment of behavior (Kerns, et al., 2004). Importantly, in our study the 
behavioral task does not evoke a response conflict, because the participants 
responded before the conflicting group ratings were presented. Therefore, in the 
present study the RCZ activity does not indicate a response conflict but a neural 
signal similar to prediction error calculated as a perceived difference of own 
judgments from group opinion.  
Our results extend the functional role of the NAc to social learning 
underlying conformity. We find that deactivation of the NAc during conflict with 
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group opinion robustly predicts subsequent conformity and correlates with 
individual differences in conforming behavior. The NAc is often viewed as an 
integrator of memory, motivation and goal-directed behaviors (Carelli, 2002). 
Thus, the individual variability of conformity could also be based on individual 
differences in the amplitude of the NAc conflict-related responses evoked by 
conflict with group opinion. The error signal at the ventral striatum, of which the 
NAc is part, has been previously correlated with individual differences (e.g. 
Tobler, Fletcher, et al., 2007). A recent study reported that individual behavioral 
differences predicted the variability of the prediction error activity, particularly in 
the ventral striatum (Cohen, 2007). We find that conformists demonstrate stronger 
deactivation of the NAc during conflict with group opinion, indicating a stronger 
prediction error. We also find that differences in conflict-related responses in trials 
that are and are not followed by conformity (conformity effects) are weaker in 
conformists, indicating a higher probability of conformity after any social conflict. 
Previous studies demonstrated that the social context modulated the activity of 
the NAc, for example, the perceived fairness of a person seen in pain affected the 
activity of the ventral striatum (Singer, et al., 2006), the opinion of others 
modulated the future valuation of objects in the striatum (Campbell-Meiklejohn, 
Bach, Roepstorff, Dolan, & Frith, 2010), and social comparison modulated the 
activity of the ventral striatum during the processing of rewards (Fliessbach, et al., 
2007). We suggest that the social comparison of the obtained reward could also be 
based on a prediction error mechanism that is similar to that reported in the 
current study.  
Our findings expand the knowledge of the neuronal mechanisms of social 
norms. Previous studies probing the neural mechanism of conformity or social 
norms have focused on the differences in neural responses to normative feedback 
delivered by a social group versus a computer (Berns et al., 2005), on the 
pathology of norms (King-Casas et al., 2008) and on a modulation of neural 
activity related to decision making by the possibility of punishment for violation 
of the norm (Spitzer, et al., 2007). These studies uncovered the effects of the 
normative context (a prior group opinion Berns, et al., 2005, or the possibility of 
punishment Spitzer, et al., 2007) on decision making but did not investigate 
closely the mechanism predicting conforming adjustments in judgment on trial-
by-trial basis. The current study has for the first time revealed that the same 
regions are activated when there is a conflict with group opinion and predict 
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subsequent adjustments of judgments. Our result provides evidence that 
behavioral conformity to descriptive group norms is triggered by the social 
conflict monitoring mechanism that is similar to the reinforcement learning signal 
(Holroyd & Coles, 2002). It is important to note here that there can be different 
mechanisms underlying conformity (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Informational 
conformity (in contrast to normative conformity) serves an informational function 
in helping to be accurate, especially if normative information is provided before 
the actual decision (e.g. study Berns, et al., 2005). From a neuroscience perspective, 
informational conformity assumes an attention-related neural mechanism, i.e. an 
activation of sensory cortices by normative information. In contrast, we find that 
neural activity predicting conformity to group norm is similar to a reinforcing 
learning signal. Therefore, conforming adjusted in judgment investigated in the 
current study are most probably normative and based on reinforcing social 
approval. In other words, group opinion works as a reinforcer for the individual’s 
judgments. Both reward for being aligned with the group and aversion to being 
non-aligned may have acted as reinforcers.  Further studies will help to generalize 
the observed mechanisms to the male population and other social situations 
(including injunctive or moral norms) leading to conformity. 
6.5.3. Conclusion 
The present study shows that group opinion affects our judgments of facial 
attractiveness, which play a critical role in human social interaction (see Langlois, 
et al., 2000 for a review). Our results support the view in social psychology and 
economics that conformity is based on reinforcing social feedback, and we go on 
to propose a neural mechanism of conformity that agrees with the concept of 
reinforcement learning from animal learning theory. The fMRI results suggest that 
social conformity is based on mechanisms that comply with reinforcement 
learning. This process starts when a deviation from group opinion is detected by 
neural activity in the paracingulate region and in the ventral striatum. These 
regions then produce a neural signal similar to the prediction error signal in 
reinforcement learning that indicates a need for social conformity: a strong 
conflict-related signal in the RCZ and the NAc triggers adjustment of judgments 
in line with group opinion. In fact, a follow-up TMS experiment indicates that the 
relation between activity in the RCZ and behavioral conformity is causal by nature 
(Klucharev, et al., 2011). Both the NAc and the RCZ receive midbrain 
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dopaminergic innervations (Schultz, 2006). Moreover, animal studies robustly 
demonstrated that prediction error signal is dopamine-mediated (Schultz, 2006). 
Our results suggest that a phasic change in presumably dopamine-related activity 
occurs when individual judgments differ from normative group opinion. 
Dopamine-dependent synaptic plasticity is thus a potential cellular mechanism for 
long-term conforming adjustments of judgments (Schultz, 2006). Since the present 
results suggest that social conformity is underlined by such fundamental learning 
principles, for marketing purposes one can rely on conformity and expect a 
behavioral effect that lasts over long periods of time. Overall, our results suggest 
that social conformity is underlined by the neural error-monitoring activity which 
signals probably the most fundamental social mistake—that of being ‘too 
different’ from others. 
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Appendix 6.A. MRI Data Acquisition  
Functional MRI was performed with ascending slice acquisition, using a T2*-
weighted echo-planar imaging sequence (Sonata 1.5 T, Siemens, Munich; 33 axial 
slices; volume repetition time (TR), 2.28 s; echo time (TE), 35 ms; 90° flip angle; 
slice matrix, 64 x 64; slice thickness, 3.5 mm; slice gap, 0.5 mm; field of view, 224 
mm). For structural MRI, we acquired a T1- weighted MP-RAGE sequence (176 
sagittal slices; volume TR, 2.25 s; TE, 3.93 ms; 15° flip angle; slice matrix, 256x256; 
slice thickness, 1.0 mm; no gap; field of view, 256 mm). 
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Appendix 6.B. fMRI Data Analysis  
Image analysis was performed with SPM5 (Wellcome Department of Imaging 
Neuroscience, London, UK). The first three EPI volumes were discarded to allow 
for T1 equilibration, and the remaining images were realigned to the first volume. 
Images were then corrected for differences in slice acquisition time, spatially 
normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) T1 template, resampled 
into 3x3x3 mm3 voxels, and spatially smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm 
full-width at half-maximum. Data were high-pass filtered (cut-off at 1/128 Hz).  
Statistical analysis was performed within the framework of the general 
linear model (Friston, et al., 1995). Conflict and no-conflict trials were modeled 
separately, as were no-conflict trials (mean number of trials 73, SD=0.8), conflict 
trials (mean number of trials 148, SD=1.5), conflict trials followed by conformity 
(as tested during the behavioral session, mean number of trials 61, SD=7.8), 
conflict trials that were not followed by conformity (mean number of trials 52, 
SD=8.7). The regressors were convolved with the canonical hemodynamic 
response function of SPM5. In addition, the realignment parameters were 
included to model potential movement artifacts. In a whole-brain analysis, 
statistical tests were family-wise error rate corrected for multiple comparisons 
across the entire brain. For the regions of interest, a small volume correction was 
used for the analysis of the conformity effects to correct for multiple comparisons 
across the search volume. For the RCZ and the NAc the search volumes were 
defined as a sphere with 10 mm radius around the center (x=4, y=15, z=43 and 
x=±11, y=11, z=-2, respectively) based on the results of a previous study (Knutson, 
et al., 2005) and meta-analysis (Ridderinkhof, et al., 2004).  
The individual contrasts were submitted to group-level random effects 
analysis. The main effect of social conflict was estimated by contrasting the group 
ratings in conflict and no-conflict trials. The main effect of conformity was 
investigated by comparing neural responses for all conflicting group ratings 
followed by conformity (i.e. facial attractiveness subsequently changed in 
accordance with the group rating) and all conflicting group ratings that were not 
followed by conformity (facial attractiveness not changed). In addition, a 
conjunction analysis was performed to confirm the regional overlap between the 
main effects of social conflict and conformity by testing the conjunction null 
hypothesis using the minimum T-statistic as implemented within SPM5 (Nichols, 
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et al., 2005). To assess the relationship between neural activity and individual level 
of conformity across participants, individual contrast estimates within the RCZ 
and the NAc local maxima were extracted and entered in correlation analyses (2-
tailed).  
Image preprocessing and data analysis of Experiment N2 was identical to 
that of Experiment N1. Differences of neural responses in Experiments N1 and N2 
were investigated by two-sample t-test.  
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Appendix 6.C. Range Effect and Stimulus Properties in 
Conformity  
The Use of Attractiveness Scale in the Consecutive fMRI and Behavioral 
Sessions 
Given the fact that group ratings were often ‘more extreme’ than participants´ 
initial ratings, one may argue that the behavioral effect of conformity is simply 
caused by an increase in variance of the scale used, i.e. variation in ratings of faces 
is greater in the subsequent behavioral session than in the initial fMRI session. 
Similarly, the behavioral effect could also be due to a decrease in variance of the 
scale used if decision-makers initially (during the fMRI scanning) have a tendency 
to use the extreme ratings more and then learn to use middle range ratings by the 
subsequent behavioral session. To exclude this simple ‘range’ effect, we compare 
variances of ratings for the first (fMRI) session and the second (behavioral) 
session. We calculated the percentage of extreme ratings (ratings 1, 2, 7 and 8) as 
an index of extreme responding. In contrast to the alternative range effect 
hypothesis, Figure 6-11 demonstrates that participants with a central tendency 
(with a low percentage of extreme ratings) show a smaller variance in the second 
session, whereas participants with higher portion of extreme ratings do not have 
this tendency. We also split participants in two groups by a median split on 
percentage of extreme ratings: participants with the low score (= 0.297) show a 
significant decrease of variance across sessions (t(1,23)=2.3, p=0.04); participants 
with a high score did not show any significant difference (t(1,23)=0.1,p=0.34). We 
did not therefore find any support for the alternative range hypothesis. 
Effect of Stimulus Ambiguity on Conforming Changes in Judgment 
Social studies have robustly demonstrated that social influence is most effective in 
an ambiguous situation (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Therefore, the conformity 
effects should be especially strong for highly ambiguous faces, i.e. for faces whose 
initial ratings vary a lot across participants. We thus have the following 
expectation: 
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Figure 6-11. Overall distribution of ratings’ variance (Experiment N1) for 
the first (fMRI) session (black) and the second (behavioral) session (grey) 
as a function of a behavioral tendency. Lines represent trend-lines for 
each session. 
Hypothesis 3: The size of the conformity effect (the absolute change 
in attractiveness judgments due to a conflict with social norms) is 
lower for non-ambiguous faces than for highly ambiguous faces. 
To determine the ambiguity level of each face stimulus, we analyze the variability 
(standard deviation—SD) of ratings during the fMRI session for each face across 
all participants: in our sample the SD varies within the range 0.72-1.83. Faces with 
the lowest (SD = 1.042, n=26) and with the highest SD (SD = 1.621, n=26) are 
selected for further analysis as non-ambiguous and ambiguous faces, respectively. 
The hypothesis 3 is supported by the results of a 2-way ANOVA (two-level factor 
of ambiguity and three-level factor of group ratings): the interaction ambiguity x 
group ratings is significant (F (2,21)=4.87, p=0.018). A planned comparison shows 
the size of the conformity effect to be greater for highly ambiguous faces than for 
non-ambiguous ones (t(1,23)=1.71, p=0.003; see Figure 6-12). This finding thus 
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Figure 6-12. Persuasive behavioral effects for highly ambiguous and non-
ambiguous stimuli as a function of conflict. In the ‘no conflict’ condition 
participants and groups responses are similar. In the other two 
conditions group’s ratings are more positive (negative) than the 
participant’s ratings.  
indicates that when there is a high consensus on the initial judgments of a 
particular stimulus, possibly indicating less ambiguous face stimuli and stronger 
confidence in the judgment, the participants are not as prone in adjusting their 
judgment based on social environment.    
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Chapter 7  
General Discussion 
This dissertation has introduced the current stage of neuroeconomics literature on 
valuation and choice and utilized fMRI methodology to investigate the biological 
mechanisms that underlie contextual effects in valuation, judgment and choice. 
Section 7.1 summarizes the main insights of the dissertation, giving most weight 
to the experimental work. Section 7.2 discusses the advantages and limitations of 
the methodological choice. The following two sections highlight the contributions 
of this dissertation to literature and practice respectively, and in Section 7.5 the 
dissertation concludes with prospects for future research.  
7.1. Summary of the Main Findings 
The first part of the dissertation provided an introductory overview of 
neuroeconomic studies and methods. In particular, Chapter 2 discussed the role of 
brain’s valuation network in encoding multiple dimensions of risky decision 
making: outcome magnitude, probability and even the combined expected value 
are all represented in the valuation network. Also multiple nonlinearities in 
valuation, such as reference dependence and loss aversion, are present in the brain 
signal. We also discussed the role of higher cognitive mechanisms (affect and 
deliberation) in behavioral framing effects. After introducing these basic findings 
on valuation and choice, Chapter 3 introduced fMRI which is a common method 
in neuroeconomics and also used in the experiments reported in the dissertation. 
The next two sub-sections summarize the main findings of the fMRI experiments.  
7.1.1. Path Dependence in Risky Choice 
Prior behavioral research indicates that decision-makers show increased risk 
appetite both when they gamble with previously won money (house money 
effect) and when they have a chance to win back a prior loss (break-even effect). 
Previously these effects have been explained by insufficient updating of a 
reference point: after a positive outcome, the reference point is low, decreasing the 
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influence of loss aversion in future choices, whereas after a negative outcome the 
reference point is high, leading to a risk-seeking attitude which is predominate in 
a loss domain. In Chapter 4 we proposed and tested another explanation: the 
changes in appetite for risk after gains and losses may be driven by increasing 
affective processing and by decreasing deliberation. We recorded the brain 
activities of decision-makers while they made choices in a novel sequential risky-
choice task. Importantly, we found that house money and break-even effects 
persist even in a single within-subject experiment. The brain imaging findings 
clearly distinguish two networks that promote path dependence: in line with our 
expectations, increased affective processing and decreased deliberation during 
gains and losses are generally related to the future tendency to select risky 
prospects. Moreover, the strength of activation in these brain networks explains 
the strength of behavioral effects in individual participants. Interestingly, the fMRI 
data suggests different time dynamics for affective and deliberative processes for 
gain and loss outcomes: while both increasing affect and decreasing deliberation 
were observed in gain and loss trials during feedback information (outcome 
phase), in the decision making phase that followed we observed increased affect 
only after losses and decreased deliberation only after gains. Overall, the results 
support the role of affect and deliberation in path dependence of risky choice.    
In Chapter 5 we tested whether risky prospects are evaluated in absolute 
terms or in a history-dependent fashion. In our novel paradigm, we were able to 
compare identical risky prospects with different historical background while 
accounting for a high variability in the absolute expected value of individual 
gambles. Results from the study confirm the hypothesis that risky prospects are 
valued in a path-dependent manner in a dynamically changing environment: both 
the bilateral striatum and the medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC) value risky 
prospects relative to their prior states as opposed to their absolute values. The 
mOFC was found to be particularly sensitive to relative gains whereas the 
striatum differentiated both relative gains and losses from neural states. These 
findings provide strong support for the role of the striatum and the mOFC in 
reference to dependent valuation of risky prospects. 
7.1.2. Social Feedback Modulates Future Judgments  
In Chapter 6 we studied how the social environment modifies judgments. In 
detail, we tested how participants’ initial judgments of facial attractiveness were 
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influenced by group opinion. We found that the perceived difference of individual 
ratings from group ratings triggers long-term conforming behavioral adjustments 
in judgment, i.e. participants change their attractiveness ratings to align them with 
group ratings. As we expected, a conflict with group opinion activates RCZ and 
deactivates the NAc, which implies that conflict with normative group opinion 
triggers neuronal signals similar to the prediction error signal of reinforcement 
learning. Subsequent conformity in judgment is predicted by larger conflict-
related responses. Conjunction analysis revealed a spatial overlap between the 
conflict-related activity and activity which predicts subsequent conformity. 
Furthermore, the individual strength of the conformity-related activity in the 
ventral striatum correlates with differences in conforming behavior across 
participants. Finally, we conducted behavioral and fMRI control experiments (a 
pilot behavioral experiment and Experiment N2) to examine the relevance of the 
social environment for our results. In these experiments we used a modified social 
version and/or a non-social version of the task by replacing group normative 
opinion with other social feedback (behavioral pilot) or computer-generated 
ratings (behavioral pilot and Experiment N2). We found that conforming behavior 
and related effects in the RCZ and the NAc are particularly strong in the social 
condition, and that social relatedness is correlated with the degree of conformity 
in the task. Overall, this data provides novel evidence that social conformity 
effects in judgment are based on basic and automatic brain mechanisms similar to 
reinforcement learning: a conflict with group opinion triggers a prediction error 
signal, indicating a need for adjustment of judgments.    
7.2. Methodological Considerations: Limitations and 
Advantages 
7.2.1. Inverse Inference Fallacy and Lack of Causality 
Ideally, using neuroscientific methods could enhance decision theory by 
providing process-level information on the calculations that lead to observed 
behavior, thus giving better possibilities to understand and forecast decision 
behavior in experimental and real life circumstances. The status of neuroimaging 
technologies and the current level of knowledge on the functioning of the human 
brain set some restrictions on reaching this goal. Here we discuss some prominent 
problems in the context of this dissertation work, one that is created by the level of 
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knowledge on brain function and the others are specific for fMRI. The first 
problem is the inverse inference fallacy, i.e. the problem of inferring mental states 
from observed brain activation sites.  Second, we discuss some typical features of 
fMRI data set: the lack of causality and absolute measure of brain activation49. 
In the studies reported in this dissertation we have attempted to 
circumvent, or at least minimize, the problem of inverse inference by basing our 
interpretations on larger networks of brain regions that are simultaneously 
activated in tasks instead of relying on an interpretation that is based only on one 
activated brain region. In the risk experiment we used knowledge of 
interconnected brain networks that are known to have at least some level of 
specificity to affective salience and executive control processes (Seeley, et al., 
2007). In Chapter 5 we tested a hypothesis on path-dependent valuation of risky 
prospects. We found differential activation in two distinct reward-sensitive brain 
regions when comparing identical prospects with different historical paths. 
Similarly, when studying the effects of social feedback on judgment, we based our 
interpretations on the simultaneous effects in the RCZ and the NAc (striatum), 
both of which have previously been reported to reflect prediction error signals in 
reinforcement learning (Gehring, et al., 1993; Hare, et al., 2008). However, the 
discussion on the exact role of brain regions in affective salience, executive control, 
valuation, and learning processes is still continuing. For instance, Craig (2009) 
argues that parts of the salience network are related to the feeling of awareness, 
instead of indicating the presence of affective content.  
Due to the correlative nature of fMRI research, most of the findings 
reported in this dissertation lack causality between brain and behavior, and 
instead indicate correlation between events and brain activation. However, some 
of the findings do implicate causality in the sense that brain activations which 
occurred in an earlier time point explained later behaviors. For instance in Chapter 
4, the affective and deliberative brain networks that activate for gain and loss 
experiences also correlated with subsequent choices, so that high affective 
activation indicates future risky choices and high control network activation 
correlates with subsequent safe choices. Similarly, in Chapter 6, error-related brain 
regions, which reacted to conflicts in judgment with the group opinion, also 
showed stronger responses in those conflict trials where decision-makers 
                                                          
49 See also Section 3.3.1 for further elaboration on the limitations of fMRI. 
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subsequently conformed to the group opinion than where they did not. This 
‘predictive power’ of fMRI signals for subsequent behaviors implies the possibility 
of a causal relation between the brain processes and behavioral patterns. 
Additionally, fMRI research gives a good basis for further experimentation on the 
causal link between brain and behavior. As an example, the implied causality 
from RCZ to behavioral social conformity has been later confirmed with TMS 
(Klucharev, et al., 2011).  
In addition to the lack of causality, fMRI does not provide an absolute 
measure of brain activity. The relative nature of the signal leaves room for 
interpretation: the same statistical results can be found when the activity level of a 
brain region increases in some conditions or when it decreases in opposing 
conditions. For instance, in the risk experiment (Chapter 4), the difference in the 
executive control activity between gain (loss) and neutral conditions can be 
interpreted as increased use of the executive control network during neutral 
outcomes or as reduced use of the network during gain (loss) experiences.  
7.2.2. What Does Neuroimaging Provide Beyond Behavioral Studies?  
Based on the present studies and other research in neuroeconomics, we argue that 
using neuroscientific tools can contribute to the process-level understanding of 
human decision making, which may facilitate future research on the topic. For 
instance, the results of the risk study in Chapter 4 suggest the role of affective and 
deliberative systems in path dependence of risky choice, and provide information 
on the timing and the behavioral influence of these two processes. Specifically, the 
results indicate that, after negative events, emotional arousal activity continues 
during the subsequent choice whereas after a positive event the next choice is 
accompanied by decreased levels of activation in the executive control regions of 
the brain. One could thus hypothesize that controlling for affective reactions 
during decision making is especially important after negative events in order to 
prevent excessive risk taking whereas after positive events decision-makers might 
resist the increasing appetite for risk by deliberating carefully on the choice 
situation. Thus, even though the neuroimaging findings do not necessarily 
provide conclusive evidence of the underlying psychological processes, fMRI does 
provide a direct, objective measure of the reactions to the task and gives insightful 
exploratory perspectives on choice behavior which can inspire future research. 
Naturally it may be possible to attain similar information on decision-making 
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processes also by behavioral means, for instance by manipulating either the 
affective network or the deliberative network in multiple time points of the 
decision-making task. Without a clear hypothesis, however, this type of behavioral 
approach might require extensive effort due to the large number of possible 
influencing variables.    
7.3. Contribution to Literature 
Due to the interdisciplinary nature of neuroeconomics and neuromarketing, this 
dissertation aimed to contribute to multiple lines of literature: scientific 
contributions to economic and consumer decision making as well as to 
neuroscience were of importance. One of the basic principles when planning the 
research was to design fMRI experiments with the potential to provide high 
quality data and insightful results which shed light on both the functioning of the 
brain and the biological underpinnings of risky choice behavior and social 
conformity. The rest of this section discusses the contributions of each part of the 
dissertation in turn.  
Chapter 2 explored the existing literature on neuroeconomics, giving a 
neuroscience perspective on preference formation and dual process models in 
decision making. The main contribution of this work was to summarize the 
biological mechanisms underlying choice behavior and indicate how different 
processes relate to behavioral deviations from utility maximization. In detail, the 
chapter indicated how some behavioral deviations, such as reference dependence 
of valuation and nonlinear probability weighting, are reflected in the brain’s 
valuation network whereas other phenomena, such as framing effects, are more 
driven by the balance between emotion and deliberation. The chapter concludes 
with a speculation on how different deviations could be reduced. Since valuation 
is related to reasonably automatic neurotransmitter mechanisms it is argued that 
deliberately suppressing valuation-driven deviations in behavior is more 
challenging than suppressing deviations driven by emotion.  
Considering that consumers make their choices as a part of ongoing 
sequence of experiences, it is relevant to understand what kind of dependencies 
there are between past experiences and current choices. This dissertation 
addressed path dependency in risky choice from two different perspectives. First, 
the findings of Chapter 4 contribute to the theoretical basis of path dependence in 
risky choice by indicating the role of affect and deliberation in respectively 
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enhancing and decreasing the risk appetite after gains and losses. Previously path 
dependence has been accounted for by assuming insufficient updating of a 
reference point, but our findings suggest that higher-level affective and cognitive 
functions may also play a role. Interestingly, the data also indicates that these 
affective and deliberative reactions correlate with the individual strength of the 
behavioral effects. This finding suggests that variability in the behavioral path-
dependency might be related to differential functioning of emotional and 
executive control mechanisms between decision-makers. This study contributes to 
the neuroscientific literature on risky choice by paying special attention to the 
effects of prior outcomes and events on the current performance. Often 
neuroscientific studies concentrate more on individual choices, ignoring possible 
carry-over effects in trial sequences (see, for example, Chapter 2 for a review of 
some of the neuroeconomics studies). Second, Chapter 5 expanded knowledge on 
reference-dependent valuation. Previously it has been shown that outcomes are 
valued in respect to the other possible outcomes. Here we show that risky 
prospects are also valued relative to the previously available risky prospects. This 
history-dependence in valuation may also bias the evaluation of decision 
problems in sequential choice situations. 
Chapter 6 of the dissertation presented fMRI data on social conformity. 
The experimental paradigm captured the neural mechanisms underlying 
compliance to descriptive social norms. The results support the hypothesis 
suggested in social psychology and economics that conforming adjustments in 
judgment are based on the reinforcing nature of social feedback. The findings 
indicate that the very same basic neural mechanisms that indicate erroneous 
responses in simple tasks are activated when decision-makers’ judgment differs 
from a group opinion, and that these basic ‘error’ reactions guide future 
judgments towards the group opinion. Furthermore, behavioral conformists and 
non-conformists differ in the strength of their ‘error’ reactions, explaining 
individual sensitivity to group pressure. These findings contribute to the 
theoretical understanding of social conformity and extend the neuroscience 
literature on error detection to social conflicts where there are no absolute ‘correct’ 
and ‘incorrect’ answers. 
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7.4. Managerial Relevance 
Reconsider the scenario of consumer who enters a casino with a group of friends 
without any intention of investing money on gambling. As discussed in the 
introduction, the consumer’s attitude towards playing might be adjusted in 
response to her social surroundings, and once she begins playing the win and loss 
history can affect her subsequent risk appetite. The behavior of consumers in such 
environments has significant financial and societal consequences. First, gambling 
is a large-scale business with substantial revenues. For instance, in the 
Netherlands the revenues of the state-owned lottery, Staatsloterij, were 889.7 
million Euros in 2009 (Staatsloterij, 2009) and those of Holland Casino were 595.6 
million Euros (De Nationale Stichting tot Exploitatie van Casinospelen, 2009). 
Second, gambling is a public health issue, raising health, social and economic 
problems in a community (Korn & Shaffer, 1999). On a personal level, gambling 
behavior can become compulsive and develop into a pathological gambling 
disorder. Compulsive gambling can have serious adverse effects on personal and 
family life and finances, similar to other compulsive consumption behaviors such 
as compulsive buying (Korn & Shaffer, 1999; Oguinn & Faber, 1989).  
This dissertation addressed the mechanisms that influence path 
dependence in risk-taking behavior and how social environment influences our 
judgments. The dissertation adopted an exploratory approach by studying the 
brain networks that are activated during choices and judgments. In general, the 
findings suggest that increasing risk appetite after gains and losses is driven by 
increasing emotional arousal and decreasing deliberation. The addictive nature of 
gambling might be decreased by providing services that prohibit consumers from 
overspending. Such services could be based on activities that help consumers to 
‘cool down’ emotionally after they have lost significant amounts of money or 
mechanisms that remind consumers to consider their actions carefully after they 
have made large gains. These types of policies would be in line the fMRI findings 
from Chapter 4 which imply a role for emotion regulation in preventing excessive 
risk-taking in future choices particularly after earlier losses. The results also 
suggest that after gain experiences decision-makers should pay special attention to 
deliberation. In fact, helping consumers to cope with their emotional arousal 
might even increase consumer satisfaction and the likelihood that the customer 
will revisit the site after a pleasant experience. Previous behavioral research 
General Discussion 141 
 
indicates that when decision-makers reduce their emotional arousal after losses, 
they continue gambling at their previously planned level of risk and avoid the 
excessive gambling that otherwise occurs after losses, and such ‘cooling-down’ 
services after losses have successfully been provided for consumers at casinos 
(Andrade & Iyer, 2009). In addition to such interventions, consumers might also 
benefit from training on emotion-regulation skills: therapeutic tools for improving 
emotion regulation have been successfully used with patient groups suffering 
from emotion regulation deficits and as a preventive tool for people who 
experience high emotional strain on a daily basis (Berking, Meier, & Wupperman, 
2010; Shearin & Linehan, 1994). 
In Chapter 6 we report that social environment influences our judgments 
through similar neural ‘error responses’ to those that induce learning in simple 
trial-and-error tasks. An important detail in the findings is that the judgments did 
not only change short term in the presence of other people, but instead the social 
context altered the subjective attractiveness ratings over a longer time period, 
indicating a change in opinion beyond temporary social gratification. Since the 
results indicate that the conforming adjustments to group opinion are driven by 
quite basic learning mechanisms, social conformity might be difficult to control 
intentionally. It is even possible that people are not always aware of these 
adjustments in their judgment. Such automatic mechanisms can have a very 
strong effect in guiding consumer behavior. Indeed, descriptive social norms have 
been found to be more effective in adjusting behavior than, for instance, 
environmental or financial motivators (Goldstein, et al., 2008; Schultz, et al., 2007). 
This indicates the strength of social norms in adjusting behavioral patterns of 
consumers and the potential for using social norms in social marketing. If social 
marketing campaigns can successfully create a perception that the majority of the 
salient others enjoy healthy food, support environmental values by recycling, quit 
smoking or protect themselves against direct sunlight, this could lead to reduced 
obesity and pollution of the environment and it could also decrease the number of 
lung and skin cancer patients. When designing such social marketing campaigns, 
one should also bear in mind the possibility of ‘boomerang effects’. If the 
consumers realize that they are being persuaded, this can reverse the intended 
effects, bringing about the opposite behaviors: people act against the promoted 
behavioral patterns to demonstrate their freedom of choice. The strength of social 
norms in adjusting consumer behavior might also create a challenge: all real-
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world examples influence consumer behavior as well. Promoting healthy diets 
with the slogan “everyone loves healthy food!” next to a fast food restaurant 
might belie the campaign message.   
7.5. Prospects for Future Research 
This dissertation investigated path dependence and environmental effects in 
valuation, judgment, and choice by using fMRI, a modern neuroscientific method. 
The experiments suggest that context dependence can be driven by multiple 
mechanisms: for instance affect, deliberation, and basic learning mechanisms. In 
particular, the results suggest that increasing affect and decreasing deliberation 
drive increases in risk appetite after prior gain and loss experiences, that prospects 
are valued in a path-dependent manner, and that conforming judgments in line 
with group opinion are driven by basic learning mechanisms. Future research is 
needed to study the neuronal underpinnings of other important factors that 
influence sequential consumer choices. An example of such factor is goal 
fulfillment and how prior experiences might influence goal target levels. 
Previously it has been shown that prior positive experiences increase consumers’ 
goal target levels which motivate increasing risk appetite (Novemsky & Dhar, 
2005), but there is limited information on what type of processes could drive these 
changes in target levels.   
Another interesting line for future research is to test behaviorally the 
hypotheses that can be derived from the process-level information described in 
this dissertation and from neuroeconomics literature in general. For instance, one 
could test whether consumers remain at their normal level of attitude to risk if 
they are instructed to pay special attention to deliberation during decision making 
after prior positive experiences, and whether this instruction would have similar 
effects on decision making after negative experiences. Taking that further, one 
could use the process-level knowledge provided by these fMRI experiments as 
one information source for further development of behavioral models. This 
theoretical work could provide more accurate forecasts of behavior in novel 
settings and also give useful rules of thumb for understanding behavior in real-life 
circumstances. In general, combining information from behavioral and 
neuroscience research could provide interesting insights and avenues for future 
research and practical applications. 
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So far, the neuroeconomic research program has provided valuable 
information on the brain processes involved in valuation and choice but the direct 
practical implications, which could not be gained without neuroimaging, are less 
clear. Increasing understanding of these basic processes and technological 
advances in neuroimaging provide a fruitful set of tools for higher-level 
applications, but more consideration is still needed to find the proper tools and 
questions for which neuroimaging can provide unique information. For instance, 
new approaches to neuroscientific data, such as multi-voxel pattern analysis, may 
increase the sensitivity of fMRI research and improve the quality of 
neuromarketing research. In the field of marketing one potential avenue which 
remains largely unexplored in neuroscientific terms is early product design 
(Ariely & Berns, 2010). In addition to the related studies described in the 
introduction (Chua, et al., 2011; Falk, et al., 2011; Knutson, et al., 2007; Tusche, et 
al., 2010), some recent findings suggest that neuroimaging tools might be useful in 
predicting a product’s future success prior to commercial breakthrough: listening 
to songs by unsigned or independent artists evokes brain activity that correlates 
with the realized sales of the coming three years (Berns & Moore, 2011). In 
conclusion, brain imaging can provide predictions of future success, indicating the 
great potential of these tools for market research.  
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Summary 
This dissertation investigates economic behavior in risky and social settings with 
neuroscientific tools. The recent expansion of knowledge in human brain function 
has created unprecedented prospects for studying human behavior directly at its 
source—the brain. These new possibilities have also motivated the development 
of consumer neuroscience and neuromarketing by providing insights on the 
relevant brain processes that drive consumer decision making. The research 
reported in this dissertation utilizes modern functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) technology that is currently one of the most popular methods in 
cognitive neuroscience.  
The first part of the dissertation gives a theoretical and methodological 
introduction to neuroeconomics and fMRI. The chapter discusses relevant 
background literature on valuation and risk, as well as on the influence of emotion 
and cognitive deliberation in decision making. The literature review indicates that 
the valuation (reward) network, including the striatum and the orbitofrontal 
cortex, encodes multiple dimensions of risky prospects, i.e. the outcome 
magnitude, probability and expected value. The striatum also accounts for 
nonlinearities in valuation: both reference dependence and loss aversion are 
reflected in the striatum activity. In respect to the role of higher cognitive 
mechanisms (affect and deliberation) in decision making, the prior research 
findings suggest that affect, as reflected in the amygdala activity, is related to 
strong framing effects whereas cognitive conflict related activity in the anterior 
cingulate cortex reflects resistance to context effects. Overall the literature review 
indicates the relevance of valuation mechanisms and higher cognitive functions in 
decision making.   
The second part of the dissertation investigates risk behavior in sequential 
choice situations. Prior research indicates that decision-makers may increase their 
risk appetite after gains and losses. Here we show that this increase in risk 
appetite is driven by affective brain reactions and by insufficient use of cognitive 
control mechanisms. In detail we found that gain and loss experiences induce 
activity in an affective brain network consisting of insula and affective parts of 
anterior cingulate cortex, and that this activity predicts future risky choices. 
Simultaneously, activity in a cognitive control network, especially in the lateral 
parietal cortices, decreases and predicts future risk avoidance. During the 
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subsequent choice after an outcome revelation, we found brain evidence for an 
increased level of affective processing only after loss experiences whereas after 
gain experiences we found decreased level of cognitive control activity. Overall, 
these results contribute to the literature by indicating the role of affect and 
deliberation in path dependency. On a practical level these results suggest that 
decision-makers might be able to reduce path dependence in risky choice by 
‘cooling down’ after negative experiences before committing to a new choice. In 
contrast, after positive events the decision-makers should deliberate on new 
choices carefully to avoid careless risk taking. Policies that help consumers in 
achieving these goals may lead to more consistent choice behavior and long-term 
satisfaction. In the context of the sequential choice task, the dissertation also 
discusses reference dependence in valuation. Prior literature indicates that 
decision-makers value outcomes relatively to the other possible outcomes instead 
of in an absolute manner. Here we show that the striatum values also risky 
lotteries in a reference dependent manner, suggesting that risky choice problems 
are evaluated in the brain in a path-dependent manner.  
The third part of the dissertation discusses social conformity, i.e. the 
tendency of adjusting one’s opinion in line with the observed group opinion. We 
found that disagreement with others activates learning mechanisms and induces 
an ‘error reaction’ in the participant’s brain. In detail, a conflict with the group 
evoked responses in two brain regions which have previously been related to 
conflict detection and error processing: we found increased activity level in the 
rostral cingulate zone, an area which is sometimes also labeled as the anterior 
cingulate cortex, and decreased activity in the nucleus accumbens (ventral 
striatum). The stronger these learning signals are the more likely participants 
change their own judgment to conform to the group opinion. Overall, these results 
indicate that the brain mechanisms of social conformity comply with the 
fundamental and automatic brain processes of reinforcement learning. These 
findings support the effectiveness of social marketing campaigns that make use of 
social norms (descriptive norms). Public’s attitude towards promoted behavioral 
patterns may change through basic learning mechanisms on a long term basis 
when people perceive the promoted behaviors to be common among their peers. 
In the final chapter we conclude that regardless of the current challenges 
that neuroscientific research methods encounter when studying high level 
cognitive functions such as decision making, neuroimaging has its place in the 
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palette of research tools in economics and marketing. When the neuroimaging 
tools are used for appropriate research questions, the directness of the measure 
and its exploratory power can provide great advantage in respect to other 
available research methods.    
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Nederlandse samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt economisch keuzegedrag in risicovolle en sociale 
situaties met behulp van methoden uit de neurowetenschappen. De huidige groei 
van kennis over het brein heeft geleid tot de ontwikkeling van 'neuroeconomics' 
en 'neuromarketing', onderzoeksgebieden waarin de neurale processen worden 
onderzocht die van belang zijn bij consumentenbeslissingen. Dit proefschrift 
maakt gebruik van een populaire onderzoeksmethode in de cognitieve 
neurowetenschappen, 'functional magnetic resonance imaging' (fMRI). 
Het eerste deel van het proefschrift bestaat uit een inleiding over de 
theoretische en methodologische achtergrond van 'neuroeconomics' en fMRI. Dit 
deel introduceert de relevantie van emoties, hogere cognitieve functies en 
zogenaamde waarderingsmechanismen bij besluitvorming.  
Het tweede deel van het proefschrift onderzoekt risicogedrag in situaties 
waarin deelnemers sequentiële keuzes maken. Uitkomsten van een 
risicobeslissing blijken grote gevolgen te hebben voor de daaropvolgende keuze. 
Mensen blijken meer risico’s te nemen zowel na een grote winst als na een groot 
verlies in vergelijking met een gemiddelde uitkomst. Onze resultaten laten zien 
dat deze neiging tot het nemen van risico’s na winst en verlies wordt gedreven 
door de ervaring van emoties in het brein in combinatie met een onvoldoende 
gebruik van systemen die een rol spelen bij cognitieve controle. De resultaten 
suggereren dat emoties en zorgvuldige rationele overwegingen een rol spelen bij 
padsafhankelijkheid ('path dependency'). In hetzelfde experiment vinden we ook 
dat het brein risicovolle keuzeproblemen waardeert op een padsafhankelijke, 
relatieve manier. Het beloningssysteem in het brein kijkt bij het beoordelen van 
risicovolle keuzes (loterijen) ook naar de voorgaande situatie. Oftewel, de 
waardering van een loterij is relatief: een loterij wordt positief gewaardeerd als in 
de voorgaande situatie minder goede loterijen aanwezig waren en dezelfde loterij 
wordt negatief gewaardeerd als in de eerdere situatie betere loterijen aanwezig 
waren .   
Het derde deel van het proefschrift gaat over de neiging om je mening aan 
te passen aan die van de groep (de neiging tot conformisme). Dit werd onderzocht 
door proefpersonen gezichten te laten beoordelen op aantrekkelijkheid en ze 
vervolgens het oordeel van hun ‘peer’ groep te laten zien over datzelfde gezicht. 
Wij vonden dat wanneer iemands mening verschilt met die van de groep er in het 
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brein een zogenaamd foutsignaal wordt gegenereerd. De sterkte van het 
foutsignaal bepaalde de mate van aanpassing van het oordeel in de richting van 
de groepsmening. De resultaten suggereren dat de neurale processen die een rol 
spelen bij sociale aanpassing dezelfde zijn als de fundamentele processen die van 
belang zijn bij het leren door middel van beloning en straf. Deze bevinding 
ondersteunt het gebruik van sociale normen in sociale marketing campagnes.  
Het laatste hoofdstuk concludeert dat ‘neuroimaging’ een toegevoegde 
waarde heeft binnen de verschillende onderzoeksmethoden die gebruikt worden 
in economie en marketing. Vergeleken met andere methodes levert de 
neurowetenschappelijke methode een directe en exploratieve manier om de 
processen te meten die een rol spelen bij besluitvorming. 
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Tiivistelmä suomeksi (Summary in Finnish) 
Tämä väitöskirja tutkii taloudellista käyttäytymistä sekä riskipitoisissa että 
sosiaalista kanssakäymistä sisältävissä tilanteissa aivokuvantamisen avulla. Viime 
aikoina lisääntynyt tieto ihmisaivojen toiminnasta on luonut pohjaa kuluttajien 
päätöksentekoprosessien tutkimiseen aivokuvantamismenetelmillä  neurotalous-
tieteen ja neuromarkkinoinnin aloilla. Tämä väitöskirja tutkii päätöksenteko-
prosesseja toiminnallisella magneettikuvauksella, joka on tällä hetkellä yksi 
suosituimmista aivokuvantamismenetelmistä.  
Väitöskirjan ensimmäinen osa käsittelee neurotaloustieteen teoriaa ja 
menetelmiä. Erityisesti tässä osassa keskitytään korkeiden kognitiivisten 
toimintojen ja tunteiden rooliin päätöksenteossa sekä arvottamiseen liittyviin 
aivomekanismeihin.    
Väitöskirjan toinen osa tutkii riskikäyttäytymistä toistuvissa päätöksen-
tekotilanteissa. Aikaisempien kokeiden perusteella tiedetään, että koehenkilöt 
ottavat enemmän riskejä sekä voittojen että tappioiden jälkeen. Tuloksiemme 
perusteella nämä muutokset riskikäyttäytymisessä voivat johtua aivojen tunne-
reaktioista sekä vähenevästä kognitiivisesta harkinnasta. Tulokset viittaavat 
siihen, että tunnereaktiot ja rationaalinen harkinta ovat merkittäviä tekiöitä 
peräkkäisten päätösten välisiin riippuvuuksiin eli polkusidonnaisuuteen (‘path 
dependency’). Mittausaineisto osoittaa myös että aivot arvottavat riskipitoisia 
tilanteita polkusidonnaisesti: riskitilanteet arvotetaan suhteessa aikaisempiin 
riskivaihtoehtoihin.      
Väitöskirjan kolmas osa käsittelee laumakäyttäytymistä, eli miten ihmiset 
muuttavat mielipidettään ryhmän mielipiteen mukaiseksi. Tuloksemme 
osoittavat, että ryhmän mielipiteestä eroaminen herättää aivoissa oppimiseen 
liittyvän virheestä ilmoittavan reaktion. Tämä löydös viittaa siihen, että 
laumakäyttäytymistä ohjaavat samat aivojen oppimismekanismit, jotka liittyvät 
myös hyödyn ja haitan kokemisen kautta tapahtuvaan vahvistusoppimiseen. 
Ihmiset siis oppivat melko automaattisesti käyttäytymään samoin kuin kaikki 
muutkin käyttäytyvät. 
 Väitöskirjan viimeinen kappale pohtii aivokuvantamismenetelmien roolia 
taloudellisen päätöksenteon tutkimuksessa. Verrattuna muihin saatavilla oleviin 
menetelmiin aivokuvantaminen tarjoaa suoran ja eksploratiivisen mitan ihmisten 
päätöksentekoprosesseihin.   
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l)CONTEXT EFFECTS IN VALUATION, JUDGMENT AND CHOICE 
A NEUROSCIENTIFIC APPROACH
It is well known that our choices and judgments depend on the context. For instance,
prior experiences can influence subsequent decisions. People tend to make riskier decisions
if they have a chance to win back a previous loss or if they can gamble with previously
won money. Another example of context is social environment. People often change their
judgments to conform to observed group behavior. Since the reasons driving such context
effects are less clear, this dissertation explores the mechanisms behind behavioral patterns
with the help of a modern neuroscience technique, functional magnetic resonance imaging.
The dissertation concentrates particularly on choice and judgment in risky and in social
settings. It consists of three parts. The first part provides a primer on the methodology of
neuroeconomics and a synthesis of the body of knowledge on the brain mechanisms of
valuation and choice. The second part investigates risk behavior in sequential choice situa -
tions. The findings suggest that decision makers tend to take excessive risk after both
wins and losses, due to increasing affective arousal and decreasing control. The third part
of this dissertation focuses on the influence of social context on judgment. Results
indicate that people automatically learn to behave as others do—being different from
others is processed in the brain in a similar way to behavioral errors. This indicates the
great power of relevant social groups in influencing our behavior. Overall, this dissertation
highlights the reasons behind context dependency and demonstrates the power of modern
neuroscientific methods for understanding economic behavior.
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